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Abstract 
Bank Costs, Structure, Performance and Regulation: 
Evidence from the UK, 1981-1995 
By Loukia Ch. Evripidou 
Given the changes in the structure of the banking industry in the last two decades, the 
current study attempts to assess their impact on the costs and profits of UK banking 
industry, by use of a new data set covering the period 1981-1995. By utilising 
different methodologies we provide an insight into the robustness of the findings 
regarding different methodological specifications. 
First, we identify economic and market trends, as well as regulatory alterations that 
might have stimulated the changes in the UK banking industry over the 1980s and the 
1990s in the context of modem banking theory. Second, we assess scale economies 
and cost complementarities by estimating a cost function for UK banks. The findings 
indicate the existence of decreasing returns to scale and the lack of cost 
complementarities at the beginning of the data period. Also, following deregulation 
during the 1990s there is evidence of economies of scope in joint production. Third, 
by estimating an efficient frontier and by measuring the average differences between 
observed banks and banks at the frontier, we find evidence that X-inefficiencies 
account for 20 to 30% UK banking costs. Fourth, we test the relationship between 
market structure and profits. The evidence supports the structure conduct performance 
hypothesis and its `quiet life' addendum. Finally, we investigate whether deregulation 
altered the costs, profits, and the efficiency of banking institutions. Evidence suggests 
that after deregulation there is increase in both bank costs and profits. 
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Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
The main motivation for the current study emerges from three factors. First, from the 
importance for the banking sector to the economy. Second, from the need to assess 
the effects of fundamental changes that occurred in the cost, profit, structure and 
performance of the banking industry in the UK over the 1980s and early 1990s. Third, 
from the lack of related empirical literature on the performance of the UK banking 
institutions. The results from this study can contribute to understanding the 
performance of banking institutions in the UK banking industry over a prolonged 
period of market and regulatory changes. 
In most countries the business of banks did not change significantly from the late 
1940s to the 1970s. This is certainly related to the strict regulatory framework 
followed by authorities in each country. In the 1980s, however, we have witnessed a 
revolution in both banking theory and banking practice. This was due to an 
international deregulation pattern that changed the nature of banking, and 
consequently its production and cost structure. Aiming at liberalising the provision of 
services and making easier the entry of new banks in the market, this deregulation 
pattern emerged mainly by two mutually reinforcing causes. The first one was 
increasing internalisation of the non-financial sector, and the second one was that the 
existing regulations were largely set up for the needs of the past, and hence no longer 
satisfied current financial needs. 
These changes in the structure of the banking industry have put an increasingly sharp 
focus on whether they have really improved bank performance. Banks provide 
liquidity, payments, safekeeping and portfolio services for depositors, and 
intermediate their funds into investments and working capital resources. They also 
ensure a smooth functioning of the economy by allowing financial and real resources 
to flow relatively freely to their highest return uses. Hence, it is important to 
determine whether these changes have altered positively the efficiency of banking 
institutions. In particular, if banks become more efficient, then we expect improved 
profitability, greater amounts of funds intermediated and lower prices and ameliorated 
quality service for consumers. Also, if they are more efficient, then they become 
1 
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more viable, and the possibility of failure or being subject to take-over, decreases 
substantially. 
Another important issue arising from deregulation concerns changes in the market 
structure of the industry. The effectiveness of banks in servicing deposits and credit 
needs is related to the structure of the banking industry. Two basic policy issues 
evaluate which banking structure could best serve the economy in terms of both cost 
and availability: (a) efficiency and (b) minimisation of failure. Efficiency is related to 
competition; in a more competitive environment, industries become more efficient. 
On the other hand, under monopolistic conditions, firms that are inefficient can still 
operate. In more concentrated markets, firms with higher market power may not gain 
from non-competitive pricing in the form of profits, but by benefiting from a more 
relaxed environment in which less effort is put on maximising cost efficiency [Berger 
(1995,1997), Berger and Hannan (1998)]. Accordingly, due to lack of competition 
inefficient banks may still operate. Therefore, the objective of a failing proof banking 
industry is being served under monopolistic condition, whereas a competitive industry 
provides favourable conditions for more efficient firms. Using evidence from the 
effects of changes of the market structure on banks' performance, regulators are able 
to pursue optimal policies. If bank performance is not affected by alterations in the 
structure of the industry, then regulations are not necessary. In the opposite case, 
regulators must intervene to maintain the well functioning of the industry and the 
economy. 
Until now, the bulk of empirical work has concentrated on the US banking industry, 
and little work has been done outside this region. However, US banking has a 
different structure from other banking industries. In Europe, banks tend to be multi- 
branch and universal, whereas branching (in some states) and universal banking in US 
are prohibited. Thus, any information obtained from US studies is of limited 
importance to other countries, and more research should be undertaken in the area of 
European bank cost and profit structure. 
Given the above, the objectives of the current thesis are, first, to assess UK banks' 
ability to realise economies of scale and cost complementarties in joint production by 
2 
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modelling the structure of costs and production for a multi-product institution. 
Second, to appraise the X-efficiency of UK banks by estimating an efficient frontier 
and by measuring the average differences between observed banks and banks at the 
frontier. Third, to examine the market structure and profit relationship in attempting 
to evaluate which market structure characterises the UK banking industry. Fourth, to 
determine the changes in UK bank profits, cost and efficiency following certain 
regulatory changes. 
In Chapter 1, we try to identify economic and market trends, as well as regulatory 
alterations that stimulated the changes in the UK banking industry over the 1980s and 
1990s. With the beginning of 1980s, British banking started to change. Improvements 
in technology introduced new facilities to bank services, and constituted a major part 
of the improvement process in banks' efficiency. Balance sheet structure changed 
rapidly with the introduction of off-balance sheet activities, product innovation, and 
banks' movement into security trading. Furthermore, two new Banking Acts (1979, 
1987) provided the industry with a detailed framework of prudential control. Finally, 
the major trends in banking regulation since 1987 are defined by the international 
convergence on common minimum capital standards of capital adequacy and the trend 
of regulatory policy towards a common European standard. 
Chapter 2 is of a theoretical nature and analyses some of the theory of modem 
banking firm in the context of the current thesis. Recent studies on banks emphasise 
their role in transforming illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, [Diamond and Dybving 
(1983), Freeman (1988)], minimising transaction costs by acting as delegated 
monitors of investors, [Diamond (1984,1989,1996), Chant (1987)], and providing 
payments and portfolio services. The interruption of these services may be costly to 
the economy as the production process may be severely affected and assets liquidated 
prematurely. In such a case, markets fail to provide the equilibrium quantity of 
services at the market price. Accordingly, banks are regulated in order to ensure the 
adequate provision of these services and to minimise the possibility of market failure. 
The next part of this chapter concentrates on the definitional and measurement 
problems of banks' input and output. Given the nature of banks' activities, the 
literature has exposed considerable difficulties defining what constitutes bank input 
3 
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and output, and has employed different approaches. We provide an overview of these 
approaches, together with a summary table of the input and output measures used in 
the bank cost literature. Finally, key competitive issues are examined, with an 
extensive discussion of scale and scope economies, X-efficiencies, and market 
structure relationship in banking. 
The objective of Chapter 3 is to assess UK banks' ability to realise economies of scale 
and cost complementarties in joint production by modelling the structure of costs and 
production for a multi-product institution. We employ two approaches in defining 
input and output, and we use a new data set to check the robustness of the results to 
different input and output specifications. In particular, scale economies suggest that 
larger firms produce at lower average cost than smaller firms, whereas cost 
complementarities in the production of two products exist if the marginal cost of 
producing one output decreases when the production of the other increases. This 
evidence is important for decision-making by banks and by regulatory authorities. 
After reviewing the alternative methodologies employed by the literature, we opt for 
the translog cost function; this cost function is preferred in studies of bank 
performance because it allows, first, the estimation of a U-shaped average cost curve, 
and, second, the derivation of scale and scope economies [see e. g. Mester (1993), 
Jagtiani et al. (1995), and Rogers (1998a, b)]. We evaluate economies of scale as the 
sum of the first-order partial derivatives of the estimated cost function, with respect to 
output [see, among others, Fields et al. (1993), Jagtiani et al. (1995) and Jagtiani and 
Khanthavit (1996)], and cost complementarities as the second order derivatives of the 
cost function with respect to output [see, among others, Mester (1987), Allen and Rai 
(1993), Jagtiani et al. (1995), and Rogers (1998a)]. 
In Chapter 4 we test the X-efficiency of UK banks by estimating an efficient frontier 
and by measuring the average differences between observed banks and banks at the 
frontier. Following Leibenstein (1966), X-efficiency is defined as the effect of 
differences in managerial ability to maximise revenue or minimise cost, and accounts 
for differences in costs that cannot be explained by differences in scale or other 
observable characteristics. Recent literature suggests that X-efficiencies account for 
20% or more of cost in banking whereas scale and product diseconomies only account 
4 
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for less than 5% of cost [Berger et al. (1993)]. In this chapter we first provide a 
review of the different approaches for measuring X-efficiency and their empirical 
results. Next, based on its advantages over other frontier methods we employ the 
stochastic econometric frontier approach [Berger and Mester (1997a), Berger and 
DeYoung (1997), Bauer et al. (1998)]. To test the effect of this assumption on the 
robustness of the results we estimate three alternative models with different 
distributional assumptions. The results suggest that the efficiency estimates are fairly 
robust to differences in methodology. 
In Chapter 5 we examine the market structure and profit relationship in the UK 
banking industry by including direct measures of both market structure and efficiency. 
Many studies in the banking literature (especially in the US) have examined the 
connection between profitability and measures of market structure (concentration or 
market share), and have found a positive statistical relationship. There are two 
interpretations for this finding: the first is the market power hypothesis, and the 
second is the efficient structure hypothesis. The market power hypothesis suggests 
that firms in concentrated markets exercise market power in pricing and earn 
supernormal profits [Shepherd (1982)]. The efficient structure paradigm links 
concentration to high profitability through efficiency [Demsetz (1973)]. Following 
Berger (1995,1997) we establish structural forms for the efficient structure and 
market power hypotheses, and we derive a reduced-form model that nests all related 
hypotheses, which helps to determine what form of market structure characterises the 
UK banking industry. An innovation of the current chapter is the utilisation of 
different efficiency measures to test the sensitivity of the results. We further test the 
existence of the `quiet life' hypothesis. As suggested by Hicks (1935), the reduction 
in competitive pressure in concentrated markets may result in higher cost per unit of 
output due to slack management. 
In Chapter 6, our goal is to determine the changes in UK bank profits, cost and 
efficiency following certain regulatory changes for the period 1983 to 1995 by 
examining the regulatory changes in the UK banking system. The motivation for this 
test comes from the global deregulation of the banking industry that has taken place 
during the 1980s and has had an important effect on the performance of banking 
5 
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institutions. However, the quantification of these effects has only been examined by a 
few studies, and no evidence is available for the UK banking market. In the first part 
of the chapter we review the relevant literature, and we describe the major regulatory 
tools in the banking industry. Next, we concentrate on the studies that quantify 
regulatory changes on banks' performance. Following Humphrey and Pulley (1997) 
and Berger and Mester (1997,1999) we divide the data into three time periods, 
namely pre-regulation, concurrent, and post deregulation. For each period we 
estimate a profit and a cost function and we separate internal bank-initiated 
adjustments from external changes in the banking environment. This separation 
enables us to identify the major impact of changes in regulation on bank profits and 
costs. 
6 
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CHAPTER 1: Recent developments and structural changes in the 
UK banking system 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of the current chapter is to identify economic and market trends, as well as 
regulatory alterations that stimulated the changes in the UK banking industry. The 
face of the British banking has changed substantially during the past three decades. 
Prior to the 1970s it was dominated by a cartelised oligopoly. By the beginning of the 
1970s legal, political and banking environment became much more favourable to the 
encouragement of free competition in banking. ' Banks faced new competitors and 
new forms of competition were developed. This intensifying competition increased 
the pressure for innovation, whereas improvements in technology lowered the 
corresponding costs of innovating behaviour by banks. Furthermore, the 
macroeconomic climate experienced by the banking industry throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s was much more volatile than in the 1950s and 1960s. The rise of interest 
rates, and inflation, accompanied by increased budget deficits prompted banks to 
reassess their attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, and augmented the economic 
impact of traditional regulations on banks [Gardener and Molyneux (1994)]. 
Banking industry in the UK, prior to the Banking Act 1979, was practically 
unregulated. In practice, governmental control was ensured with the combination of 
selective legal restrictions on certain banking activities, together with the Bank of 
England's control over the structure and operation of the banking industry. The 
banking crisis of 1973-74 highlighted the need of a detailed framework of prudential 
controls for the banking market. As a result, two Banking Acts were brought into 
being, Banking Act 1979 and 1987. The main trends in banking regulation since 1987 
are defined by international convergence on common minimum standards of capital 
adequacy and the increasing Europeanistation of regulatory policy. The purely 
domestic changes in the regulatory structure have been few and relatively modest. 
1 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, September 1983. 
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These changes in the structure of the UK banking industry give rise to the question of 
their effects on banks' performance. This gives us the motivation for the current 
study. As this study concentrates on estimating the performance of UK banks for the 
period 1980 to 1995, this chapter provides an insight to all of the changes in the 
industry following the introduction of the Banking Act of 1979 until the Bank of 
England Act of 1998. The first part deals with the market developments from early 
1970s till mid 1990s. The second part of this chapter deals with the regulatory 
developments both in the UK and EC, for the same period. 
1.2 Market developments 
Four decades ago, the British banking system was dominated by a cartelised oligopoly 
consisting of the London clearing banks and their associates in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. By the beginning of 1970s, the legal, political and banking opinion became 
much more favourable to the encouragement of free competition in banking and much 
more hostile both to cartels and to similar counter-competitive techniques of monetary 
policy2. Drastic deregulation followed, where in response to official prompting, 
clearing banks changed the form of their published accounts. At the same time, again 
with official approval, extensive mergers substantially reduced the number of clearing 
banks. 
During the ensuing competitive decade (and though partly interrupted by some re- 
imposition of direct controls during 1974-80) the banking industry started to change 
with the introduction of new facilities for its customers. For personal customers, 
credit cards and cash dispenser became readily available, so that by 1982 nearly 80% 
of bank current account holders held at least one such card. Automated credit transfer 
and direct debit facilities became available, while personal customers also gained 
easier access to a more complete array of instalment facilities. Corporate customers 
had access on a growing scale to the wholesale market, whether as lenders or 
borrowers of short-term money. The cost of such customers was thereby reduced 
[Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (September 1983)]. 
2For example restrictive lending ceiling applied to banks and depository institutions 
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In the beginning of the 1980s, a radical change in the structure of the UK and of the 
international financial sector took place. This was due to two factors. First, following 
the international trend large financial institutions provided a wide range of financial 
services, and consequently, specialisation in particular areas or activities was 
discouraged. After the considerable changes in supervision during 1985, the largest 
UK banks concentrated on providing both commercial and investment banking 
globally, and move towards universal banking. On the other hand medium and small 
banks continued to focus on more traditional activities and less ambitious investment 
banking strategies [Banking Act Report (1985/1986)]. Second, pressure for change 
grew considerably due to the increase in competition within the banking industry. 
Banks faced new competitors and new forms of competition were developed. 
1.2.1 Market Overview from late 1970s to mid 1990s 
During late 1970s and early 1980s entered a period of recession. 3 At that period UK 
banks faced a continuous decline in their capital ratios. In 1982 there was a sign of 
rise, in line with the recover of economic activity. However, following the Finance 
Act 1984, in March 1984, there was a decline in post-tax profits caused by 
substantially higher effective tax rates. Most banks increased provisions through 
transfer from existing reserves, which resulted in deterioration in their capital ratios. 
The banks affected have taken measures to recover their capital, mainly by issuing 
subordinated loan stock and to a less extend from issuing of capital [Banking Act 
Report (1984/1985)]. 
During the following years there was an increasing pattern in the banks' capital ratios 
and profits, and this was mainly emerge due to changes in their structure and 
strategies, and due to the decline of corporate tax rate. Changes in banks' structure 
and strategies stem mainly from the increase in the number of off-balance sheet 
activities, product innovation, increasing participation in security markets and banks' 
movements into investment banking and securities trading and distribution, both in 
the UK and overseas. Diversification and increasing involvement in the domestic and 
international security markets raised a number of questions concerning the assessment 
of risk and the quality of earnings. On the one hand, diversification can be thought as 
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a tool in reducing bank's overall risk by achieving a greater balance in portfolio 
exposure. On the other hand, trading losses incurred in investment banking and 
securities operations can significantly damage the earnings even of largest institutions 
[Banking Act Report (1986/1987)]. A clear example for this concern came forth 
some years later. In 1995 the merchant bank Barings collapse after experiencing large 
losses on futures and option trading by a Singapore subsidiary. Because of the risk 
faced by banks due the utilisation of the aforementioned instruments, the Bank of 
England as well as the EC supervisory body, issued several regulatory notices for the 
matter in concern (a detailed analysis is given in the next section). 
Another point of notice for this period involves the considerable concerns raised for 
those banks with concentration of lending to major debtor countries. During 1982 the 
number of countries experiencing debt-serving difficulties, increased. Although the 
immediate debt problem of these countries tended to diminish trough time due to 
improvements in their external positions, the resolution still depended largely on their 
domestic economies and world growth. As a result in 1987 large British banks 
increased their bad debts provisions to around 25%-35% of their exposures to 
problem countries. Nevertheless, this increased in the level of provision, led to a 
sharp fall in profits [Banking Act Report (1987/1988)]. 
Apart from increases in debt provisions, banks that diversified into securities markets 
during the past couple of years faced a further problem. Banking business closely 
related to stock market activities remained severely affected by market's difficulties 
following the sharp fall of prices in October 1987. The majority of banks' securities 
markets operations, both equities and fixed interest, were significantly affected by 
strong competition, by lower levels of turnover in the market and by narrower 
margins. Nevertheless, the experience was not uniform and securities business 
continued to be profitable for certain banks, particularly large ones. Low level of 
activity and reduced value of funds under management also affected investment 
management activities [Banking Act Report (1987/1988)]. The adverse effects of 
1987 were balanced, to some extent, from continuing rapid growth in lending to 
personal and to corporate sector. Figure 1-1 presents the changes in pre- and post-tax 
3 International economy entered a period of recession after the oil shock in 1979. 
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profits for large UK banks4 over the period 1982 to 1995, and Table 1-1 summarises 
the large UK banks capital ratios. 
10 
ij 
6 
4a 
sý 
4 
t: 
ä2 
1-- 00 -71 -D rI c pre-tax 
E3 post-taxi 
cc C, C, 00 
ö 'o ý, ä Cl 
Years 
Figure 1-1: Pre- and post-tax profits (£ billions) of the UK largest banks for the 
period 1982-95 (Source: Bank of England, Banking Act Reports 1982-1996). 5 
As it can be seen from the Figure 1-1, there is a substantial upward movement in the 
profitability of large UK banks in 1988, the year after the allowance for large 
provisions against the problem of country debt. The recovery of their profit rates 
diminished their reliance on capital issues as a means of increasing capital and 
reserves. Furthermore, the strength of their retained earnings and the raising of new 
equity improved banks' overall capital ratios. However, tighter monetary policy in 
1989 led to deterioration in the property markets and the corporate sector of the 
economy, while several companies started facing financial difficulties. Due to 
worsening economic conditions, signs of difficulties appeared in small and mediUun- 
sized companies with corporate insolvencies reaching near record levels in 1989 
[Banking Act Report (1989/1990)]. To maximise profits large banks place emphasis 
on cost control and on less capital-intensive income sources. Moreover, the decision 
a UK largest banks as defined by the Bank of England are Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National 
Westminster, Standard Chartered, Bank of Scotland, The Royal Bank of Scotland and TSB. 
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of large banks to add substantial new provisions against problem country debt, as well 
as domestic commercial bad debt charges (sometimes up to 80%), in conjunction with 
general economic conditions, resulted in the fall in profits. In an attempt to lessen the 
effect of economic deterioration, banks improved the monitoring of doubtful debts, 
within branch networks, and upgraded information systems and credit appraisal 
techniques. 
Table 1-1: Capital ratios of large UK banks in £ billions. 
Year Total assets Weighted 
assets 
Adjusted 
capital base 
Risk asset 
ratio 
1982 234.4 179.8 13.7 7.6 
1983 271.1 208.0 16.9 8.1 
1984 315.7 245.4 18.6 7.6 
1985 303.1 236.0 23.0 9.7 
1986 334.6 351.7 26.3 10.5 
1987 345.2 267.2 26.3 9.8 
1988 392.6 316.1 32.0 10.1 
1989 461.7 377.1 34.7 9.2 
1990 471.1 374.9 34.5 9.2 
1991 476.8 364.8 35.5 9.7 
1992 535.6 378.5 37.4 9.9 
1993 593.0 381.2 41.3 10.8 
1994 711.4 424.4 48.5 11.4 
1995 809.7 471.1 51.1 10.9 
Source: Bank of England Reports 1982 -1996 
At the beginning of 1990s the UK economy swung into recession and uncertainty was 
triggered by the events in the Middle East. The rate of growth of banks' domestic 
lending dropped, whereas the bad debt provisions made by banks against their UK 
portfolios increased. One of the major reasons for these high provisions was that due 
to financial liberalisation of the last decade, many borrowers became more geared 
and, thus, more vulnerable to combination of high interest rates and weakening 
demand. Ranks' earnings were also affected by changes in interest rates. In the past, 
banks benefited during periods of higher interest rates fron the existence of 
substantial non-interest-bearing elements in their deposits. However, the increasing 
competition in personal savings, both between the banks and between them and other 
financial institutions (e. g. building societies and life assurance companies) generated 
5 Data covering the period prior to 1982 is not available. 
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the need for new products offered to customers, such as a variety of interest-bearing 
accounts. During the 1970s the non-interest-bearing sterling deposits had reached 
50% of total deposits for many of the large banks, whereas in the 1990 they had fallen 
to 15% as more and more depositors switched to interest-bearing accounts. In an 
attempt to alter the interest rate exposures arising from on-balance-sheet items, banks 
developed a range of off-balance-sheet instruments (e. g. the use of swaps to match 
floating-rate funding and fixed-rate lending) [Banking Act Report (1990/1991)]. 
Throughout the recession, operating profits of large banks were boosted by cost 
cutting and efficiency measures. These measures were taken in an attempt to 
influence operating profitability in the recession period, and as a response to 
competitive pressures, which had intensified after 1980s deregulation. The result of 
this re-structuring was a sharp reduction in the number of employees. The only factor 
that increased costs was the continuing heavy investment in information technology 
undertaken by most banks in conjunction with higher depreciation charges. The latter 
came forth in a desire for long-term benefits and by increased automation of labour 
intensive activities (credit assessments, data processing and storage of customer 
information). Computerisation also helped banks improve services by expanding their 
scope to match products more closely with demand. Furthermore, large banks sought 
other sources of operating income less vulnerable to the recession: for instance, non- 
interest income, being a form of income that requires less capital, grew substantially 
as a proportion to total income and contributed to the increase in operating profits. 
Major sources of growth were foreign exchange and money markets trading 
commissions and the penetration in life assurance [Banking Act Report (1991/1992)]. 
Recovery came forth in 1993, and hereafter there is a continuously increasing pattern 
in banks' profitability and capital ratio, albeit during 1995 the steady asset growth of 
large banks led to a slight decrease in their capital ratio. However, as can be seen 
from Table 1-1 the capital ratios of large banks, remained comfortably above the 8% 
Basle minimum capital (more details on the Basle requirements are given in the next 
section) for the last ten years. During 1993 banks' operating profits grew due to non- 
interest income, where as interest income remained depressed due to stagnation in 
lending and the shift of some banks' balance sheets into lower risk and lower margin 
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business. Moreover, more stable economic and financial conditions led to a fall in the 
overall bad debt charges [Banking Act Report (1992/1993)]. 
Operating profits further improved in 1994. Nevertheless, the improvement in 
profitability was almost entirely due to reduced bad debt provisions together with 
significant write-back of provisions against problem country debts at some banks. 
There was only a slight increase in the interest income, where as non-interest income 
was lower than in 1993, after increasing for the previous eight years [Banking Act 
Report (1993/1994)]. Profits continued to rise in 1995 as well. UK banks benefited 
from the recovery in loan demand during 1995, and this produced an increase in net 
interest income. Furthermore, non-interest income increased as well resulted mainly 
from dealing profits [Banking Act Report (1994/1995)]. 
1.2.2 Small banks 
During the 1980s medium and small UK-banks record grew in line with the banking 
sector. Nonetheless, towards the end of the decade, increasing competition from 
larger banks placed substantial pressure on their business activities. Moreover, with 
the introduction of Banking Act 19876 small banks faced heavy cost in terms of 
satisfying minimum criteria for authorisation. During the recession, the deterioration 
in the UK small-banking sector became clear. These banks were traditionally 
involved with the property market, which left them highly exposed to the effects of 
the recession, as the ability of personal and small-business' sectors to service debt was 
reduced, and as the property market decline. The Bank of England kept these banks 
under review for the whole period under consideration, and helped them re-order their 
affairs or wind down business in an orderly manner [Banking Act Report 
(1992/1993)]. More stable economic and financial conditions in 1993 eased financial 
pressures on these institutions [Banking Act Report (1992/1993)]. 
6A detail analysis of the requirements of the Banking Act 1987 is given in section 1.3. 
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1.2.3 Banks' portfolios 
The composition of banks' loan portfolios changed considerably during 1980s. Since 
widespread international debt problems emerged in 1982, new syndicated lending to 
sovereign and overseas borrowers declined. Many of highly rated corporate 
borrowers began looking for finance directly to bond markets rather than to banks. On 
their part, banks also placed greater emphasis on managing the shape of their loan 
portfolios, with some swapping from international debt and ceding other types of 
loans in an attempt to reduce credit risks. Furthermore, banks tried to increase the 
liquidity of their portfolios with securitisation. 
The domestic personal sector has been an important area for the UK banks. Towards 
the second part of 1980s residential loans grew substantially due to strong demand for 
housing finance. However, banks' reliance on personal borrowing brought them into 
competition with building societies. Several banks announced significant structural 
change in their expense pattern in terms of interest bearing accounts [Banking Act 
Report (1989/1990)]. During the second part of the decade, corporate lending 
increased as well, mainly because of the increase in take-overs and merger activities. 
The increase in personal and corporate lending balanced by a decrease in the financial 
sector and overseas lending, leaving the total value of loans within the banking 
industry relatively unchanged for a period of five to six years. This can be seen from 
Figure 1-2, which presents the total loans and deposits of the banking industry for the 
period 1979 to 1995 are presented. 
In the light of the difficult trading conditions in the beginning of 1990s, banks became 
more cautious in their assessment of the creditworthiness of borrowers. As already 
mentioned, most banks increased bad debts provisions on domestic lending due to 
increased company insolvencies in property, retail, and service sector. Moreover, 
major foreign banks restricted their UK lending activities and re-focused on areas of 
comparative advantage, such as trade finance and other country home business. In 
general, with the beginning of the new decade banks' lending to UK residents 
decreased sharply, reflecting also monetary policy tightening which had begun in 
1989. 
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Figure 1-2: Total Deposits and Loans of the UK banking industry (£ billions) for the 
period 1979-1995 (Source: Datastream International). 
As can he seen from Figure 1-2, although total deposits continued their increasing 
pattern, total loans remained approximately constant from 1986 to 1992. Following 
the improvements in the economic environment in 1993, total loans within the 
industry started growing, and continued following increasing pattern. 
1.2.4 International developments 
Apart from domestic changes, international developments also affected banking 
activities. Towards the beginning of 1990s, both European and non-European banks 
were reviewing their activities in the EU in accordance to the Single Market. In the 
light of the Second banking Directive (a detail analysis on the Directive is given in the 
next section), some non-European institutions were interested in opening subsidiaries 
in the UK, whereas several UK banks opened additional branches or established 
subsidiaries throughout Europe. Some overseas bank took more drastic steps in 
banking or related financial services through selective acquisitions. As a result 
16 
Chapter 1 
several well-known British financial institutions came under the control of large 
foreign companies7. [Banking Act Report (1989/1990)] 
On the other hand, at the same period some banks from non-industrial countries 
ceased their London activities, because they were unable to achieve satisfactory 
returns, whereas others cut back their activities by transferring some assets to their 
parent banks thereby cutting down costs in terms of staff. Further, following the 
Middle East events in 1990, Middle Eastern banks experienced a period of difficult 
trading conditions [Banking Act Report (1990/1991)]. However, foreign banks, 
together with the total banking industry, started experiencing increasing profits in 
1993 and onwards. 
Furthermore, banking industry in the 1990s was characterised by increased 
competition, by building societies, insurance, and investment companies. At the same 
time personal and corporate customers became more demanding, and were no longer 
willing to deposit money at a low rate of return. Hence, banks became interested in 
establishing better and closer relationships with their depositors, and in attracting 
more customers. As a result, a voluntary Code of Banking and Practice was issued, 
which came into force in March 1992. This set out minimum standards of good 
banking practice for dealing with personal customers. A revised edition was issued in 
February 1994 and included a commitment to provide advance notification to 
customers for changes to charges and interest rates. 
7 For example the national Australia Bank purchased the Yorkshire Banks, and the Bank of Yokohama 
purchased the majority of interest in the Guinness Mahon. 
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1.3 UK and EC Regulations 
Prior to the Banking Act 1979, banking industry in the UK was formally unregulated. 
There was neither clear definition of a bank nor any statutory control over the use of 
banking names and description. In practice, governmental control was ensured by the 
combination of selective legal restrictions on certain banking activities and the Bank 
of England's control over structure and operation of the banking industry. The 
banking crisis of 1973-74 highlighted the need of a detailed framework of prudential 
controls, for the banking market. As a result, two Banking Acts were brought into 
being, Banking Act 1979 and Banking Act 1987. Under these regulatory frameworks, 
unauthorised conduct of deposit-taking business has been prohibited. Moreover, the 
new legislation expanded and legitimised the regulatory discretion of the Bank of 
England. Another point of notice is the creation of new entry barriers in the industry, 
to prevent unnecessary competition and to reduce the contestability in the banking 
market to the benefit of established institutions. Nevertheless, the main trends in 
banking regulation since 1987 are defined by international convergence on common 
minimum standards of capital adequacy and the increasing Europeanistation of 
regulatory policy. The purely domestic changes in the regulatory structure have been 
few and relatively modest. In this section a review of the changes in the regulation is 
presented, starting with the beginning of 1970s. 
In May 1971, the government in an attempt to combine an effective measure of 
control over credit conditions with greater scope for competition and innovation in the 
banking industry, issued a policy paper 'Competition and Credit Control' (C. C. C. ) 
that was implemented in 16 of September of the same year. The introduction of 
C. C. C. abolished the collective agreement of clearing banks on the interest rates and 
in 1972 the bank rate was replaced by the Minimum Lending Rate. Furthermore, 
government policy encourages overinvestment through a rapid expansion of property 
developments. However, due to the collapse in the property markets and the sharp 
deterioration in the general economic situation during 1973, it was clear after two 
years that reduced asset requirements led to large increase in the money supply. 
Therefore, the government in the 17th of December in an attempt to overcome the 
problem, presented its proposals for a new Development Land Tax on commercial 
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property and the introduction of a `corset'. In particular, the corset was a special 
deposit scheme that was intended to impose ceilings on the growth of banks' interest- 
bearing eligible liabilities with penalties in the form of non-interest bearing special 
deposits. However, two days after the announcement, in the 19th of December, a 
banking crisis broke, as a number of banks were unable to replenish their resources. 
This came to be known as the secondary banking crisis of 1973. 
Following the secondary banking crisis and the EU First Banking Directive of 1977, 
the Banking Act was passed in 1979. The purpose of the EU Directive was to require 
from Member States to set up systems for authorising and supervising credit 
institutions. Accordingly, the Banking Act 1979 required the classification of deposit 
takers as either `recognised banks' or `licensed institutions'. The Act set up a set of 
minimum conditions that a bank should fulfil in order to be classified as a recognised 
bank: 
"A `high reputation and standing in the community'. 
" Supply of `either a wide range of banking services or a highly specialised 
banking service'. 
" Business performance `with integrity and prudence'. 
" Direction under at least two individuals. 
9 Meets the minimum net asset requirements compromised in the Act but also to 
be considered appropriate by the Bank of England. 
The licensed depository institution had to fulfil the latter three conditions, and instead 
of the first condition the following requirement should be satisfied: 
" Demonstrate that all directors, controllers and mangers are `fit and proper' to 
carry out business. 8 
The Act came into effect in October 1 st 1979, and although it changed the process by 
which UK banking industry was regulated, the operation of the system still depended 
to a large degree on moral suasion. 
Further to the Banking Act, the Bank of England (hereafter the Bank) in an attempt to 
clarify some important issues in banking process, in 1979, circulated three 
consultation papers within the banking community on important aspects of banks and 
8 Schedule 2 of the Banking Act 1979 amended in the Banking Act 1987. 
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other deposit-takers operations. The first paper, entitled `The measurement of 
capital', explains the basis upon which the Bank of England appraises capital 
adequacy of deposit taking institutions. There are two methods for assessing the 
adequacy of capital: namely the gearing ratio and the risk asset ratio. The gearing 
ratio is the ratio of current liabilities to capital resources, excluding that part of capital 
utilised to finance infrastructure and other non-banking activities. The risk asset ratio 
refers to the risk of losses generated by the use of institution's assets to capital 
available to finance such losses? The objective of these two capital ratios is, first, to 
ensure that capital of an institution is regarded as acceptable by its depositors and 
other creditors (gearing ratio), and second, to test the adequacy of capital in relation to 
the losses which may be sustained (risk asset ratio). The definitive paper was issued 
in September 1980 and the Bank considered this paper as the basis on which it 
measures the adequacy of the capital of authorised institutions. (Composition of 
gearing and asset ratio is given in Appendix to Chapter 1, section 1.5.1). 
The second paper, entitled `Foreign currency exposure', develops the basis upon 
which the Bank measures and monitors risk to which deposit taking institutions are 
exposed due to exchange rates movements. The paper sets out the general guidelines 
for the exposure of banks to foreign exchange risk, and the requirements of 
information by the Bank for the assessment of the method applied for each institution 
for measurement of its exposure. Appendix to Chapter 1, section 1.5.2 lists the 
elements required to be measured and the elements required to be reported and 
monitored. The third consultative paper, entitled `The measurement of liquidity', 
serves as the basis for assessing the adequacy of liquidity of all institutions covered by 
the Banking Act. 1° Banks must be able to meet their obligations when they fall due or 
when they are called. This can be done by holding cash and/or liquid assets and by 
arranging an appropriate profile of maturing assets. Appendix to Chapter 1, section 
1.5.3 provides a description of the liquidity measures. 
9 There are three types of risk: 
(1. ) credit risk: claims on others not redeemable at the due date at their full book value, 
(2. ) investment risk -marketable: claims on others may depreciated below their book value, and 
(3. ) forced sale risk: actual and additional losses sustained because of the need to make ultimately 
sales of assets may yield less than their quoted value. 
10 Annual reports by the Bank of England, 1979-1982. 
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During the mid-1980s the sharp growth of off-balance activities and the increasing 
participation of banks in security markets led the Bank to re-assess its policies by 
issuing a set of notices. In particular, as increasing number of banks started marketing 
currency options the Bank issued in April 1984 a memorandum circulated to banks, 
which states the treatment of banks' foreign currency options in order to measure for 
the purpose of measuring their foreign exchange exposure. According to the 
memorandum, exposures arising by exchange rate movements between the two 
currencies involved must be contained within existing foreign exchange guidelines. 
The Bank of England considered the hedging technique utilised by each bank in order 
to validate its appropriateness. If the measure were regarded satisfactory, the Bank 
would permit the use its own formulae in measuring its exposure on currency options. 
Otherwise the Bank would take into account `the potential effect of the exercise of 
option rights held by the customers of the bank on its open position in individual 
currencies, and make no allowances either for the likelihood of the option not being 
exercised or for any options taken by the bank to hedge its position'. " 
Further to the above, the Bank expressed concerns about the growth of off-balance 
sheet risks, which were not captured in the measurement of capital. As a result, in 
April 1985, it introduced a provisional risk asset ratio weighting for underwriting 
obligations arising out of note of issuance facilities12 and revolving underwriting 
facilities. It also announced a review of the whole range of off-balance sheet risks 
including more traditional contingent liabilities. This was released in conjunction 
with the `Statistical notice to monetary sector institutions, which stated that a bank's 
responsibility as an underwriter of a note issuance facility/revolving underwriting 
facility would be treated as a contingent liability. 
The year 1985 was also marked by progress in the development of Banking 
Supervision in the UK. Specifically, a committee was established to contemplate any 
changes deemed necessary in the present supervisory system. The committee report, 
11 Annual report by the Bank of England 1984/85, p. p. 8. 
12 These facilities are defined as `arrangements which enable a borrower to raise funds through the 
issue of short-term paper, where the availability of funds is in effect guaranteed by a bank or a group of 
banks underwriting the issue of paper by the borrower. These includes facilities arranged by both bank 
and non-bank borrowers, where the paper is issued in the form of certificates of deposits or promissory 
notes. - `Off-Balance Sheet Risks: Note Issuance Facilities/Revolving Underwriting Facilities', 
BSD/1985/2, April 1985. 
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entitled `The Leigh-Pemberton Report', was published by the Government in July 
1985. The report made the following recommendations: 
1. Replacement of classification of recognised banks and licensed deposit-takers 
under the Banking Act, by a single category of authorisation. 
2. Establishment of an operation providing the means for regular dialogue between 
supervisors and banks' auditors. 
3. Concentration of risk in banks' assets must be subjected to more strict controls. 
4. Banks' management control systems should be monitor more closely. 
5. Increase of staff within the Banking Supervision Division of the Bank. 
The recommendations suggested by the report were accepted by the government, 
which in turn issued in December 1985 a 'White Paper' on banking supervision to set 
out the framework for a new Banking Act on Banking Supervision. One of the major 
additional proposals included in the paper concerned the introduction of a new Board 
of Banking Supervision. 
The proposals of the report and the White Paper did not imply a fundamental change 
in banking supervision in the UK. Their intention, was to identify a number of 
weaknesses within the system of supervision, which had become apparent during the 
implementation of the regulatory framework. Nevertheless, although the reform 
proposals did not alter the substance of the authorisation requirements of the Banking 
Act 1979, the government chose to introduce an entirely new bill. Main innovations 
of the Banking Bill (hereafter Banking Act 1987) were the following: 
1. The establishment of the Board of Banking Supervision. 
2. The discarding of the two-tier system, 13 which was replaced by a unified system 
with a single category of authorised institutions. 
3. Replacing the provisions on regulations on banking description and names. UK- 
incorporated authorised institutions were permitted to use a banking name if their 
paid-up share capital and/or undistributable reserves amount to at least £5 million. 
Authorised institutions from overseas were entitle to use the names under which 
they carried business in their country of origin. All authorised institutions were 
able to use banking descriptions. 
13 The two-tier system had the objective to signal differentiation between the authorised institutions 
recognised by the Banking Act 1979, in recognised banks and licensed institutions. However, it led to 
22 
Chapter 1 
4. A more detailed description of the authorisation criteria. 
5. The Bank had given the power to object to take-overs and to changes in the control 
of deposit-taking institutions. An advance notice should be given to the Bank if a 
person is proposing of becoming a shareholder-controller of a UK-incorporated 
institution. The same stands for existing shareholders that required to take their 
shareholding over 50% or 70%. 
6. The introduction of new requirements on large exposures. Institutions whose 
primary place of business is UK, should report to the Bank for exposures 
exceeding 10% of their capital and to give prior notice of proposed transactions 
that would expose them to risk of loosing over 25% of their capital. 
7. In cases where further information of regulatory nature would be requires by the 
Bank, bank auditors would be released from their duty of confidentiality to their 
client institution. 
8. False provision of information to the Bank would result in criminalisation. 
9. The Bank's power to require information and undertake investigations in the 
affairs of deposit-taking institutions was strengthened. 
10. All authorised institutions were required to notify the Bank for changes in 
directors, controllers and mangers. The Banks had the right to change these 
requirements for institutions whose principal place of business was outside the UK. 
The Banking Bill received Royal Assent on 15 May 1987. The major changes that 
took place with the Banking Act 1987 were, first, the abolishment of the two-tier 
status system and its replacement with a single status of authorised institutions. 
Second, the establishment of the Board of Banking Supervision on a statutory basis, 
and, third, the significantly increased role of auditors in monitoring and reporting. 
At the same year developments in international policy took place as well. In 
December 1987, the Basle Supervisors Committee issued a paper with the proposals 
for the convergence of capital adequacy, with three basic principals: 
1. There should exist a common definition of capital, where its primary (tier 1 or core 
capital) value should be equity capital and reserves arising from retained earnings, 
confusion, regarding the way related criteria of function and status, were applied. Further, there was no 
clear distinction in the use of banking names and descriptions between the institutions in the two-tier. 
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allowing also for a wider range of instruments to be included within a secondary 
category of capital (tier 2 or supplementary capital). 
2. There should exist a common system of risk weights applied to each balance sheet 
and off-balance sheet items, so as to reflect their credit value. 
3. A standard minimum level of capital must exist, which banks would have to hold 
against their risk-adjusted assets and off-balance sheet business. 
The aforementioned proposals have limited discretion to national supervisors in their 
application of the framework. In the UK, the Bank, where there was a national 
discretion within the framework, hold to its existing policies, due to the fact that 
major differences existed between the Basle framework and the domestic system. In 
July 1988, the Committee issued a new paper 14, setting out a common risk-based 
system for the measurement of capital, with a required minimum level of 8% for all 
international banks. 15 
Furthermore, during the same period the European Commission was working on three 
new Directives on the view of full harmonisation of national regulations towards 
European integration. The first draft policy paper was on the establishment of 
`Second Banking Co-ordination Directive'. The general idea was the liberalisation of 
capital movements and other Community instruments in the banking field, generated 
from the desire to eliminate barriers of establishment in the banking sector. Proposals 
were based on a single banking license, which would enable credit institutions 
incorporated in a Member State, to be equally recognised through the EU by virtue of 
their home country authorisation. With the development of such a license, home 
country supervisors of the Member State would be accountable for the authorisation 
and overall supervision of the Community-wide branch operation of their credit 
institutions. On the other hand, host authorities would be responsible for the 
14 Basle Committee, "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards - The 
Basle Accord", July 1988. 
15 Further to the above the Basle Committee issued the `Basle Statement of Principles on Money 
Laundering'. In the UK, this Statement was circulated to all authorised deposit takers during January 
1989, according to which all UK banking institutions should demonstrate that their policies were 
consistent with the Statement of Principles. At that time the Bank believed that the Statement reflected 
the existing best banking practice in the UK. However, in light of increasing international concern 
about on laundering, the Bank on 10 November of the same year sent a letter to all authorised 
institutions, to comply with the Basle Statement of Principles. Further, banks had to take up policies in 
accordance to the statutory provisions relating to the reporting of suspicious transactions to law 
enforcement authorities. Banks were also notified that failure to install or maintain a system adequate 
to cope with money laundering could result in revocation of authorisation. 
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implementation of measures related to monetary policy. The second draft policy 
paper, called 'Own Fund Directive', concerned the definition of capital for prudential 
supervision purposes. The Directive imposed boundaries to the kind of resources 
Member States should allow their banks to enumerate as capital. Finally, the 
`Solvency Ratio Directive' introduced a uniform risk weighting system for all EU 
credit institutions, together with a minimum requirement level for banks' risk asset 
ratio, set at 8%. The proposals of this Directive were in line with those set out by the 
Basle Committee. 
Following the proposals of the Basle Committee, the Bank of England published a 
paper in October 198816 stating how the proposed framework would be applied to all 
UK incorporated institutions. Implementation of the Basle Convergence Agreement 
in the UK came into effect at the end of December 1989. Another paper for capital 
adequacy purposes was issued in October 1988. The 'Supervisory treatment of the 
ECU Treasury Bills' circulated to authorised institutions, according to which, in 
measuring capital adequacy the Banking Supervision Division, the same treatment to 
Treasury Bills denominated in ECUs would apply as to those denominated in sterling. 
Turning back to domestic policies, UK banks showed a growing interest in recent 
years in developing schemes for transferring risks associated with banks' loan assets 
through selling, securitising or sub-participating. Concerns of supervising authorities 
resulted in the issue of a policy notice in February 1989, entitled `Loan transfer and 
securitisation'. The Bank issued the relevant paper after consulting market 
participants on the best method by which sale of loan assets can be achieved, together 
with legal implications and the effects in terms of risk. The policy notice covers the 
sale of single loans and packaging, securitisation, and sale of loan pools. It also 
covers the transfer of risk under sub-participation agreements. This policy outlines 
the conditions that banks must fulfil to eliminate risk when selling an asset. 
Accordingly, this asset is allowed to be removed from the balance sheet for capital 
adequacy purposes. Appendix to Chapter 1, section 1.5.4 sets out the objectives of 
the policy as well as the methods of transfer. 
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Another policy development that took place in 1989 was the adoption of three EU 
banking directives. According to the Bank of England, the EC Directives set up the 
framework for completion of the internal market in banking. The first one is the 
`Own Fund Directive, adopted in April. This technical Directive determines the 
items that should be included in the calculation of a bank's capital ('own funds'). It 
differentiates capital into two categories. The first category, consists of all items that 
have attributes of capital, such as share capital, accumulated reserves and general 
provisions (tier 1 or core capital), while in the second category are items of lower 
quality which can provide protection against insolvency, but cannot guarantee 
continuing survival of the institution. This includes evaluation reserves, value 
adjustments and subordinated debt (tier 2 or supplementary capital). The Second 
'Banking Co-ordination Directive', was adopted in December and attempted to 
eliminate the remaining intra-EU barriers to freedom of establishing the banking 
sector. It permits cross-border business within the EU without need for further 
authorisation. The main aim of this legislation is to harmonise laws and rules for 
credit institutions so that they can set up and operate freely across the EU, subject to 
adequate supervision. It further aims to increase competitions and to remove barriers 
to banking throughout the EU by deregulating the requirements for branches level of 
endowment capital. The last one, the `Solvency Ratio Directive', was adopted in 
December, and its purpose was to incorporate the definition of capital from the Own 
Funds Directive into a minimum harmonised risk asset ratio of 8% met by all credit 
institutions. Capital adequacy requirements established by the Directive were in line 
with the Bank for International Settlements proposals (BIS). However, the BIS 
capital guidelines were not legally enforceable, as they were only recommendations 
for international banks. On the other hand, capital adequacy requirements of the 
Directive were incorporated into EU and member country law, and thus were in fact 
legally enforceable. Appendix to Chapter 1, section 1.5.5 presents a more detailed 
analysis for the three aforementioned EU Directives. 
In the next decade, banking industry and supervision faced, both in the UK and 
internationally, significant changes as a result of the creation of the Single European 
Market. The Bank in December 1990 published a notice implementing the EU 
16 Bank of England, " Implementation of the Basle Convergence Agreement in the UK", BSD/1988/3, 
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'Solvency Ratio Directive'17, with amendments to this paper made in November 1992 
and March 199518, imposing a minimum capital ratio of 8% from 1 January 1993. At 
the same time, another notice was circulated to authorised institutions establishing the 
implementation of the `Own Funds Directive'19, with amendments made in January 
and August 199220. Following this notice, the policy covering the implementation of 
the Basle Convergence Agreement in the UK was withdrawn. 
In 1993, the advent of the Single European Market in Banking required from all 
Member States minimum standards of supervision. Following that, three EU banking 
Directives were implemented during 1993 in the UK. The first one is the `Second 
Banking Co-ordination Directive', which according to the Bank of England is the 
most important piece of legislation in the establishment of the EU Single Market in 
banking services. As already mentioned according to this Directive, a bank 
incorporated in any Member State is permitted to branch or provide services 
throughout the EU without further authorisation. Legal responsibilities for most 
aspects of the supervision for EU banks are placed with the home country, while the 
host country also retains power to impose measures justified on the grounds of general 
good. 21 
The second Directive is the `Directive on the Consolidated Supervision of Credit 
Institutions' 22; its purpose was to ensure that home country supervision takes into 
account total financial business conducted throughout a banking group. In light of 
that, in March 1993, the Bank published a policy notice notifying authorised 
institutions on the immediate implementation of the Directive, and all the relevant 
requirements. Upon the implementation of the Directive, supervision of authorised 
October 1988. 
17 Bank of England, 'Implementation in the United Kingdom of the Solvency Ratio Directive', 
BSD/1990/3, December 1990. 
1$ Bank of England, 'Implementation in the United Kingdom of the Solvency Ratio Directive, 
BSD/1992/6, November 1992 and BSD/1995/1, March 1995 (amendments to the 1990 paper). 19 Bank of England, 'Implementation in the United Kingdom of the Directive of Own Funds of Credit 
Institutions', BSD/1990/2, December 1990. 
20 Bank of England, 'Implementation in the United Kingdom of the Directive of Own Funds of Credit 
Institutions', BSD/1992/1, January 1992 (amendment to the 1990 paper), and 'Verification of interim 
prof is in the context of the Own Funds Directive', BSD/1992/5, August 1992. 
The implementation of the Second Banking Directive, came through the `Statement of Principles - 
Banking Act 1987: The Banking Co-ordination (Second Council Directive) Regulation 1992'. 
22 Bank of England, 'Implementation in the UK of the Directive on the Consolidated Supervision of the 
Credit Institutions', BSD/1993/1. 
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institutions must be conducted on consolidated basis (preparation of consolidated 
returns covering a group, or part of a group), whenever such institutions are members 
of a wider group. Moreover, the new notice extended consolidated supervision to 
include the authorised institution's parent and financial subsidiaries of parent. 
Furthermore, banks are required to have systems and controls, which are sufficient for 
the production of data and information on a consolidated basis. Also, authorised 
institutions are required to submit, at least twice each year, consolidated returns 
covering capital adequacy and large exposure. 
The last Directive is the `Directive of Monitoring and Control of Large Exposures of 
Credit Institutions' implemented in October 1993 with the publication of a policy 
notice23 by the Bank. The aim of this Directive was to increase the spread of risks 
incurred by banks, in order to prevent that default by one client jeopardises the 
existence of an institution, and the financial system in general. The requirements of 
the Directive were in line with the Bank's existing large exposure policy, apart from 
few changes (see Bank of England, `Implementation in the UK of the Directive on the 
Monitoring and Control of Large Exposures of Credit Institutions', BSD/1993/2). 
Moreover, during the beginning of the 1990s banking trading activities continued to 
develop. More and more institutions throughout EU undertook security-trading 
activities. Existing requirements up to that time did not address directly market risks 
faced by banks engaged in such activities, as the solvency ratio captures only credit 
risk, and interest-rate and currency risks from derivative instruments. In an attempt to 
accomplish the inclusion of market risks faced by banks that incorporate security- 
trading activities in the measurement of capital adequacy, and to ensure consistency of 
treatment between credit institutions and securities and investment firms, the `Capital 
Adequacy Directive' was adopted in 1993. According to the Directive, uniform 
requirements with respect to the minimum capital cover of trading activities should be 
applied on both types of institutions (see Appendix to Chapter 1, section 1.5.5). From 
January 1st 1995 UK-incorporated banks applied the provisions of the Directive to 
their market risk, and started building the necessary reporting systems. During the 
same year they formulated trading-book policy statements in detail consultation with 
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the Bank. Furthermore, to allow banks to develop systems for compliance with the 
Directive by the target date, in December 1994 the Bank issued a consultative paper 
outlining the proposed approach. Actual implementation of the Directive in the UK 
came on April 1995 with the publication of a policy notice. 24 A second policy notice 
was issued in December 1995 to clarify areas of the new policy where necessary. 25 
Today, the responsibility of banking supervision has passed to the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA). The British Government, in an attempt to reform financial 
regulation, announced in May 1997 that it would create a single regulator for all 
financial firm and markets by merging the regulatory responsibilities of nine bodies: 
1. Securities and Investment Board (SIB). 
2. Supervision and Surveillance Division of the Bank of England. 
3. Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO). 
4. Personal Investment Authority (PIA). 
5. Securities and Future Authorities (SFA). 
6. Insurance Directorate of the Department of Trade and Industry. 
7. Building Societies Commission (BSC). 
8. Friendly Societies Commission (FSC). 
9. Registry Friendly Societies (RFS). 
During October 1998 the FSA was introduced, and in June 1988 the Bank of England 
Act 1998 formally transfers responsibility for banking and wholesale market 
supervision to the FSA. The FSA starts supply regulatory and other services in 
January 1999.26 
We conclude this section with a summary of the requirements from the Bank for any 
authorised institutions as listed in its published paper "A stable financial system": `To 
become authorised, and to remain authorised, a bank must have adequate capital, 
and must make appropriate provisions against possible bad debts. The aim is to 
ensure that there are sufficient resources available to the bank to absorb losses 
23 Bank of England, 'Implementation in the UK of the Directive on the Monitoring and Control of 
Large Exposures of Credit Institutions', BSD/1993/2. 
24 Bank of England, 'Implementation in the UK of the Capital Adequacy Directive', S&S/1995/2, April 
1995. 
25 Bank of England, 'Implementation in the UK of the Capital Adequacy Directive', (amendments to 
S&S/1995/2), S&S/1995/4, December 1995 
26 Financial Services Authority, Summary Annual Report, 1998/1999. 
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without placing depositors' money at risk. The bank must also have enough ready 
cash, or liquidity, to meet likely withdrawals. The quality of management is very 
important: directors and senior managers must be honest and competent - fit and 
proper, in the language of the Act. So must those who control banks - major 
shareholders, for example. There must be adequate internal systems and controls to 
enable management to assess their risks properly and to ensure that prudent banking 
procedures are observed. '27 
Table 1-2 presents all policy and practice notices issued by the Bank *of England for 
the period 1981 to 1995. 
27 Bank of England, 'A stable financial system', 1997. 
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Table 1-2: List of policy and practice for the period 1981-1995. 
Title Date of Issue 
Foreign currency exposure April 1981 
Measurement of liquidity July 1982 
Connected lending; accounts ; large exposures; fraudulent 
invitations; floating charges (BSD/1983/1) 
April 1983 
Foreign currency options April 1984 
Note issuance facilities/revolving underwriting facilities 
(BSD/1985/2) 
April 1985 
Statistical notice to monetary sector institutions (released in 
conjunction with BSD/1985/2) 
April 1985 
Large exposures in relation to mergers and acquisitions 
(BSD/1986/1) 
February 1986 
Subordinated loan capital (BSD/1986/2) March 1986 
Statistical notice to monetary sector institutions June 1986 
Large underwriting exposures(BSD/1987/1.1) February 1988 
Advertising for deposits April 1988 
Supervisory treatment of ECU Treasury bills (BSD/1988/2) October 1988 
Letter to authorised institutions concerning money laundering January 1989 
Loan transfer and securitisation (BSD/1989/1) February 1989 
Further letter to authorised institutions concerning money 
laundering 
November 
1989 
Letter to authorised institutions concerning advertising of 
interest-bearing accounts 
December 
1990 
Letter to authorised institutions concerning guidance notes issued 
by the Joint money Laundering Working Group 
December 
1990 
Code of conduct for the advertising of interest-bearing accounts December 
1990 
Implementation in the UK of the Directive of Own Funds of 
Credit Institutions (BSD/ 1990/2) 
December 
1990 
Implementation in the UK of the Solvency Ratio Directive December 
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(BSD/1990/3) 1990 
Statistical notice to reporting banks on capital adequacy treatment December 
of deferred tax assets 1990 
Implementation in the UK of the Directive on Own funds of January 1992 
Credit Institutions (BSD/1992/1) 
Loan transfer and securitisation (BSD/1992/3) (amendment to April 1992 
1989 paper) 
Verification of interim profits in the context of Own Funds August 1992 
Directive (BSD/1992/5). 
Implementation in the UK of the Solvency Ratio Directive November 
(BSD/1992/6) (amendment to the 1990 paper) 1992 
Letter to authorised institutions concerning debt provisioning February 1993 
Implementation in the UK of the Directive on the consolidated March 1993 
Supervision of Credit Institutions (BSD/1993/1) 
Statement of principles( Banking Act 1987 section 16; The May 1993 
Banking CO-ordination (Second Council Directive) Regulation 
1992 Schedule 7 
Implementation in the UK of the Directive on the Monitoring and October 1993 
Control of Large Exposures of Credit Institutions (BSD/1993/2) 
On balance sheet netting and cash collateral (BSD/1993/3) December 
1993 
Subordinated loan capital issued by UK-incorporated authorised May 1994 
institutions (BSD/1994/3) 
Implementation in the UK of the Solvency Ratio Directive March 1995 
(S&S/1995/1) (further amendment to the 1990 paper) 
Implementation in the UK of the Capital Adequacy Directive April 1995 
(S&S/1995/2) 
Implementation in the UK of the Capital Adequacy Directive December 
(amendments to S&S/1995/2) (S&S/1995/3) 1995 
otes: (1. ) BSD: Banking Supervision Division. 
(2. ) S&S: Supervision and Surveillance. 
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1.4 Conclusions. 
The objective of this chapter was to identify economic and market trends, as well as 
regulatory alterations, that stimulated changes in the UK banking industry. Changing 
economic forces during the last two decades generated the need for new financial 
products and services. Changes in the banks' structure and strategies led to new kinds 
of financial technology, whereas banking became more international and banks 
expanded into foreign banking systems. With internalisation of financial services and 
deregulation in the EU, UK banking industry became more open to equal competition. 
At the same time there has been a re-regulation trend to capture the new exposures of 
banks in the face of the new environment. 
The major market trends in the UK banking industry during the 1980s and mid 1990s 
were, first, the improvements in technology that introduced new facilities and new 
services to customers. Credit cards and cash dispenser, as well as credit transfer and 
direct debit facilities became readily available in early 1980s, while during 1990s 
information technology considered as a major part of the improvement process in 
banks' efficiency. Second, the number of off-balance sheet activities, product 
innovation, and banks' movements into securities trading increased considerably. In 
attempting to reduce their risk exposures UK banks increased their involvement in 
domestic and international securities, while they also tried to increase the liquidity of 
their portfolios with securitisation. Third, following the international recession during 
the late 1970s there was a large bad -debt provisions that increased the number of 
countries experiencing debt-servicing difficulties. Increases in the bad debt provision 
came forth again during the end of 1980s. Due to worsening economic conditions 
there were signs of increased difficulties in property, retail and service sector. In the 
light of that, banks added substantial new provisions, sometimes up to 80%. The high 
levels of bad debts provisions led to sharp falls in profits. Fourth, there was a 
liberalisation of cross-border trade of banking and financial services, and the right to 
establishment of EU financial institutions in other EU member countries. 
As far as regulations are concerned, the most important trends are, first, the Banking 
Act 1979 and its legislative renovation of 1987 with the Banking Act 1987, and, 
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second, the national implementation of the European Banking Directives through 
secondary legislation and policy notices issued by the Bank of England. The two 
Banking Acts, emerged from the need to protect investors and the economy, from 
extensive failures among banks. The national implementation of the EU Banking 
Directives came from the tendency towards fully harmonised national regulations in 
view of European integration. According to the Bank the most important regulation 
in the establishment of the EC Single Market in banking is the Second Banking 
Directive. Current banking regulations in the UK aim at an optimal trade-off between 
motivations for quality and competitiveness of bank services, and soundness and 
stability of the banking industry. 
Given all these changes over the last two decades, it is of interest to investigate cost 
economies and efficiency in the UK banking industry. As deregulation induced 
substantially changes, and as technology and wider market developments release new 
competitive pressures, banks are required work at high efficiency levels, and adopt the 
most cost-efficient size and product mix. Moreover, given the changes in the 
structure of the banking industry, a main policy issue arises: which type of banking 
structure serves best the public in terms of both cost and availability of banking 
services. The current study, taking into the market and regulatory alterations that 
constitute the major forces of change in the UK banking industry, concentrates on the 
estimating the performance of UK banks for the period 1980 to 1995, having as a 
starting point the current chapter, which provides an insight to all of the changes in 
the industry following the introduction of the Banking Act of 1979 until the Bank of 
England Act of 1998. 
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1.5 Appendix to Chapter 1 
1.5.1 The measurement of capital 
There are two measures for assessing the adequacy of capital: the gearing ratio and 
risk asset ratio. The first one is the ratio of current liabilities to capital resources, 
excluding that part of capital that is utilised to finance infrastructure and other non- 
banking activities. The second one refers to the risk of losses generated with the use 
of the assets of the institution to the capital that is available to finance such losses. 
For the calculation if gearing and risk asset ratios the following items of the balance 
sheet are employed: 
Table 1-3 : Composition of gearing and risk asset ratios28 
Requirements Gearing ratio Risk asset ratio 
Capital base Share capital Share capital 
Loan capital Loan capital 
Minority interest Minority interest 
Reserves Reserves 
General Provisions General Provisions 
Deduction from Investment in subsidiaries and Investment in subsidiaries and 
the capital base associates associates 
(adjustments) Goodwill Goodwill 
Equipment Equipment 
Premises Other fixed assets 
Other fixed assets 
Adjusted capital Deposit and other non-capital Adjusted total of risk assets2 9 
base liabilities Risk asset ratio =3 as 
Gearing ratio = 3: 4 percentage of 6 
28 Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, "The measurement of capita! ", September 1980, p. p. 
329. 
29 The classification of assets and the risk weights attached to each of them are given by the Bank-see 
"The measurement ofcapital ", Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin: September 1980, p. p. 329. 
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1.5.2 Foreign currency exposure30 
The paper states the basis on which the Bank would measure, monitor and discuss 
with deposit taking institutions. In accordance with the paper the following list 
contains the elements to be measured: 
1. The Bank regards exposures generated from any uncovered foreign currency 
position in any currency, as well as the aggregate net position in all currencies. 
2. Future flows of income and expenses not yet received could give rise to an 
exposure. If those are determinable, then they should be measured. 
3. A distinction is required between daily banking operations from those exposures 
that are long-term in nature. 
4. The Bank would consider as long-term exposures those that arise from banks' 
fixed and long-term assets and liabilities, including items such as loan capital, 
premises and investments in subsidiaries and associates. 
The following list contains elements to reported and monitor: 
(A) UK-incorporated institutions: 
1. There are no formal limits for a bank's foreign currency position, but there would 
be agreed position guidelines with each institution individually. 
2. The guidelines compare both the dealing position (daily banking operation) and the 
capital of each bank. 
(B) Overseas branches of UK banks: the aforementioned requirements are applicable 
to all the branches of each bank, both in the UK and overseas. 
(C) UK branches of foreign banks: for monitoring purposes, the Bank would take into 
account the branch's own internal controls, those exercised by the head office, and the 
monitoring arrangements of its own supervisory authority. If the Bank does not 
consider these satisfactory, it would agree appropriate absolute levels of exposure to 
serve as guidelines. 
(D) Frequency and method of reporting: 
1. So as to monitor the banks' position, the Bank requires returns to be made on a 
monthly basis. These would give the net spot long or short position and the net 
forward long or short position in each currency at the close of business on the 
reporting day. The sum of these positions would give the overall net position in 
each currency, in current terms. 
3o Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, "Foreign currency exposures", April 1981 p. p. 235-237. 
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2. The part of the bank's positions which is agreed to regarded as structural (long- 
term), should be deducted from the overall net position in that currency to give the 
dealing position. 
3. Swaps should be excluded from the dealing positions. 
4. When the dealing position is determined, then it should be translated into sterling 
pounds. 
1.5.3 The measurement of liquidity31. 
The measure is based on a cash flow basis approach, taking liabilities and assets in 
currency together. In some case it can also be applied to liabilities and assets in one 
or a group of currencies. It is a `series of accumulating net mismatch position is 
successive time bands'. The measure combines the following features: 
1. Liabilities: Deposits of all types, known firm commitments to make funds available 
on a particular date, commitments which are not due to be met on a particular date. 
Contingent liabilities are not included. 
2. Assets: Assets are measured by references to their maturity, marketable assets are 
taken into account in the cases where they can be sold for cash quickly, contractual 
standby facilities the bank by other banks. Assets know to be of doubtful value are 
excluded from the measurement. 
1.5.4 Loan Transfer and Securitisation. (BSD/1989/1). 
`Transfer by novation and assignments duly notified to the borrower, provided that 
there are no rights of set-off between the borrower, provided that there are no rights of 
set-off between the borrower and the seller, are regarded as clean transfers and the 
relevant assets are excluded from the calculation of the seller's risk-asset ration and 
included in the buyer's. Less favourable treatment is reserved for transfers by silent 
agreements (without notification to the borrower) and sub-participation (which do not 
involve the legal transfer of the right and obligations under the original loan but an 
entirely separate back-to-back non-recourse funding arrangements): the transfers are 
disregarded and the assets included in the seller's ratio if the Bank is not satisfied that 
the full risk has effectively passed to the buyer and that the latter has no recourse to 
31 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, " The measurement of Liquidity'; July 1982 p. p. 399401. 
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the seller. With regard to securitisation, the policy warns the banks originating or 
servicing the securities against the assumption of residual "moral" obligation to 
support losses incurred by the buyers of the securities and draws attention to the 
operational risks. '32 
1.5.5 EU Banking Directives 
1.5.5.1 Own Funds Directive 
The Directive aims to establish a common definition and classification for the capital 
base of credit institutions - banks and building societies - as a basis for setting 
minimum levels of capacity adequacy. The capital is divided into two categories core 
and supplementary capital. The latter may be included in the calculation of the own 
funds only in amounts that do not exceed 100% of the former. Member states were 
required to bring the Directive into force by 1 January 1993. The Bank recognised the 
following items as core capital: 
1. permanent shareholders' equity; 
2. disclosed reserves arising from the appropriation of the retained earnings, share 
premium s and other surplus; 
3. published interim retained profits; and 
4. minority core-capital interests arising on consolidation; 
but requires the deduction from their total of- 
1- goodwill and other intangible assets; 
2. current year's unpublished losses; and 
3. equity issued by the capitalisation of property revaluation reserves. 
The following items are recognised as supplementary capital, up to an overall limit of 
100% of the core capital: 
1. undisclosed reserves and unpublished interim retained profits; 
2. reserves arising from the revaluation of fixed assets; 
3. general provisions against loss up to 25% of total risk-weighted assets (but not 
special provisions); 
3Z, Hadjienvnanuil, C. "Banking Regulation and the Bank of England", UK: LLP limited, 1996, p. p. 
202. 
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4. hybrid capital instruments, i. e. perpetual cumulative preferred shares under certain 
conditions and only up to 50% of the core capital; 
5. minority supplementary-capital interests arising on consolidation; 
6. equity issued by the capitalisation of property revaluation reserves. 
The following items are deducted from the total of core and supplementary capital: 
1. investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and associates; 
2. connected lending of capital nature; 
3. all holdings of other credit institutions' capital instruments. 
1.5.5.2 Solvency Ratio Directive 
It sets minimum standards of capital adequacy that the credit institutions have to meet, 
by establishing a uniform method of assessing the ability of credit institutions to meet 
credit losses arising from default of their customers. The directive sets out a risk asset 
ratio to be applied to credit institutions, where the numerator of the ratio is the capital 
of an institution as defined in the Own Funds Directive. The denominator is the 
institution's total assets and off-balance sheet liabilities adjusted to reflect differing 
degrees of risk. It requires the calculation of solvency ratios on a consolidated basis 
at least twice per year. 
1.5.5.3 Second Banking Directive 
It aims at the provision of banking services across the Community. The intuition 
behind was to harmonise laws and rules for credit institutions so that they can set up 
and operate freely across the Community being subject to adequate supervision. The 
main provisions of the directive were as follows: 
1. minimum capital requirements for banks of 5 million ECUs, with special 
provisions for smaller banks, 
2. provision for monitoring and venting the bodies that have substantial bank 
shareholding, 
3. controls over banks' long-term participation in non-financial companies, and 
4. the establishment of a single banking `passport' to permit activity within the EC, 
which is based on the `home country control' and mutual recognition'. 
Member states were required to bring the Directive into force by 1 January 1993. 
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1.5.5.4 Capital Adequacy Directive 
It proposes uniform minimum capital cover for trading activities, for credit 
institutions, securities and investment firms. The requirements are based on the 
allocation of a credit institution's holdings of financial instruments33 between the so- 
called "trading book" and the non-trading, or banking book. 
" Only restrictive positions in the financial instruments held for resale or short-term 
benefit from price changes and exposures due to unsettled transaction, free 
deliveries and over-the-counter derivative instruments can be included in the 
trading book. Allocation of items between the two books must take place on the 
basis of the objective and consistently applied criteria. The regulated institutions 
must "mark to market". 
All institutions are required to support their trading-book positions and their 
foreign-exchange exposures, with capital. Under the "building-block" approach 
appropriate amounts of capital cover are calculated separately as a fraction of the 
nominal value of the underlying contract or exposure, for the various identifiable 
risks inherent in the holding of trading positions. The overall capital requirements 
is found by adding these amounts. 
9 Common standards are developed for: 
1. specific (related to changes in the price of the particular instrument) and 
general (related to broad market-wide movements) positions risk arising from 
holdings of traded debt and equity instruments, including derivatives as well as 
underwriting risk arising from the underwriting of such instruments, 
2. counterparty and settlement or delivery risks arising from uncompleted 
securities transactions, 
3. foreign exchange risks. 34 
33 This involves transferable securities, units in collective investment schemes, money market 
instruments, futures contracts, forward interest rate agreements, interest rate, currency and equity 
swaps, or options to acquire or dispose any of the above 
34 Hadjiemmanuil, C. "Banking Regulation and the Bank of England"; UK: LLP limited, 1996, p. p. 
207. 
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The Directive set as implementation date the 1st of January 1995, with the national 
provisions becoming effective by 1 January 1996 at the latest. 
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CHAPTER 2: The Theory of Modern Banking Firm 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the crucial problems in finance is to match preferences of surplus sector to 
lend short, with those of the deficit sector to borrow long. Hicks (1939) characterised 
this as the `constitutional weakness' of an unintermediated financial market. This 
`constitutional weakness' led to the development of financial intermediaries. 
Financial institutions interpose between the ultimate lender and the ultimate borrower. 
The lender places funds with a financial intermediary instead of providing the funds to 
the final borrower, and in return has a deposit or a claim on the financial intermediary. 
In turn, the financial firm, having received the funds of the ultimate lender, is then 
capable of on-lending these funds to the ultimate borrower. The latter provides 
securities held by the financial intermediary. 
But why is it necessary for the financial intermediary to stand between the ultimate 
lender and the ultimate borrower? The answer is twofold. First, in the absence of 
intermediation the presence of information costs weakens the ability of the potential 
lender to find the most appropriate borrower. Second, borrowers and lenders may 
have different liquidity preferences. The divergence between borrower's and lender's 
preferences regarding contract terms and direct finance costs, information gathering 
and monitoring of borrowers, and accepting risks associated with asset 
transformation, created a space for intermediaries to fill. 
Financial institutions are divided into two broad categories: bank and non-bank 
financial firms. The major feature that distinguishes banks from other financial 
institutions is the creating aspect of their activities [Partington (1989)]. It is suggested 
that banks can increase the total volume of spending in the economy by their unique 
ability to add to the stock of existing credit. On the other hand, non-bank financial 
institutions play basically a transmission role in the economy, by transmitting funds 
created by the banking system. Accordingly, banks are central to the smooth 
functioning of the economy with their uniqueness based on the services they provide. 
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2.2 The rational for banks 
The first step towards studying financial intermediation is to examine the reasoning of 
bank existence. The question `why do banks exist' is central to the literature. Recent 
studies on banks emphasise their role in providing liquidity insurance and risk-sharing 
opportunities to the agents, by transforming illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, 
[Diamond and Dybving (1983), Freeman (1988)], minimising transaction costs by 
acting as delegated monitors of investors, [Diamond (1984,1989,1996), Chant 
(1987)], and providing payments and portfolio services. 
2.2.1 Portfolio Management 
Financial intermediaries transform primary securities issued by firms into indirect 
financial securities desired by final investors. However, by definition, the chain of 
transaction between the firm and the final investor is longer than in direct finance 
additional transactions might lead to an increase in transaction costs. Consequently, 
any proposition that intermediated finance is more advantageous than direct finance 
must be based on the view that presumed gains from intermediation outweigh 
increased transaction costs. 
Gurley and Shaw (1960) view intermediaries as the missing link between firms and 
final investors. In their model, firms issue shares and bonds, whereas the final 
investor desires demand deposit or life insurance policies. Intermediaries come as 
connection between the two. They issue demand deposits or insurance policies and 
hold shares and bonds. But why firms do not issue demand deposits and insurance 
policies and final investors do not hold shares and bonds? And why intermediaries 
are actually needed in the Gurley-Shaw analysis? The answer is that direct finance 
does not permit enough diversification of risk, whereas financial intermediaries are 
able to do that. Moreover, the function of intermediation in the Gurley and Shaw 
study can be viewed as overcoming frictions due to transaction costs. Firms could 
issue the demand deposits required by consumers who face consumption-timing risk, 
but it might be costly for most consumers to lend directly to a diversified array of 
firms. By definition, small investors prefer to diversify their risk, which multiplies 
contracts and transaction costs. 
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2.2.2 Provision of Payment Mechanism 
In developed economies, the payment system is an accounting procedure by which 
transfer of ownership of certain assets is carried out in settlement of debts incurred. 
Thus another pivotal role of banks is to facilitate payments and keep rack of wealth 
among individuals. This booking-activity of banks is realised by debiting and 
crediting accounts. With the introduction of banks and the payment mechanism that 
they provide, the holding cost that individuals incurred though the use of currency is 
reduced by the provision of currency storage and dispensing facilities. 
2.2.3 Transformation of illiquid assets to liquid liabilities 
With the liquidity35 function, banks transform short-term liabilities preferred by 
consumers into long term loans desired by firms. In general, banks are able to 
transform illiquid assets by offering liabilities with different, smoother pattern of 
returns over time that the illiquid assets offer, and this illiquidity of assets provides the 
rational for the existence of banks [Diamond and Dybving (1983)]. 
An argument formalised by Diamond and Dybving (1983) and expanded by Freeman 
(1988) is that an important activity of banks is to finance illiquid assets with short- 
term deposits. In the model proposed by Diamond and Dybving (1983) investors join 
intermediaries to minimise their risk. But as suggested by Freeman, even risk neutral 
investors could join intermediaries because they receive expected return through 
reduction of transaction costs. 
Also, intermediary contracts prevent inefficient interruption of production. Provision 
of liquidity improves a competitive market through risk sharing among people who 
wish to consume at different random times. While an individual investor faces 
uncertainty about his consumption path, banks can forecast the intertemporal 
distribution of aggregate consumption. This makes possible for the bank to promise 
withdrawals on demand while keeping only a fraction of its assets in liquid though 
35 Liquidity is based on a number of asset properties: (1) Marketability which is associated with the 
ease and speed with which the value of an asset can be realised, (2) Reversibility which refers to the 
difference in value between the simultaneous acquirement and realisation of assets, (3) Divisibility 
which is reflected in the smallest unit in which the transaction in the asset concerned is occurred, (4) 
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less productive reserves. Basically, the bank's service is to reassign the ownership of 
the bank's short and long run assets according to realised needs. 
2.2.4 Acting as delegated monitors of investors 
Another function of banks is that of minimising transaction costs by monitoring loans 
and signalling in the presence of asymmetric information [Diamond (1984,1989, and 
1996), Chant (1987), Battacharya and Thakor (1993)]. `Private information held by 
borrower results in contracting problems, and the delegation of screening and 
monitoring to banks is an efficient allocation mechanism' 36 
In particular, before reaching a decision about a project, investors examine it with 
respect to its potential productivity. But once the investment takes place, other 
problems arise. Can it be assured that funds will be directed towards the agreed 
purpose? Will borrowers fulfil their financial obligations once the repayment is 
due? 37 To this extent, the monitoring and enforcement problems shift away from 
ultimate lenders to the intermediary. Because the bank now acts as a delegated agent 
with the responsibility of monitoring and enforcing, becomes the residual claimant of 
income. Banks borrow from small investors (depositors) using unmonitored debt 
(deposits) to lend to borrowers whose loans are monitored. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) were the first to present an informational framework for 
financial intermediaries in the context of delegated monitoring. They suggested that 
financial intermediaries are able to discover the qualities of individual assets and 
portfolios and then sell the claims diversified portfolios to investors. They claimed 
that a bank could attain information about borrowers at lower cost than individual 
borrowers. 
Formalising the ideas of Leland and Pyle, Diamond (1984) indicated the value of 
diversification in reducing monitoring costs. He suggested that the potentiality of 
Capital certainty which is the extent to which an asset's future value in terms of cash can be foreseen at 
future date. 
36 Baltensperer and Dermine (1993), p. p. 26. 37 The cost of ensuring that funds will be used for the agreed purpose is called monitoring cost, while 
the cost of ensuring whether borrowers are solvent is called enforcement cost. 
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financial institutions rests on two propositions. First, monitoring and control of a firm 
involve natural scale economies. A single financial intermediary monitoring and 
controlling firms is at least as effective as ten thousand shareholders, yet at a lower 
cost. Second, if a well established portfolio of firms being financed by intermediary 
exists, then the relations between the financial intermediary and its own financiers 
will not be significantly affected by moral hazard and asymmetric information. Based 
on the two propositions, Diamond showed that under certain situations, an economy 
with intermediation is more incentive-efficient than with out it. 
From the above stated, we see that banks have comparative advantage in monitoring. 
Also the transformation of short-term liabilities (preferred by consumers) into long- 
term loans (preferred by firms) must be considered as a joint product with delegated 
monitoring. 
2.3 Banking Regulations 
A government tries through the regulations to establish an efficient and stable banking 
system. The rational for banking regulation rests on two characteristics, namely the 
social value of banks and the possibility of market failure. As stated in the previous 
section, banks provide liquidity, transform illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, and act 
as delegated monitors of investors, along with the traditional function of providing 
payment and portfolio services. The social value associated with these functions 
exceeds their private value; the interruption of these services would be costly for the 
economy as the production could be severely affected and assets are liquidated 
prematurely. In such a case, markets fail to provide the right quantity of services at 
the right price, and banks should be regulated in order to ensure the adequate 
provision of these services. Because banks play a central role to the smooth 
functioning of an economy, extensive failures among banks could seriously obstruct 
other sectors of the economy. 
Furthermore, in an unregulated economy, there is always higher possibility of market 
failure. The sources of market failure come from the first two functions of banks. 
Specifically, risk-sharing deposit contracts leave banks vulnerable to panic runs. This 
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is the core of the most coherent rational for deposit insurance, articulated by Diamond 
and Dybving (1983). Runs can be provoked by panics, encouraging depositors to 
withdraw their funds. This results in the premature liquidation of assets and the 
collapse of what would otherwise be a sound bank. 38 
Additionally, there is risk due to asymmetry of information between banks and 
investors. Banks lend to companies rather than invest in marketable securities and as a 
result their activities are difficult to monitor. The evaluation of bank risks is very 
costly because bank activities are difficult to control, as it is difficult for individual 
investors to collect information about bank investments. Hence, monitoring and 
evaluation of banks by each depositor separately is not possible. Nevertheless, perfect 
information is a necessary condition for the existence of competitive markets. 
Otherwise investors cannot access banks at all times, which creates again the problem 
of market failure. In turn, if investors do not realise that a single bank failure is not a 
sign of total collapse of the system, then panic runs may be observed. Therefore, 
externalities between investors and banks justify regulation. 
In determining the scope and the forms of regulation, regulators must bear in mind 
that the two classes of market failures described above are very different in nature. 
Firstly, the systematic risk caused by bank runs, where investors face the risk of 
insolvency, is basically financial in nature. To avoid this risk a central requirement is 
that banks hold sufficient capital so as to reduce the risk of market failure. On the 
other hand, the risk arising from asymmetric information reflects the nature and the 
activities of a firm and its employees. Consequently, regulations are unlikely to play 
an important role to the extent that they are indirectly related to the nature and the 
activities of the firm and its employees, since any correction of asymmetric 
information is based on screening and monitoring of firms and its employees. 
38 Three conditions are necessary to make panics possible in the absence of any regulations; First, 
banks must satisfy a sequential service constraint, that is withdrawals tenders must be served 
sequentially till the bank runs out of assets. This creates incentives to run and get the money before 
other people. Second, investments of the bank cannot be totally liquid. Differently by withdrawing 
early it is not possible to gain anything. And third, depositors must have high enough degree of risk 
aversion. Otherwise the optimal risk sharing contract involves a face value lower than the liquidation of 
bank assets. 
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2.4 Measuring Bank Output 
So far, the intermediary and payment functions were identified as reasons for bank 
existence and rational for regulating banking industry. It must be admitted though 
that their activities raise definitional problems of the determination of their 
production. The literature has exposed considerable difficulties in the definition and 
measurement of bank input and output, since financial institutions are multi-product 
firms producing services rather than physical products. Output of primary and 
secondary industries can be measured in terms of physical quantities or money values 
deflated by appropriate price indices, whereas output in the form of services usually 
cannot be measured in terms of physical quantities. In addition, the output and input 
of financial institutions presents particular difficulties because each bank is a multi- 
product firm, where many of its services are joint or interdependent, and also banking 
is subject to government regulation that may affect cost, prices or its level of output 
[Kinsella (1980)]. Asa result, economists disagree on the correct definition of output 
and input in the banking industry, because each definition embeds a particular set of 
banking concepts. 
To define input and output of banks two main questions should be answered. First, 
how to choose the appropriate output and input and second, how to measure these 
variables. As far as the latter is concerned, the solution is constrained by data 
availability and requires choosing if inputs will be measured by flow or stock 
variables. In the banking industry it is appropriate to consider some stocks as a proxy 
of outputs (although this is unusual for other sectors of economic activity), given the 
assumption that deposits and outstanding loans require a continuous flow of work 
independent of customer's demand. Furthermore, stock measures can be chosen 
because of data availability. 
Benston, et al. (1982) have described the above problem in the following manner: 
`One's view of what banks produce depends on one's interest. Economists who are 
concerned with economy-wide issues tend to view bank's output as dollars of deposits 
or loans. Monetary economists see banks as producers of money-demand deposits. 
48 
Chapter 2 
Other sees banks as producing loans, with demand and time deposits being analogous 
to raw-materials'. 39 
The lack of consensus in the relevant literature leaves the definition of input and 
output unsettled, and up to now there is no precise definition. Most prior banking 
studies did not use national accounting measures; instead they tended to adopt either 
the production approach, or the intermediation approach. According to the 
production approach banks are viewed as firms that are mainly producers of demand 
deposits, time and savings deposits, and loans account services. Output is measured 
by the number of account serviced or the number of transactions carried out on each 
type of product, while input cost is . total operating cost 
incurred in the production of 
these outputs. Output is treated as a flow, i. e. as the amount of output produced per 
unit of time, and inflation bias is absent. In this approach the definition of inputs 
includes capital and labour but precludes interest costs. The production approach is 
appropriate for studying cost efficiency of banks since it concerns operating costs. 
On the other hand, in the intermediation approach banks are viewed as intermediators 
of financial services. They transform and transfer financial resources from units in 
surplus to units in deficit. The value of loans, investments, and other assets are 
viewed as appropriate measures of bank's output. Inputs include total production 
costs, which are labour, capital, operating cost plus interest costs. As far as deposits 
are concerned, some studies use them as bank input and others as bank output. This 
approach is merely used for studies where most activities of banks involve are 
purchasing funds from other financial institutions and large deposits, and turning them 
into loans and financial investments. 
The intermediation approach was first used in early cost studies. Alhadeff (1954) and 
Horvitz (1962) measured bank output as the ratio of loans and investments, to total 
assets to reflect used capacity to total capacity of the bank. Moreover, average costs 
were measured by the ratio of total expenses to loans and investments. In this sense, 
earning assets were used as the measure of bank output. The major disadvantage of 
this measure is that it excludes other assets; this omission will tend to inflate the unit 
39 Benton et al. (1982). 
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cost of larger banks. The studies of Schweger and McGee (1961) and Gramley (1962) 
were not subject to this potential bias because total assets and deposits were used to 
normalise expense data. However, all these studies used real-valued unweighted 
indices, which ignored the differential importance of individual bank products, the 
relative cost of production, and the easiness with which banks can change their 
product mix. Further the amount of assets and deposits are `stock' concepts, while 
production is a `flow' concept. 
To correct some of these problems, studies in late 60's and 70's have used weighted 
indices to measure banks' output. For example, Greenbaum (1967) used the market 
value of services to measure output in an attempt to estimate the real social value of 
banking services. He considered demand and time deposits as inputs, and output was 
expressed in terms of assets. With the use of linear regression methods he derived a 
set of average interest rates charged on various categories or earning assets which 
were used as weights; however, a major problem of this approach was that it ignored 
the effect of inflation on interest rates. 
Meanwhile, Benston (1965) introduced the production approach. The advantage of 
this method is that it allows numbers of accounts and average size of accounts to have 
differential effects on costs. Further, it meets some of the problems of the 
intermediation approach by removing the inflation bias and is a flow concept. On the 
other hand, this approach suffers from lack of a method for weighting the contribution 
of each service to total output and omits many important items of bank services such 
as interest costs. Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey (1982) used a new output measure 
called the Divisia Multilateral Index, which is defined as the weighted numbers of 
accounts in each activity area. Again, the approach is still vulnerable to criticism due 
to the omission of interest cost, which constitutes a substantial proportion of bank's 
total costs. This approach dominated the literature until the beginning of the 1980s. In 
more recent studies this approach has only be used by studies focusing on the relative 
efficiency of branches within a particular bank, rather than across banks. Latest 
studies use the intermediation approach, based on the notion that output should be 
measured as the dollar value of banks' earning assets. 
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Berger and Humphrey (1992b) stated that before reaching a decision on which of the 
above method is to be used, an identification of the most important banking function 
for the study being undertaken is required. Consequently, they outlined three 
approaches to this initial identification process. 
The first one is the asset approach, which is a variant of the intermediation approach. 
According to this approach, assets (mainly those that produce loans) strictly define 
outputs. Banks are considered as financial intermediaries between liability holders 
and bank funds recipients. Loans and other assets are considered as output, whereas 
deposits and other liabilities are inputs to the intermediation process. However, this 
approach has one major drawback. For some large banks, that basically purchase 
their funds from other banks and turn these funds into loans, the asset approach is a 
satisfactory description. Nonetheless, most banks, especially nowadays, do more than 
simply purchasing their funds; they provide a series of services to their depositors, 
which are not counted as output in this approach. For studies of loan cost or studies 
of bank's profitability asset approach is the most appropriate because costs and 
different methods of raising funds are taken as exogenous variables (assuming the 
utilisation of a reduced form model). In contrast, studies that consider total banking 
output need to consider a structural form in which purchased funds are an 
intermediated output of raising deposits, and the services provided to depositors are a 
partial payment for these funds. 
The user cost approach determines whether a financial product is defined as an input 
or output on the basis of its net contribution to the bank revenue. If the cost of a 
particular liability is less than the opportunity cost or if the returns of an asset exceed 
the opportunity cost, then the item is considered as an output, while otherwise it is 
considered as an input. `An optimising bank earns exactly its opportunity costs of 
funds at the margin on each asset and pays exactly its opportunity costs at the margin 
on every liability. Thus, to the extent that the user cost approach accurately measures 
marginal financial revenues and opportunity costs, its allocation is largely on the 
basis of excluded operating costs. '40 Nevertheless, there are some problems in 
measuring financial revenues and marginal opportunity costs, which makes the 
40 Berger and Humphrey (1992a) p. p. 247. 
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determination of bank output and input subject to significant measurement error and 
sensitive to changes of data over time. A major difficulty involves the presentation of 
assets and liabilities in the balance sheets of the banks. Banks frequently use 
compensated balances or pay below market rates on deposits as a method of charging 
for bank services. Further, sometimes borrowers required to hold part of their loans 
as idle demand deposit balances. Consequently, some of the bank's earnings on loans 
are less than the opportunity cost of funds on deposits. Hence, there is a bias towards 
finding loans to be inputs or to have a smaller output weight, and towards finding 
demand deposits to be an output or to have a higher output weight. 
Another problem is the adjustment of the opportunity cost for important 
characteristics of bank assets and liabilities, such as differences in maturity and credit 
risk. According to theory, the financial return or cost of each category must be 
adjusted before applying a common opportunity cost. However these adjustments are 
difficult to be implemented in practice. 
Finally, another approach is the value-added approach. The difference of this 
approach from asset and user cost approaches is that it considers all liabilities and 
assets categories to have some output characteristics, rather than distinguishing inputs 
and outputs in a mutually exclusive way. In this approach the identification of 
activities as inputs and outputs is based on the share of value added, which means that 
items of balance sheet with substantial share of value are considered important 
outputs. Under the value-added approach the major categories of produced deposits, 
namely demand, time and savings, and loans are considered as output, whereas 
purchased funds are considered as inputs because they require very small amounts of 
labour and capital. Furthermore, government securities and other non-loan 
investment are considered to be unimportant outputs, because again their value-added 
requirements are very low. Table 1 gives a summary of input and output measures of 
latest studies together with the approach used in the determination of these inputs and 
outputs. 
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Table 2-1: Input-Output Measures in Bank Cost Literature. 
Authors Inputs Outputs Approach 
Benston, Labour Demand deposits PA 
Hanweck, and Capital Time and saving deposits 
Humphrey (1982) Real estate loans 
Instalment loans 
Business Loans 
Gilligan and Deposits Loans PA 
Smirlock (1984) Total Securities 
Berger, Hanweck, Labour Demand deposits PA (No of 
and Humphrey Capital Time and savings deposits ales and 
(1987) Real estate loans average 
Commercial loans size of 
Instalment loans a/cs) 
IA (dollar) 
Aly, Grabowski, Labour Real estate loans IA 
Pasurka, Ragan Capital Commercial and estate loans 
(1990) Loanable funds Other loans 
Demand deposits 
Farrier and Labour No of demand deposit PA 
Lovell (1990) (employees) accounts 
Occupancy costs No of time deposits 
and expenditure on accounts 
furniture and No of real estate loans 
equipment No of commercial loans 
Expenditure on No of instalment loans 
materials 
Berger and Labour Deposits (demand, retail and IA 
Humphrey (1991) Physical capital savings) 
Purchased funds Loans (Real estate, 
Large certificates commercial and industrial, 
of deposit instalment) 
Foreign deposits 
Other liabilities for 
borrowed money 
Glass and Labour Lending output IA 
McKillop (1992) Capital Lending plus non-lending 
Loanable Funds output 
Total earning assets 
Berger and Labour Demand deposits IA 
Iiumphrey (1992) Physical Capital Time and savings deposits 
Purchased Funds Real estate loans 
Corn nercial and industrial 
loans 
Instalment loans 
Nathan and Labour Commercial and industrial IA 
Neave (1992) Physical Capital loans (1,2 and 5) 
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Financial Capital Other loans VAA 
Time deposits (1,2,3, and 
Demand deposits 4) 
Securities and investments 
Mester (1992) Labour Loans required monitoring IA 
Physical capital New loans originated 
Deposits Loans purchased 
Borrowed funds Average loans sold 
Grabowski, Labour Loans (Commercial and IA 
Rangan, Capital industrial, consumers loans) 
Rezvanian (1993) Loanable Funds Demand deposits 
Investment securities 
Bauer, Berger and Labour Demand Deposits IA 
Humphrey (1993) Physical Capital Small time and saving 
Purchased funds deposits 
Real estate loans 
Commercial and industrial 
loans 
Instalment loans 
English, Interest bearing Loans ( real estate, AA 
Grosskopf, small deposits commercial, consumer 
Hayes, Labour instalment loans) 
Yaisawarng Occupancy Investments 
(1993) expenses 
Purchased or 
borrowed funds 
Fields, Murphy, Labour Total amount of loans IA 
and Capital 
Tirtiroglu (1993) Credit 
Total Deposit 
Allen and Rai Labour Wholesale and retail loans IA 
(1993) Capital Insurance and real estate 
Loanable funds loans 
Investment and trading 
assets 
Noulas, Miller, Labour Real estate loans IA 
and Ray (1993) Capital Consumer loans 
Deposits Commercial and industrial 
All other loanable loans 
funds Federal funds sold, total 
securities, and assets held in 
trading a/cs 
Berger, Labour Business and consumer VAA 
Hanckock, and Purchased funds loans 
Humphrey (1993) Deposits 
Services (number of 
branches 
Favero and Papi Labour Loans AA 
1993) (employees) Investments IA 
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Capital (fixed Non-interest income (only 
assets and AA) 
premises) 
Loanable funds 
Berg, Forsund, Labour (man-hours Loans to other financial PA 
Hjalmarsson, per year) institutions 
Suominen (1993) Capital (machinery Deposits from other 
and equipment) financial institutions 
Number of branches 
Mester (1993) Labour Mortgage loans AA 
Physical capital Other loans 
Deposits and other Securities and other 
borrowed money investments 
Berger (1993) Labour Demand deposit VAA 
Capital Retail and time saving 
Core deposits deposits 
Purchased Funds Real estate loans 
C&I loans 
Instalment loans 
McAllister and Purchased Funds Real estate loans VAA 
McManus (1993) Saving deposits Commercial and industrial 
Fixed assets loans 
Labour Instalment loans 
Demand deposits 
Saving deposits 
Grabowski, Labour Real estate loans IA 
Rangan, and Physical capital Commercial and industrial 
Rezvanian (1994) Loanable funds loans 
Consumer loans 
Demand deposits 
Securities 
Kaparakis, Miller, Deposits Loans to households IA 
and Noulas Labour Loans secured by real estate 
(1994) Physical Capital Commercial and industrial 
Purchased Funds loans 
Federal funds sold and total 
securities 
Elysiani and Labour Real estate loans IA 
Mehdian (1995) Capital Investments 
Saving deposits Commercial and industrial 
Demand deposits loans 
Other loans 
Jagtiani, Nathan, Labour Earning assets (loans and IA 
and Sick (1995) Physical capital investments VAA 
Financial Capital Deposits (VAA) 
OBS guarantees 
OBS foreign currency 
OBS interest rate 
Aggregate OBS items 
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Miller and Noulas Total transaction Commercial and industrial IA 
(1996) deposits loans 
Total non- Consumer loans 
transaction deposits Real estate loans 
Total interest Investments 
expenses Total interest income 
Total non-interest Total non-interest income 
expenses 
Jagtiani and Labour Produced deposits IA 
Khanthavit Physical Capital Loans and Investments 
(1996) Deposits OBS Products 
Lang and Welzel Labour Short-term loans to banks IA 
(1996) Physical Capital Long-term loans to non- 
Deposits banks 
Interbanking assets 
Residual output 
Fees and commissions 
Revenues from sales of 
commodities 
Mester (1996) Labour Real estate loans IA 
Physical Capital Lease fmancing receivable, 
Deposits agricultural 
loans, loans to foreign 
governments, other loans 
Loans to individuals 
McKillop, Glass, Labour Loans and Bills Discounted IA 
and Morikawa Capital Cash and due from banks 
(1996) Loanable funds plus call loans 
Securities plus trading 
account securities 
Berger, and Labour Commercial loans AA 
DeYoung (1997) Physical capital Consumer loans 
Real estate loans 
Fee-based income 
Berger, and Labour Consumer loans IA 
Mester (1997) Core deposits Business loans 
Purchased funds Securities 
Notes: PA denotes Production Approach, 
IA denotes Intermediation Approach, 
VAA denotes Value-added Approach, and 
AA denotes Asset Approach. 
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2.5 Competitive Issues in Banking 
From the beginning of 1970s, world banking experienced marked changes. The 
expression `financial revolution' has been coined to characterise the scale and nature 
of these changes. Many countries adopted structural deregulation policies to liberalise 
their financial institutions and markets to make them more open to equal competition. 
Together with structural deregulation trends, there has been a growing conduct re- 
regulation pattern, as domestic supervisory systems had to adapt to new developments 
in international banking and finance and to cope with new kinds of risk exposure. 
Concentration in financial market increased with a trend towards a smaller number of 
larger institutions in many leading banking sectors. Furthermore, banking became 
more open to world developments and banks expanded into foreign banking systems. 
Also, technology had a significant impact on banking in areas like competition, new 
products and payment system. But above all, the importance of banking services in 
economic activity grew substantially. The number of bank branches and the level of 
employment in the banking sector increased in the major European countries during 
the 1980s. An EC study indicated that contribution of financial services during the 
first part of the 1980s amounted to 6.5% of total value-added and accounted for 
around 3% of total employment within of the member countries. 41 Last but not least, 
the banking sector grew in size relative to gross national product in almost every 
European country over the last decade 42 
Important elements that impact on the new face of the banking industry relate to 
competition, cost efficiency, and changes in the market structure. First, in the light of 
recent deregulation and its potential effects on market competition managers and 
shareholders are interested in knowing how to improve cost efficiency so as to obtain 
higher profits and increase chances of survival within the industry. Next, customers 
are interested in knowing the effects of these changes on bank cost, and consequently 
on price and quality of bank services. Finally, policy makers would like to have 
41 European Economy (1988). 
8 Gardener and Molyneux (1994), ch. 2. 
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information concerning the effect of the present regulatory framework on bank cost, 
competition and market structure of the industry. 
2.5.1 Scale and Scope Economies 
Scale economies suggest that larger firms produce output at lower average cost than 
smaller firms [Lewis and Davis (1987)]. A strict definition is in terms of production 
function. That is, a cost saving resulting from economies of scale exists when the 
proportional increase in all inputs used in the production leads to a greater than 
proportional increase in output. Nevertheless, the observation that per unit costs fall as 
output increases does not necessarily suggest the existence of economies of scale. 
The reduction in cost per unit of output may be caused by other factors such as 
technological changes, or improvements in managerial ability (X-efficiency). Hence, 
in order to examine the effects of scale only on cost, we must separate the effects of 
other factors [Kolari and Zardakoohi (1987)]. 
Scale economies are based on the shape of the average cost curve, which illustrates 
average costs at each level of output. Figure 2-1 displays the long-run average cost 
(LAC) curve and long-run marginal cost (LMC) curve with a series of short-run 
average cost (SAC) and short-run (SMC) curves. 
The average cost curve shows the average cost per unit at different levels of output, 
while the marginal cost curve shows the additional cost incurred when producing a 
very small increment of output. The Long-run curves allow for simultaneous changes 
in all factors of production, and Short-run cost curves represent cost changes as output 
increases because of changes in some factors of production. Each set of short-run cost 
curves represents a different amount of fixed factors of production; e. g. the fixed 
factors associated with SMC2 and SALZ are greater than those for SMCI and SAC,. 
The LAC curve is declining at output up to Y, n, where economies of scale (or 
increasing returns to scale) exist. For level lower than Yr LMC lies below LAC, 
whereas for higher levels, LMC lies above the LAC, and diseconomies of scale 
(decreasing return to scale) exist. 
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Tr 
LAC 
Figure 2-1: Average and marginal cost curves and economies of scale 
Figure 2-1 presents a U-shape cost curve. The shape of the LAC curve is important 
because of its implications for scale decisions and of its effect on the potential level of 
competition in the market. For instance, a flat-bottomed LAC curve indicates the 
existence of constant returns to scale. The number of competitors and the ease of 
entry will be greater for industries with U-shaped LAC curves than with those with L- 
shaped or continuously downward sloping LAC [see Geroski (1991)]. 
From the viewpoint of a bank, economies of scale exist if an increased size lead to an 
increased return of shareholders' funds [see Lewis and Davis (1987)]. Certain sources 
of size economies highlight this advantage. First, by interpreting scale via balance 
sheet items and based on the assumption that all items in the profit and loss move 
proportionately to scale, profits will increase more than proportionately because 
physical inputs and, consequently, operating expenses grow less rapidly than the scale 
of activities. Asa result, the rate of return on shareholders' funds will rise. Second, 
n--the existence of scale economies, there is the possibility to rearrange the asset 
portfolio to grow faster than interest paid. This implies diversification across 
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liabilities and assets with uncertain maturities as size increases, and operate with a 
lower ratio of low-yielding reserve assets. Finally, an increase in size might lower the 
variability in profits. When the income earned on assets follows a stochastic process, 
a bank can operate with a higher degree of leverage and as a result the rate of return 
on shareholders' funds will rise for a given degree of risk. 
Moreover, economies of scale play a significant role for the regulatory authorities. In 
an unregulated economy, where the banking industry is characterised by economies of 
size, larger banks dominate because they would be more efficient. Furthermore, 
because as competition increases, concentration will increase as well, because cost 
inefficient banks will no longer be viable. Consequently, banking industry will 
consist of larger and, probably, fewer institutions. 
In terms of product mix, cost reductions can be achieved through economies of scope. 
Many firms produce more than one product, and in some cases the firm's products are 
closely linked. Thus, firms are likely to enjoy cost advantages when they produce 
more than a single product. In strict terms, economies of scope are present when joint 
output of a single firm exceeds potential output of two different firms each producing 
a single product (assuming equivalent production inputs). On the other hand, if a 
firm's joint output is less than that of separate firms, then its production process 
involves diseconomies of scope. The concept of economies of scope can be explained 
geometrically in Figure 2-2. 
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Figure 2-2: The concept of economies of scope (Source: Molyneux et al. (1996), p. 
144). 
Consider two outputs, Y1 and Y2, and the separate cost functions TC (Yl) and TC (Y2) 
respectively. If there exist economies of scope then: 
TC (Yl, Y2) <TC (Yl) + TC (Y2) (1.1) 
Figure 1-2 illustrates that the scope economies concept entails a comparison of TC 
(Y1 ; 0) plus TC (0, Y2 ). These are the sum of heights in the surface ove \ ,. 
corresponding points on the axes, with TC (Y1 , Y2*), the 
height of the cost surface at 
point (Y1 ; Y2") which is the vector sum of (Y1 *, 0) and (0, Y2). If TC (Y1'1 Y2") lies 
below the hyperplane OAB which goes through the origin and points TC (Y1', 0) and 
TC (0, Y2), then the conditions for scope economies are attained. Point D, in figure 
2-1, must equal TC (Y1 *, 0) + TC (0, Y2*) since the hyperplane is defined by TC = aYj 
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+ ßY2 for some constants c, /1. Accordingly, TC (Y1 0) = aY1 and TC (0, Y2") _ 
, 
BY2* must be less than aY1 + ßY2 for scope economies to hold [Baumol et al. (1988)]. 
As already mentioned above, economies of scope imply that joint production of two 
or more products by a single firm is less costly than the sum of their production by 
two or more firms. Now, banking by definition is a business that entails the joint 
production of deposits and loans. In addition, the existence of sharable goods, such as 
bank employees and technology, generates the possibility of their being. The use of 
such inputs for the production of an output does not rule out the possibility of the 
same input to be used in the production of other outputs. On the contrary, due to the 
nature, these inputs can be used, to a certain extent, for the production of several 
outputs. Furthermore, joint production of different outputs results in the spread of 
fixed costs and generates information economies by the costless use of information 
obtained in the context of other services. Last, but not least, product mix may lead to 
risk reduction through asset diversification across different asset group, which in turn 
may reduce portfolio and interest rate risk. 
Again, the existence of such economies in the banking industry is equally important. 
From the aforementioned definition, it is clear that economies of scope underlie some 
of the limitations of specialisation, because specialised banks will be less efficient 
than multi-services bank. And in an unregulated environment these institutions tend 
to die and be replaced by non-specialised banks. 
2.5.2 X-Efficiency 
In evaluating the performance of a firm, the first task is to separate production units 
that perform well by some standards from those with poor performance. This can be 
achieved through frontier analysis. In the economic literature X-efficiency covers all 
technical and allocative efficiencies of individual firms, distinct from scale and scope 
economies. Technical efficiency determines the proportional decrease in input usage, 
which would have been achieved if the firm operated on the production frontier. 
While allocative efficiency indicates the proportional decrease in cost if the right 
input mix had been utilised. 
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Modern literature on efficiency measurement and on estimation of production 
frontiers starts with the seminal article by Farrell (1957). Farrell's measures are still 
generally accepted and widely used until nowadays. Figure 2-3 displays X-efficiency. 
xI/y 
P 
X1 
0 
Figure 2-3: Overall, Technical and Allocative Efficiency (Source: Schmidt (1986), 
p. 292). 
Assume two inputs (an assumption made for graphical simplicity only) so that the 
production frontier is y =f (xi, x2) where xi, x2 are inputs and y is the output. Further 
assume constant returns to scale so that f (xi/y, x2/y) = 1; the frontier is characterised 
by the efficient unit isoquant, illustrated in Figure 2-3 as ygyo. The x1/y and x2/y are 
the vertical and horizontal axes respectively. Suppose that the firm uses xi* and x2* to 
produce y* and is denoted as point a in Figure 1-3. The necessary proportion of (xl', 
x2) for the production of y* is given by Ob/Oa, where it denotes the technical 
efficiency of a firm. Accordingly, 1- Ob/Oa indicates the technical inefficiency of 
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the above firm. Technical inefficiency (T) measures the proportion by which (xIS, x2) 
could be reduced without reducing output, holding the input ratio XI/x1 constant. 
Consider now pp, which shows the ratio of input prices, with the point c as cost 
minimising. However, since the cost at point d is the same as the cost at c, allocative 
efficiency (A) is measured by the ratio Od/Ob, and correspondingly the allocative 
inefficiency of the firm is given by 1- Od/Ob. 
Total efficiency (X-efficiency) of the firm is defined as Od/Oa, which measures the 
proportional reduction in costs which could have been obtained if the firm had been 
both allocatively and technically efficient. The relationship between overall, technical 
and allocative efficiency is given by the following [Farell (1957)]: 
OE=T+A. (1.2) 
OE measures the possible reduction in the cost from moving from point a (observed 
cost point) to c (the cost minimising point). Total inefficiency can be decomposed as 
the sum of technical and allocative inefficiencies [Schmidt (1986)]. 
In general terms, X-inefficiency measured as the deviation from the efficient frontier 
is the effect of the differences in managerial ability to maximise revenue or minimise 
cost. The term X-inefficiency has first been formulated by Leibenstein (1966) and 
covers the excess of actual costs over the minimum attainable level given the current 
state of technology. Essentially, this kind of efficiency is measured, or modelled, as 
the distance reflecting a firm's own position in relation to its efficient production 
(cost frontier). The real advantage of frontier estimation is that it permits objectively 
determined numerical efficiency values and ranking of firms that is not otherwise 
available [Berger and Humphrey (1997)]. 
Turning to the banking sector, the question whether banks are efficient is of interest to 
managers and shareholders, as well as to customers and regulators. If these 
institutions become more efficient, then profitability will improve, greater amounts of 
intermediated funds will be available and better prices and service quality for 
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consumers will be obtained. Thus, banks become more viable, and therefore, the 
possibility of failure or being subject to take-over, decreases substantially. 
2.5.3 Market Structure and Performance 
Apart from the internal structure of the firm, performance is also affected by external 
factors. The broad line of reasoning is that firms conduct pricing and production 
policies under market rivalry, and hence their performance (profitability and 
efficiency) depends on market structure. 
But which market structure satisfies best firm's performance? From the policy- 
makers viewpoint, which market structure maximises social welfare? For instance, let 
us consider two extremes cases, perfect competition and monopoly. Under perfect 
competition, combined marginal cost equals the market price. By contrast, under 
monopoly price is greater than cost. The different predictions concerning price and 
output in long run equilibrium in terms of dead-weight welfare loss are illustrated in 
Figure 2-4. The critical assumption underlying this model is that cost conditions are 
the same for a monopolist and for a set of small firms operating under perfect 
competition. 
TC 
PM 
PC 
-rs' utility 
verage 
qm qc Quantity 
Figure 2-4: Monopoly and Competition compared (Source: Pappa et al. (1991), 
p. 419) 
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With a constant cost function, point c represents the long-run competitive equilibrium, 
where price is equal to marginal cost. Point m denotes the equilibrium under 
monopoly. It is clear from the above figure that under monopolistic conditions 
consumers will pay higher price (pm > pc), while the quantity produced will be lower 
(q,, < qj. This result to the fundamental proposition in economic theory that 
monopoly is `bad' compared with perfect competition. 
Now, in terms of consumer welfare, the demand curve (DI) represents the value that 
consumers place on the product, and thus its social utility. For simplicity we assume 
that unit costs are constant and therefore correspond to marginal cost, i. e. ATC = MC. 
Consequently, under competitive market equilibrium price will corresponds to p, and 
output to q, This gives a consumer surplus corresponding to triangle a -pr-c. " On 
the other hand, under monopoly market structure consumer surplus would be 
restricted to a p,,, -b. Moreover, there is also a producer surplus corresponding to the 
area of monopoly profit, given by Pm p. -m -b. If we further assume that the private 
cost production is a fair measure of social cost, then social welfare increase as long as 
consumption utility, measured by the demand function, exceeds marginal cost. Under 
monopoly, equilibrium output is below this level. Hence, if the market harmonises to 
competitive structure and settles to point c, welfare would be maximised. This, is 
turn, creates a new consumer surplus corresponding to the triangle b- m-c, which 
coincides with the net gain for society. If this is the case, area b- m-c is regarded as a 
dead-weight welfare loss because it is a loss under monopoly structure. 
Under imperfect competition, policy makers should therefore enhance market 
competition. However, private costs of producers and the valuation of consumers, 
might not measure satisfactorily social costs and benefits, due to economies of scale. 
By definition, economies of scale suggest that larger firms produce at a lower cost. If 
we accept that economies of scale might be a significant factor, what are the 
implications for our analysis? The answer is not clear-cut, but it is possible that the 
fundamental conclusion that monopoly leads to a higher price and lower output no 
43The consumer surplus is the sum of the excess consumer valuation expressed by the demand function 
over the price paid, pc ,, on all 
inputs up to q,. 
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longer holds. Hence, despite the prima facie evidence against monopoly, in some 
cases it is necessary to allow for the potential gains from scale economies. 
Furthermore, the existence of fewer firms in the market results in lack of competitive 
pressure that, in turn, permits organisational slack to develop. Less competition 
suggests less motivation for managers to control cost at optimal levels. Hence, firms 
are operating at levels above the point that is economically efficient, exhibiting X- 
inefficiency. The latter is assumed to be increase with market power [Berger and 
Hannan (1993,1997, and 1998)]. This generates an important gap between potential 
economies of scale and realised economies of scale due to of X-inefficiency arising 
from market power. 
Until now, there is no comprehensive theory on the best market structure for an 
industry. Each industry should be considered separately, and examined in reference 
to its own organisational behaviour. 
The need to test market structure and performance relationship in banking is based on 
the notion that effectiveness of banks in serving deposits and credit needs of an 
economy is in some way related to the structure and organisation of banking industry. 
There are two basic policy issues that evaluate optimality in banking structure in 
terms of both cost and availability. The first one is efficiency and the other is 
minimisation of failure. In economic theory, efficiency is related to competition, i. e. 
in a more competitive environment industries are more efficient, as inefficient firms 
are forced to leave the market. On the other hand, under monopolistic conditions, 
inefficient firms can still operate. Accordingly, the objective of a failing proof 
banking industry is being served under monopolistic condition, whereas a competitive 
industry provides the conditions for more efficient firms. However, the existence of 
economies of scale complicates the choice between the two market regimes. Since 
economies- of scale arise when there is an increase in bank size, fewer competitors 
should exist in the market. 
In general, if the performance of banks is not affected by changes in industry 
structure, regulatory authorities need not to intervene. In the opposite case, regulators 
must intervene to maintain the well functioning of the industry and the economy. 
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Moreover, market structure and performance relationship has several implications for 
consumers and banks. When the market is characterised by high degree of 
competition, banks work towards increasing efficiency to become more competitive 
and viable. Consequently, higher efficiency results in lower costs and higher profit. 
From the consumers point of view higher competition implies better services as well 
as lower prices. On the other hand, when the market is characterised by monopolistic 
conditions, banks might engage in some activities that raise cost more than revenue. 
In turn, consumers will be charged with higher loan rates and lower deposit rates. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we analysed the theory of the banking firm. The first step was to 
examine the reasoning for the existence of banks as opposed to other financial 
intermediaries. Studies on banks emphasise their role in providing liquidity by 
transforming illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, acting as delegated monitors of 
investors, as well as their traditional function of providing payments and portfolio 
services. The social value associated with some of these functions provided by the 
banks, such as the provision of liquidity and payments services, exceeds their private 
value. Interruption of these services is costly as the production process is severely 
affected and assets are liquidated prematurely. Given the central role of banks for the 
smooth functioning of an economy, extensive failures among banks could seriously 
obstruct other economic sectors. With the introduction of regulations probabilities of 
bank failure are minimised. 
After examining the rational for regulation, we concentrated on the definitional 
problem of bank input and output. We reviewed complications arising when one 
attempts to define and measure bank output and input, with special attention paid to 
production intermediation approaches. The literature has exposed considerable 
difficulties in the definition and measurement of bank input and output, in as much as 
financial institutions are multi-product firms producing services rather than physical 
products. 
Next, key competitive issues related to banking markets were examined. First, we 
discuss extensively scale and scope economies in banking. Scale economies suggest 
that larger firms produce output at lower average cost than smaller firms. Economies 
of scope are present when joint output of a single firm is greater than potential output 
of two different fines each producing a single product. Next, we discussed efficiency 
differences (X-inefficiencies). Studies suggested that differences in managerial 
ability to control costs or maximise revenues seem to be larger than costs effects of 
scale and scope production. 
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The final section of this chapter looked at the market structure and performance 
relationship. The effectiveness of banks in serving deposits and credit needs is related 
to the structure and organisation of the banking industry. Two basic policy issues 
evaluate which banking structure best serves the economy, in terms of both cost and 
availability. The first one is efficiency and the other is the minimisation of failure. 
Efficiency is related with competition, the more competitive the environment is, the 
more efficient is the industry. On the other hand under monopolistic conditions, firms 
that are inefficient can still operate. Therefore, the objective of failing proof banking 
industry is being served under monopolistic condition, whereas a competitive industry 
provides the conditions for more efficient firms. 
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CHAPTER 3: Scale and Scope Economies in UK Banking. 
3.1 Introduction. 
The primary objective of this chapter is to assess UK banks' ability to realise 
economies of scale and cost complementarities in joint production by modelling the 
structure of costs and production for a multi-product institution. The main motivation 
emerges from the need to assess the effect of all the fundamental changes occurred in 
the cost structure of the UK banking industry. Given that the major changes, both 
nationally and internationally, took place during 1980s and 1990s, the current study 
employ UK data from 1981 to 1995. 
Knowledge of the optimal size and product mix is important for decision-making by 
banks and by regulatory authorities. Given the rapid developments in the British 
banking during the last two decades, new opportunities and new powers have been 
granted to banks. The evolving structure of the industry will depend on the extent of 
size (scale) and product mix (scope) available to them. Taking into account the 
increasing pattern of competition and concentration within the industry, institutions 
that adopt the most cost-efficient size and product mix will be in a position to exploit 
relative cost advantage and will continue to grow. On the other hand, cost inefficient 
firms will no longer be competitively viable. 
The existence of scale economies determines, to a large extent, market structure. An 
industry that exhibits substantial scale economies is likely to result in an oligopolistic 
market structure in the long-run [Scherer (1980)]. Furthermore, if scope economies 
are present, firms may expand their activities by adding new products and services in 
established markets. Scale and scope economies, favour mergers and acquisition, 
which in turn lead to a more concentrated financial system. Accordingly, the 
existence of such economies is of interest to the government for regulation of markets. 
Information obtained, improve government policy by assessing the effect of 
regulation, mergers, and the structure of the market. Further, restrictive regulation 
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impending growth and diversification of banks could lead to operational inefficiencies 
in the form of diseconomies of scale and/or joint production. 
Many studies that investigated economies of scale and scope in banking markets over 
the last thirty years. Nevertheless, most of the empirical literature on scale and scope 
economies investigates the cost structure of the US market. Results differ depending 
on the size of banks used in the data sample, but in general, studies tend to conclude 
that large bank over-performed small ones in terms of scale efficiency. For the 
European market little work has been done, and although existing evidence suggests 
the presence of scale economies, there is no agreement to the level of output at which 
economies are exhausted. Some studies examine the existence of scope economies 
with varying conclusions: overall, findings suggest stronger scale economies 
compared to scope economies. Therefore, it is clear that more research should be 
undertaken, for the cost structure of the European banking industry. 
Section 2 refers to the alternative methodologies utilised for the estimation of 
production and cost definition. Section 3 presents the different measures of scale and 
scope economies employed in the banking literature. Section 4 provides the possible 
sources for the existence of scale and scope economies. Section 5 gives a detail 
description of the literature review. Section 6 provides a detail analysis of the 
methodology applied. Section 7 discusses the data set utilised. Section 8 presents the 
input and output specification. Section 9 gives a descriptive analysis of the empirical 
results, and section 10 summarises the study and presents conclusions. 
3.2 Production and Cost Functions: Alternative Methodologies 
The relationship between bank's input and output can be examined via a production 
function or its appropriate cost function. The relevant literature has employed 
different functional forms so as to capture the multi-product nature of banking firm. 
This section provides an overview of the different methodologies applied in the 
banking literature. 
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In general, the problem of the firm is to maximise profits subject to a given 
technology. In the neo-classical formulation, technology is summarised by a 
production function, indicating the maximum output attainable for alternative 
combinations of production factors. 
The production function of a firm, producing a single output from two inputs can be 
represented as: 
Y =f(x,, x: I 
where: 
y= denotes maximum possible output, 
x,, x2 = denotes inputs levels. 
(3.1) 
In most empirical applications the production function gives output y as a function of 
capital (K), and labour (L). Hence: 
y=f(x, L) (3.2) 
Equation (3.2) may exhibit returns to scale (decreasing, constant, or increasing) at 
particular points. Returns to scale indicate the response of output to an 
equiproportionate change in both inputs. In order to have returns to scale phenomena, 
Equation (3.2) must be homogeneous of degree n. Then depending on whether n, is 
less than, equal to, or greater that unity, equiproportionate increases in input will lead 
to a less than proportionate, equiproportionate, or greater that proportionate increase 
in output. Consequently, there are decreasing, constant, or increasing returns to scales 
respectively. Going back to Equation (3.2), returns to scale can be measured by: 
f( , AL) = A(K, L) (3.3) 
where: 
A= denotes equiproportionate change in factor inputs, 
n= denotes the degree of homogeneity. 
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The most widely used production functions for empirical estimations is the Cobb- 
Douglas production function which take the form: 
y=AKGL! (3.4) 
where A, a, and, jß are 
fixed parameters. The Cobb-Douglas function is homogeneous 
of degree a +, 8, since: 
Y( , AL)=A(AK)a(AL)ß ='a+ßy(K, L) (3.5) 
Therefore, if a+8>1, there are increasing returns to scale, if a+ ft = 1, there are 
constant returns to scale, and if a +, 8 <1, there are decreasing returns to scale. 
The Cobb-Douglas is linear in the logarithms of the variables. Considering cross- 
section studies, the Cobb-Douglas function for the ith firm, after taking logarithms and 
adding a stochastic disturbance term s; to account for variations in the technical or 
production capabilities of the firm i becomes: 
1ny, =1nA+a1nK, +ß1nL, +8i (3.6) 
where A includes the effect of technology. As regards parameters a and ß it is 
assumed that they are the same for all firms, and any differences among firms are 
captured by the disturbance s;, which is assumed to have zero mean, and 2 variance. 
Finally, parameters a and 6 measure the elasticities of output with respect to capital 
and labour, taking values between zero to unity. 
However, the Cobb-Douglas specification allows only for uniform scale 
characteristics. Thus, the cost function is restricted in reflecting, either increasing, 
constant, or decreasing returns to scales. No combinations of the scale are allowed, as 
required by e. g. a U-shaped cost curve. A further restriction imposed by the Cobb- 
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Douglas specification is that the elasticity of factor substitution44 equals unity, which 
limits substitution between production factor. 
Another major problem in the use of Cobb-Douglas specification is the disregard for 
the existence of a dual relationship between the production function and cost function. 
The cost function is dual to the production function in that it provides an alternative, 
yet equivalent description of the firm's problem. A firm maximises its profits either 
by maximising the amount of output produced, given its resources, or equivalently, by 
minimising its cost. Maximisation of output, or minimisation of cost, are two 
alternative approaches to profit maximisation. In order to properly estimate cost, it is 
necessary that the cost function reflects all properties of the dual production function. 
Considering now the cost function, as in Nerlove (1963), total cost can be given: 
TC=piK+p2L (3.7) 
where p1 and p2 are capital and labour prices, respectively. Minimising total cost 
subject to the production function in Equation (3.4) gives : 
p, Kla = p2L/ß (3.8) 
As Nerlove noted, there are problems with the estimation of relationships between 
input and outputs arises whenever prices paid for factors vary from firm to firm, 
because independence among production efficiency, output level, and factor prices no 
longer holds. Therefore, it is preferable to derive estimates of structural parameters 
from estimates of reduced-form parameters. 
However, Nerlove did not estimate each reduced-form equation separately, but (since 
all data concerned total cost) he estimated the total cost function in the form of a 
aa. The elasticity of factor substitution is defined as a= KIL 
d (K / L) 
/ 
rd 
(r//w w) 
, where r, and w are 
prices of capital and labour respectively. It measures the proportionate rate of change of the input ratio 
divided by the proportionate of change in the ratio of factor marginal products in the Cobb-Douglas 
production function. 
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linear combination of reduced form equations. Thus, by substituting reduced form 
expressions for pl and p2 into equation (3.4), he obtained: 
TC= y ytlr p1K'Ir p2L81r, -ter (3.9) 
where, 
r=a+, ß, 
y= r(Aa«ß e)-ii. 
Parameter y is the constant and the r is the returns-to-scale parameter, equal to the 
sum of output elasticities with respect to capital and labour. Because cost function 
(3.9) is directly derived from minimising the cost relationship (3.7) subject to the 
production function (3.7), duality between cost function and production function is 
assured. 
The cost function can be expressed in log-linear form as: 
1nTC =1n y+(: )1n y+(: 
)1n p, + (-)1np2 - (ý)1nu (3.10) 
Further, since a+6=r, coefficients on In pi and In P2 must add to unity; that is 
a+P 
=1. Then equation (3.10) can be rewritten as: 
rr 
1nTC-lnp, =1ny+(ý)1ny+(A, 
k1np2 
-1np, )-(ß, -)1n8 (3.11) 
Equation (3.11) can be estimated to give a measure of scale economies. However, a 
problem may arise with uniform scale economies, as U-shape cost curve is not 
allowed, and the elasticity of substitution equals unity. 
A more general specification is the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
production function [Arrow et al. (1961)], which allows for any degree of 
substitutability between two input factors. The typical CES has the form: 
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y= A[bK"B + (1- b)L"e ]"e (3.12) 
where z denotes the returns to scale, and 0 is the substitution parameter. Elasticity 
between K and L is constant and is measured by a= 1/(1 + 0. 
Still, there is an obvious need for the development of variable elasticity of substitution 
(VES) specification. VES functions were developed in the early 1970s, and the major 
problem was to find a functional form that allowed a variable elasticity of substitution 
and that could be easily estimated. 
A general form of VES functions was presented by Christensen et al. (1973), known 
as `transcendental logarithmic' or translog production and cost functions 45 Translog 
models allow the estimation of production or cost function with more than one output 
and more than two inputs. Moreover, they are flexible, in that they allow any degree 
of substitutability at all levels of employment. Finally, they allow estimation of a U- 
shaped cost curve. 
The general form of the translog production function can be expressed as: 
lny =a,, + al lnxI +1E aij lnx; xj (3.13) 
where a;. = aji, and i, j and xi are n quantities of inputs. 
The big advantage of (3.13) is easy estimation. In general, this function is quiet 
flexible in approximating arbitrary production technologies in terms of substitution 
possibilities. It provides a local approximation to any production function, and has 
also the property that implied returns to scale implied are not the same across all 
values of input and output. 
as Christensen et al. (1973) developed a single output technology translog function. The multiple case 
was presented by Burgess (1974) and Diewert (1974). 
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Following the duality principle, that cost functions can be obtained directly from 
production functions [for proofsof duality principles, see Diewert (1974,1982), Fuss 
and McFadden (1980), Nadiri (1982)] the following translog cost function can be 
derived: 
'n n1mM1nn 
InTC=ao +Ea, lny; +Eß1 lnw; +-ZýSy lny; lny1 +, Zy lnw, lnwf 
1_1 ; _I 2 +_, j_j 
2 j_, j_, 
nm 
EEp, lnw, lnyJ 
i-I j-1 
(3.14) 
where w; denotes price of inputs. There are m+1 independent ai parameters, n 
independent A-, m (m + 1) /2 cýi parameters, since it is assumed that 4j = 4; for 1< i, j 
< m, n (n + 1) /2 1j parameters, since it is assumed that yj = y; for 1< i, j<n, and mit 
independent p; j parameters in the translog cost function defined by equation (3.14). 
The translog cost function can be regarded as a second-order approximation to any 
arbitrary cost function, is linearly homogeneous in input prices, and like the translog 
production function permits the nature of the return-to-scale implied to vary with the 
levels of inputs and outputs. 
In general, the translog cost function is preferred in studies of bank performance 
because it allows, first, the estimation of U-shaped average cost curve, and, second, 
the derivation of scale economies. Further, it does not impose theoretical restrictions 
and permits economies to vary by size of banks. Most important, it allows the 
estimation of effects of multi-product operations on costs and subadditivity46 on unit 
and marginal costs. 
However, when one output becomes zero the translog specification does not allow the 
evaluation of scope economies and product specific economies of scale,. To 
overcome this problem, Caves et al. (1980) developed a hybrid translog cost function, 
46 A cost function is subadditive when single-firm production of the output mix Yi = (Y1, Y2i ..., 
Y) is 
less costly than production of the output mix of Y; using any combination or division of Yi among 
group of firms, holding technology and input prices constant. 
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which is a generalisation of the translog function. The difference between the 
translog and the hybrid function is that in the latter the log of output is replaced by a 
Box-Cox transformation, that is: 
y. _(yz-i) a, #o 
y' =1n y, A=O (3.15) 
When A approaches zero, the hybrid cost function approaches the translog function. 
When A equals one the cost function becomes semilog. Therefore, by treating .A as an 
additional unknown parameter the model becomes more flexible. 
3.3 Economies of scale and scope in a multi-product firm 
Scale economies in the single product firm exist if total cost increases less than 
output. Consider a firm with the cost function, TC = J(y), where y is output. Then the 
average total cost can be derive as ATC = f(y) / y, and the marginal cost is o7C 
Consequently, economies of scale can be defined as: 
SE _ 
ATC 
_ 
öy 
MC Y(äTC l äy) 
(3.16) 
which is the elasticity of cost with respect to output. Hence, when SE >_ 1, SE = 1, 
and SE 5 1, we have increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale, with the 
derivative of average cost with respect to output being negative, zero, or positive, 
respectively. 
The multi-product nature of banking institution renders the analysis and interpretation 
of economies of scale and scope more complex since average cost is defined for a 
single product process. Conventional average cost curves cannot be derived for multi- 
product firms unless all products are aggregated into -a single index, which in most 
cases is not feasible. In the banking literature the behaviour of costs is examined in 
79 
Chapter 3 
proportion to bank's output. If each product in the bundle increases by a given 
percentage, the quantity of the composite commodity increases by the same 
percentage. This approach is known as the ray average cost (RAC) [see Baumol 
(1977), and Baumol, et al. (1988)]. Ray average costs are a natural generalisation of 
single product average cost and are defined as follows: 
RAC(Y) = 
TC(y) 
= 
TC(tq°) (3.17) 
yj jn 
where q° is the unit bundle for a particular mixture of outputs, and n is the number of 
units in the bundle. Accordingly, y= nq°. The degree of scale economies at 4° is 
defined as the elasticity of output with respect to cost, equivalent to 1/(1 - s), where it 
is greater than, less than, or equal to one as returns-to-scale are locally increasing, 
decreasing, or constant, and as the slope of the RAC curve is negative, positive or 
zero, respectively. 
A number of researchers suggested that the appropriate measure of overall economies 
of scale in a multi-product case is the sum of individual output cost elasticities with 
respect to output, holding the product mix constant. That is, total change in cost 
equals the sum of differential changes in the level of m outputs: 
0In TC OSE _ form=1 ,...., i (3.18) 
, _, 
0 In y, 
If OSE < 1, overall marginal costs are decreasing and, therefore, production is subject 
to increasing returns to scale, and thus economies of scale. If OSE >1 there are 
decreasing returns to scale (implying diseconomies of scale) and, finally, if OSE =1 
there are constant returns to scale. 
Overall economies of scale explain the behaviour of cost as output increases or 
decreases for a given bundle of outputs. However, the behaviour of total cost in not 
explained when there is a change in the mixture of output. Changes in total cost as 
output of one-commodity changes are measured with product specific economies of 
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scale (PSES) [Panzar and Willing (1988a), Baumol et al. (1988)]. PSES are 
evaluated with the use of average incremental cost (AIC). AIC is defined as the extra 
cost of adding the production of that given product at a specific level of output, rather 
than not being produced at all, divided by the output of that product. Measurement of 
PSES for product i at output vector y is given by the ratio of the AIC of the product to 
its marginal cost (TC/y; ), that is: 
PSES, . 
AIC; 
= 
IC, 
(oTC / öyi) eýrrTC 
(3.19) 
where eTc. is cost elasticity if i`h output, and IC; is the incremental cost of product ith, 
given by 
ICi = TC(y>> Y2) - TC(O, Y2) (3.20 
where PSES > 1, PSES = 1, and PSES <1 shows decreasing, constant and increasing 
returns-to-scale, with respect to output i. 
In terms of product mix, the existence of cost savings can be examined via scope 
economies. Economies of scope between two outputs exist when a twice 
differentiable multi-product cost function exhibits cost complementarities between the 
products. Cost complementarities (COMP) exist if the marginal cost of producing one 
output decreases when the production of the other output increases, i. e: 
z 
COMPy =aye (3.21) 
rj 
If COMP <0 then cost complementarities are present implying economies of scope, 
while if COMP >0 we have diseconomies of scope; a value equal to zero suggests 
`cost independence. 
There are also two other measures of scale and scope based on the cost subadditivity 
concept, the expansion path scale economy (EPSCE) and the expansion path 
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subadditivity (EPSUB) [Berger et al. (1987)]. Cost subadditivity measures the 
relative efficiency of large and small firms and takes into account both scale and 
scope economies simultaneously. EPSCE denotes the cost advantage or disadvantage 
of a large firm, A, compared to a smaller one, B, by measuring the elasticity of cost 
with respect to changes in output. This is calculated as: 
EPSCE _A 
(y" 
(B"))) l Tc(yA) 
*ö 1nTC(y") /ö In y. (3.22) 
i_, (TC(y )- Tcy 
where yn , TC(y4) 
denotes the output and the total cost for firm A, 
y. , TC(yB) denotes the output and the total cost 
for firm B, 
y. ', TC(y c) denotes the output and the total cost for firm C. 
In the second measure, EPSUB, a large bank opposed to a smaller one are considered, 
together with a third, hypothetical bank, C, whose output is the difference of the other 
two banks' outputs. This can be represented algebraic form: 
EPSUB - 
TC(yB)+TC(yc )-TC(yA) (3.23) 
TC(Y 4) 
The measure gives the relative cost increase or decrease arising from the production 
of large bank's output by the small bank and the complementary bank. When 
EPSCE<l, there exist economies of scale, whilst EPSCE>1 indicates diseconomies. 
When EPSUB<O then firm B is not competitively viable. Consequently, it may be 
driven out of a competitive market by the combination of firms at A and C. 
3.4 Sources of economies of scale and scope 
As the concepts of economies of scale and scope have been analysed in chapter 2, we 
discuss here the possible sources for the existence of such economies. Literature 
concentrates on four major causes for scale economies. The first one suggests that 
economies of scale are the effect of a more efficient use of some or all inputs with an 
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increase in the volume of output [Benston (1965a), Bell and Murphy (1968), Scherer 
(1980)]. Firms may have unavoidable excess capacity of some inputs, so that an 
increase in output may not require a proportionate increase in input. Specifically, 
some inputs might be wholly or partly indivisible by output. The existence of 
indivisibility may help reduce costs per unit of output as the output level increases. 
Second, increased size may allow a more efficient organisation of resources. A 
relatively large bank allows for greater input and process specialisation, e. g. in a large 
bank, one employee is assign to one task, whereas in a smaller bank one employee is 
often assign to a variety of tasks. 
Third, large banks have the economic advantage, over smaller ones, for some types of 
technical innovations such information technologies. Hence, according to asset size 
banks could employ different compositions of inputs with varying degrees of 
efficiency. 
Fourth and last, Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987) state that the law of large number of 
accounts for certain economies of scales. Large banks may be not required to hold as 
much cash balances as small banks (in proportion to their anticipated transactions). 
Since holding cash balances is costly, larger banks incur lower cost than smaller 
banks, to the extent that the law of large numbers smoothes transaction demand47. 
Possible sources of scope economies in banking, as suggested by the literature, come 
forth from banks' multi-product structure [Baumol et al. (1988, p 75-79), Berger et al. 
(1987, p. 503-504), Mester (1987a, p. 17-18). First, information economies exist with 
the join use of information for a certain customer by different divisions. Second, 
fixed costs could be spread over an expanded product mix. Third, asset 
diversification across different assets group may reduce portfolio and interest rate 
risks. Fourth, there is a reduction in customers' cost by doing business in a wide range 
of product and services at the same branch. 
47 For a detail analysis see Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987) 
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3.5 Literature Review 
3.5.1 Early empirical studies 
Early cost studies utilised financial ratio analysis to examine the existence of 
economies of scale in US banking industry, by use of data gathered from balance 
sheet and income statements. These studies can be distinguished into two categories 
based on output specification. The first category includes studies that measure bank 
output in terms of earning assets, while the second category comprises of studies that 
uses total assets as a measure of output. 
3.5.1.1 Earning Assets as a Output Measure 
The first studies that documented cost differences between bank of different size were 
Alhadeff (1954), and Horvitz (1963). Both studies defined output as the ratio of loans 
plus investments to total assets (earning assets), and cost included operating and 
interest costs. With the utilisation of a simple cost function, scale economies occurred 
if average costs decline as average cost increases. They find evidence of constant 
returns to scale for mid-sized banks, while small and large size banks exhibited 
increasing returns to scale. Furthermore, they reported that branch banks had higher 
average costs than unit banks. 
3.5.1.2 Total Assets as Output Measure 
The major criticism of the aforementioned studies was that output measure included 
only earning assets, whereas other assets, such as trust operations, were excluded. 
This omission led to an increase of larger banks' average unit cost. To overcome this 
limitation, Schweiger and McGee (1961) and Gramley (1962) used total assets as a 
measure of bank output. Both studies employed multiple regression analysis and find 
evidence that average costs were decreasing as the size of bank increased, and 
therefore larger banks are found to have a cost advantage over small banks. 
From the above it is clear that earlier cost studies for the US banking industry 
produced conflicting results. Studies that used earning assets as a measure of output 
find that medium sized banks faced constant unit cost, and small and large banks 
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faced. a lower average cost. On the other hand, studies that employed total assets as 
measure of output found a declining average cost for all ranges of output size. 
3.5.2 Cobb-Douglas cost function 
Subsequent studies proceed one step further, and, instead of simple statistical models 
based on ratio analysis, model bank cost with the use of the Cobb-Douglas cost 
function. A further advance of these studies is the attempt to model the multi-product 
nature of banks with the inclusion of multiple outputs. Table 3-1 summarises the 
results of a number of empirical studies in banking for the US markets using Cobb- 
Douglas cost function. The general conclusion that emerges from the early research 
in American banking industry was the existence of economies of scale for most 
individual services offered by banks, varying according to the banks internal 
organisation. At that time this conclusion was crucial, as it implied a monopolistic 
structure of the industry. However, at the end of 1970s this conclusion began to be 
questioned on both theoretical and methodological grounds, and by the 1980s was 
seriously held in doubt. 
The first criticisms came from Baumol (1977) who indicated that economies of scale 
where neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of monopoly in a 
multi-product industry such as banking. The importance of economies of scale in 
one-output case is that the existence is required to have a natural monopoly. 
Nevertheless, in the multi-product case, scale economies only describe the technical 
gains from increases in scale of operation, rather than gains originating from the 
production of several goods jointly. Consequently, it became necessary to introduce 
new indicators in the analysis of the banking costs. The main purpose of these 
indicators was to determine whether monopoly was a natural result of unregulated 
markets, since deregulation had already started. Because scale returns were 
inadequate as indicator, economies of scope or joint production were further 
examined with the origin of the latter being the combined use of the same input to 
produce different output or services. Also, earlier studies employed the Cobb- 
Douglas methodology, which does not allow a U-shape functional form, no does it 
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allow testing for the existence of economies of scope. Hence there was a need for a 
more flexible functional form. 
Table 3-1: Cobb-Douglas cost function studies in the US banking industry. 
Authors 'ý' Data Output and Control, ! Conclusions=,, s' 
Väriäbles: =, 
Benston Gross-section Number of demand Economies of scale: demand 
(1965a) data from the deposits, time deposits and mortgage 
FCA for 80 deposits, mortgage loans. 
banks. loans, instalment Diseconomies of scale: time 
1959-1961 loans, business loans, deposits, instalment loans. 
and securities. Banks size does not it self 
CV: Average account provide a cost advantage. 
sizes, branching and 
mergers dummies, 
price and total assets. 
Benston Same data set Same variables as in Banks with three or fewer 
(1965b) as in Benston's (1965a). branches, experience cost 
Benston's benefits, and as the number 
(1965a). of branch offices increases, 
demand deposit, instalment 
loan, and occupancy cost 
increase as well. One and 
two branch banks have cost 
characteristics consistent to 
those of unit banks. 
Bell and Gross-section Same output Economies of scale for 
Murphy data form the variables as in demand deposits and real 
(1968) FCA Benston's (1965a). estate loans, and slight 
consisted of diseconomies of scale for 
283 banks. time deposits and 
1963-1965 instalments loans. Branch 
banks were more cost 
efficient than unit banks, 
while the cost functions' of 
the three types of banks, 
were very different. 
Murphy Gross-section Same output Banks are characterised 
(1972) data from the variables as in with constant returns to 
FCA Benston's (1965a). scale. 
consisted of 
967 banks, for 
1968. 
Schweitzer Call Reports Lending output There is a U-shaped cost 
(1972) and Condition index: measured as curve. Scale economies are 
Data on the total loan revenues exhausted for the most part 
9`h District plus revenue from after $3.5 million in assets, 
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banks for other sources. and diseconomies exist 
1964 Dummy variables: beyond $25 million in 
location, bank assets. Constant returns to 
holding company, scale in the $3 to$25 million 
Federal Reserve asset range. 
membership. 
Daniel, Gross-section Number of demand Only large banks can 
Longbrake, data from the Deposits improve operating 
and FCA CV: Average size efficiency with the use of 
Murphy consisted of variable, annual wage technology. Banks with 
(1973) 967 banks, for rate, rental rate, fewer than $18 millions 
1968. number of branches. demand deposit accounts 
should use conventional 
accounting systems 
Kalish and Data from Lending output Banks affiliated with a 
Gilbert FCA index: measured as holding company have 
(1973) consisted of total loan revenues greater costs efficiency than 
898 banks for plus revenue from branch banks at lower 
1968. other sources. output levels, but he reverse 
is true at higher output 
levels. 
Further, cost curves are U- 
shaped 
Longbrake, Gross-section The same approach Differences in cost function 
and data form the as Daniel Longbrake, shapes between banks with 
Haslem FCA and Murphey. various legal forms of 
(1975) consisted of banks' organisation; The 
967 banks, for number of branch bank 
1968. offices had little effect on 
the cost of producing 
demand deposit services. 
Mullineaux 1970 data The same approach Evidence for the existence 
(1975) from Federal as Benston (1965) of economies of scale for 
Reserve Bank and Bell and Murphy unit banks; for branch banks 
of Boston, (1968) economies of scale were 
New York CV: dummy variables small. 
and for branching 
Philadelphia. 
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3.5.3 Translog Cost Function 
Earlier studies in banking faced three important limitations. First, they focused on 
individual bank functions; hence, total cost of banking operations was not addressed. 
Second, an average cost curve that could take a U-shape over the full range of banks 
was not fitted, either because larger banks were omitted or because of the use of 
Cobb-Douglas function. As a result, the optimum (minimum) cost size of a bank, or 
office, could not be determined. Therefore, they produced inappropriate efficiency 
comparisons between unit and branch banking [Benston et al. (1982)]. Last but not 
least, no tests for the existence of economies of scope were undertaken. In an attempt 
to overcome these problems, studies in the 1980s used the translog methodology in 
examining scale and scope economies in the US banking industry. As mentioned 
earlier, the translog cost function allows the estimation of U-shaped average cost 
curve and, also, it does not impose theoretical restrictions. Indeed, results from 
translog studies suggested that average cost curves in the US banking market are U- 
shaped. 
Table 3-2 summarises the results of a number of empirical studies in banking for the 
US market using the translog methodology. The major conclusions from these studies 
are that bank's average operating cost have U-shape form, hence the Cobb-Douglas 
functional form should not be applied to cost studies. Moreover, although earlier 
studies find that economies of scale are exhausted at low levels of output, later studies 
reported mixed results. For instance, Benston et al. (1983) concluded that economies 
of scale exist for all sizes of branch offices, except branches with more than $400 
millions of deposits. The same authors find that in the case of unit banks, economies 
of scale exits only for the first $50 millions of deposits. Another major contribution, 
from those studied in the literature, was the test for the existence of economies of 
scope. Some evidence of cost complementarity is found, but an important drawback 
of these studies is the utilisation of FCA data, which ignores large banks and only 
concentrates on smaller institutions [Hunter et al. (1990)]. Hence, the results from 
these studies are not useful for estimating the effects on operating costs of banks with 
total deposits over of more than $1 billion. 
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Table 3-2: Translog cost function studies in the US banking industry. 
Authors Conclusions "" 
Benston, Gross-section data Average operating cost curve are U- 
Hanweck, from the FCA shaped or upward sloping for both unit 
Humphrey 1975-1978 banks and branch banks. Unit banks 
(1982b) above $50 million of deposits exhibit 
diseconomies of scale, branch banks 
exhibit small economies of scale. 
Optimum size of a bank is, between $10 
to $25 million of deposits. 
Benston, Berger, FCA data Scale economies exist for all branch 
Hanweck, 1978 offices. At firm level no scale economies 
Humphrey or diseconomies exits. For unit banking 
(1983) economies of scale exists for less than 
$50 millions of deposits, diseconomies of 
scales at $200 millions of deposits. 
Evidence of pairwaise cost 
complementarities. 
Clark (1984) Data from Call Results are insensitive to the choice of 
Reports of Income output. Economies of scale in banking 
and Conditions for appear to be small; exits only for small- 
1205 unit banks, sized banks. An increase in size is 
from 1972 to 1977 unlikely to improve the operating 
efficiency of a bank. 
Gillian and Data from Call Scales economies for banks with less than 
Smirlock (1984) Reports of Income $10 millions of deposits, diseconomies of 
and Conditions by scale for banks beyond $50 millions of 
the FRB of Kansas deposits; bank costs are characterised by 
for more 2,700, a U-shaped cost function. Cost of 
form 1973 to 1979 producing one output depends on the 
level of other outputs. 
Lawrence and Gross-section data Scale economies at all size levels for 
Shay (1986) from FCA, from branch banks; significant scale economies 
1979 to 1982 only for smallest unit banks. Significant 
economies of scope between deposit and 
loans, deposit and investments, 
diseconomies of scope between 
investment and loans. 
Kolari and Gross-section data Economies of scale for banks with up to 
Zardkoohi from FCA, from $50 million of deposits, diseconomies for 
(1987) 1979 to 1983 banks beyond the level of $50-100 
million of deposits, except 1983. 
Evidence for scope economies. Flat cost 
curves for unit banks, U-shaped or 
upward-sloping for branch banks 
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Berger, FCA data for 413 Slight scale economies at branch level 
Hanweck, and branching state and slight diseconomies of scale at firm 
Humphrey banks and 214 unit level. Unit banks exhibit large 
(1987) state banks, 1983 diseconomies of sale for large banks. 
Evidence of diseconomies of scope 
Gropper (1991) Gross-section data Economies of scale exist beyond small 
from FCA, from levels of output for years prior to 1982; 
1979 to 1986 significant economies of scale in post- 
1982 years for branch and unit banks. 
Degree of scale economies increases over 
the period. 
3.5.4 Recent evidence 
The internalisation of banking services and the deregulation pattern raise new policy 
issues. Hence, recent studies examine the effect of these changes on the cost of 
banking industry and the viability of banking institutions on the new and more 
concentrated and competitive markets. In this section we report evidence from studies 
that examined the effect of deregulation on the cost structure of the banking markets, 
evidence from European and international studies, as well as evidence from studies 
that applied alternative methodologies. 
3.5.4.1 Deregulation: their effect on the production and cost structure of banking 
industry 
During the 1990s a number of studies concentrated on the debate on the optimal 
structure of the banking system and banking regulation. Regulatory changes, which 
in turn led to changes in banks' balance sheet structure, aimed to make banks more 
open to competition, and to cope with new kind of risk exposures. 
With deregulation, bank powers have expanded allowing them to offer a number of 
non-traditional activities, and compete directly with other financial institutions in 
product markets. Nowadays, banks engage in a wide range of non-traditional 
activities such as loan sales and purchases, securitisation of assets, and off-balance 
sheet commitments (e. g. derivatives). Traditional bank activities involved a firm link 
between the asset and liability of the bank's balance sheet. Banks were taking in 
deposits and lending them out as loans to be held until maturity. However, the 
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emergence of non-traditional activities has led to unbundling of the asset and liability 
sides of the bank. This, in turn, led to changes in production and cost structure of the 
banking industry [Mester (1992)]. 
The new structure that characterises banking markets nowadays generates an 
important question: do banks improve efficiency due to product mix and/or due to 
larger scale of operation? Empirical studies produce mixed results. Mester (1992) 
compares the cost of traditional banking activities of originating and monitoring loans 
with costs of non-traditional activities of loan selling and buying, and finds that banks 
operate at a scale slightly than minimum efficient. Also, results suggest that there are 
significant diseconomies of scope between traditional and non-traditional activities. 
This, in turn, suggests that banks could benefit from specialisation by separating most 
of their traditional activities into a different bank. Jagtiani et al. (1995) include off- 
balance-sheet (OBS) products as output in the cost function to measure their effects 
on scale economies and cost complementarities. They find that OBS activities have 
none or small impact on scale estimation; results, in general, suggest no scale 
economies. In addition, no evidence of cost complementarity is found for most 
combinations of output, except for the case of OBS foreign currency products and 
guarantees, or aggregate OBS and earning assets. The authors state that the volume of 
OBS has little or no effect on bank costs. 
An additional study that examines the effects of OBS products on banks cost 
efficiency is Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996). This study examines, apart from OBS, 
the impact of risk based capital requirements on bank costs. In general, results 
indicate that the introduction of risk-based capital requirements, from their 
announcement to the actual implementation, expose significant structural changes in 
banking industry in terms of efficient size and optimal product mixes. In the case of 
small banks, there is negligible effect in terms of efficient size, whereas for the 
optimal product mix the effect is greater. Before the implementation of regulation the 
cost function was in most cases subadditive. After the imposition of capital 
requirements, product-mix economies disappear since the EPSUB index becomes 
insignificant. In the case of large banks, after the introduction of regulation 
diseconomies of scale and scope are found, indicating that these banks are too large to 
be efficient. 
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In an attempt to capture the quality of banks' assets and banks' individual risk in the 
light of the new structure of the industry, Mester (1996) includes two additional 
variables in the cost function apart from input prices and outputs. The first one is the 
average volume of non-performing loans, which serves as a proxy for the quality of 
banks' output, and the other is financial capital, which captures bank's risk. From his 
results it is clear that banks in the sample are operating at constant returns to scale. In 
addition, there is no evidence for scope economies. 
All the above studies tend to focus on cost. Rogers (1998a) employees revenues and 
profits as additional measures of bank performance. Contrary to other studies, his 
results suggest definite advantages to joint production of loans, deposits, credit 
enhancements, and other non-traditional bank outputs, in terms of both costs and 
profits. In general, studies that find insignificant results in joint production suggest 
that banks are already producing an optimal mix of products, and hence they cannot 
increase efficiency [Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996)]. On the other hand, in terms of 
profit efficiency, joint production of traditional and non-traditional activities results in 
higher profit compare to the case where each output is produced by a separate firm 
[Rogers (1998a)]. 
3.5.4.2 European and international Studies 
The smaller volume of cost studies on European banking suggest larger scale 
economies compared with US; however, there is no consensus as to the level of output 
at which these economies are exhausted. Nevertheless, US and European banking are 
very different in structure. European banks are more universal, whereas US banks are 
more specialised as universal banking is restricted by US regulations, whereas in 
some states branch banking is prohibited (see chapter six for information of the US 
banking regulations). This might constitute a reason for larger scale economies 
experienced by the European banks, compared to the US banks. The concept of scope 
economies has been investigated by few studies, which suggest some scope 
economies for larger banks in some markets, i. e. Germany, and for smaller banks in 
other markets, i. e. France. 
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More specifically, early studies on the French banking system concentrate on scale 
economies, utilising a standard translog methodology and suggested that overall scale 
economies are rather limited [Dietsch (1988)]. Martin and Sassenou (1992) and 
Dietsch (1993) find evidence of both scale and scope economies. The results of the 
first study suggested that small banks benefit from larger scale and scope economies, 
while bigger banks incur relatively large diseconomies of scale depending on their 
output mix and their degree of specialisation. As far as the latter study is concerned, 
the results indicate economies of scales for all bank sizes, whereas economies of 
scope are not observed at a high level of output. 
Studies on the Italian banking industry suggest economies of scale at all size ranges. 
These economies tend to increase, as bank size becomes larger [Cossutta et al. (1988), 
Baldini and Landi (1990), Conigliani et al. (1991)]. Contrary, at firm level scale 
economies become small, as they tend to decrease with the increase in banks' asset 
size. In terms of scope economies, studies do not find any evidence in favour of their 
existence. 
Cost economies studies in the UK concentrate on the building society sector. The 
evidence indicates economies of scale, although there is no consensus as to what bank 
size these economies are exhausted. On the other hand, as regards scope economies, 
studies find no evidence for their existence. Cooper (1980) finds that scale economies 
for asset size less than £100 million, where as larger societies are subject to 
diseconomies. Hardwick's (1989) findings suggest that societies with assets under 
£280 million benefit from scale economies, where those with assets above £1500 
million are subject to diseconomies. Drake (1992,1995) finds mild scale economies 
for societies in the £120-500 millions size range. On the other hand, no evidence for 
scope economies is found. McKillop and Glass (1994) find evidence of scale 
economies for both national and local societies, but only constant returns for those 
that are regionally based. They also find no evidence of scope economies or of cost 
complementarities between the provision of mortgage and non-mortgage outputs. 
Lang and Welzel (1994,1996) employ the translog cost function approach and 
estimate cost economies for German co-operative banks. Their results suggest 
moderate economies of scale for all size classes, and evidence for scope economies, 
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especially for larger banks. Fields et al. (1993) examine the existence of scale 
economies in Turkish banks for the years 1986 and 1987 with the utilisation of a 
standard translog methodology. Their results indicate no significant evidence of 
economies of size for either year, and conclude that their results are similar to other 
studies for different time periods, data, and types of countries. 
Glass and McKillop (1992) investigate the existence of scale and scope economies for 
1972 to 1990 in the Bank of Ireland, and find that for the sub-period 1975-1978 the 
bank is characterised by overall diseconomies of scale. For the whole period product- 
specific scale economies are found to be decreasing for investments and increasing for 
loans. Moreover, the results suggest diseconomies of scope. 
All previously mentioned studies are based on a single country; yet, commercial 
banking activities experience globalisation for the past years. An international study 
performed by Allen and Rai (1993) estimate a global cost function with a data set of 
150 banks from 15 counties. Results indicate that there is no evidence for scale 
economies for large banks. Scale economies exist only in small and representative 
banks in integrated banking countries. Further, there is no evidence of scale 
economies in countries where commercial banking activities are separate from non- 
banking activities. Concerning of scope economies, it is found that global 
diseconomies of scope exist for loan and investment banking activities for all banks, 
while a small of economies of scope are found for real estate and insurance for all 
banks in all countries. 
In general, the results on the European banking market support the existence of scale 
economies, though there is no consensus as to what bank size these economies are 
exhausted. Few studies examine the existence of economies of scope and report 
conflicting results. UK and Italian studies find no such evidence, whereas studies on 
the French banking market find evidence for economies of scope for small and 
medium size banks. 
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3.5.4.3 Methodological Issues 
A portion of the recent banking literature concentrates on methodological issues. 
These studies attempt to examine either the robustness of the results under different 
methodological specification, or to utilise new methodological tools in an attempt to 
obtain more accurate estimates. 
Given the difficulties in defining what constitutes bank's input and output, a portion 
of the literature examines the sensitivity of the results to different input and output 
specification. Nevertheless, the results from the literature are mixed. Nathan and 
Neave (1992) use the value-added approach and find scale efficiencies and some 
inefficiencies in the joint production of loan and deposits. With the application of the 
intermediation approach the results suggest that the production of earning assets 
exhibits scale inefficiencies and efficiencies in joint production. On the other hand, 
Favero and Papi (1993) find that the results are robust to modifications in the 
specification of inputs and outputs. 
Another issue that has been examined in the literature is the reliability of the ordinary 
translog function. The major caveat of the translog function is when one output 
becomes zero, since in such a case the cost function becomes undefined. Many 
studies replace the zero value of the output with a very small number, i. e. 0.001. 
Gilligan and Smirlock (1984) use the value 0.001, whereas Allen and Rai (1993) use 
the value 0.00015. Kim (1986) and Mester (1987) select 10 percent of the mean the 
minimum values, respectively. Noulas et al. (1993) use several values (0.0001,0.001, 
0.1) in an attempt to examine the sensitivity of the results. Their sensitivity analysis 
indicates that the findings are robust and that scope estimates change in size and 
magnitude considerably. Their results indicate that banks between $1 up to $6 billion 
of assets are cost effective; larger banks do not appear to share this advantage. 
Other studies examine the reliability of the translog function by estimating different 
cost function specifications. McKillop, Glass and Morikawa (1996) estimate four 
cost functions: a composite, a generalised translog, a standard translog, and a 
separable quadratic cost function, so as to compare the results in terms of statistical 
fit, regularity conditions, and measurement of scale and scope economies. They used 
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data from five large Japanese banks over the period 1978 to 1991. The results suggest 
that the generalised translog and composite model mode provide equally reasonable 
results. This is further reinforced by the estimates of product specific scope 
economies and cost complementarities. In general, results indicate neither economies 
of scale, nor economies of scope. 
McAllister and McManus (1993) suggest that a single translog cost function, produce 
contradictory results. To overcome this problem, they use a non-parametric 
regression technique to provide a global approximation to the unknown true cost 
function. Their findings suggest that small banks exhibit scale inefficiencies, full scale 
efficiencies are reached at $500 million in assets, approximately constant average cost 
afterwards up to $10 billion in assets. 
Mester (1996) includ two additional variables in the cost function apart from input 
prices and outputs. The first one is the average volume of non-performing loans, 
which serves as a proxy for capturing the quality of the banks' output and, the 
financial capital of each bank which represents individual bank risk. In contrast to her 
previous estimates, there is evidence that banks included in the sample operate at 
constant returns to scale. In addition, no evidence is found for either economies or 
diseconomies of scope. 
All previously mentioned studies consider the production cost of a bank's to be equal 
to its total cost. Nevertheless, Clark (1996) argues that the total cost of a bank can not 
be measured by the production cost alone, but opportunity cost should also be added. 
Accordingly, total cost comprises a bank's operating and interest expenses 
(production cost), and a measure of the opportunity cost of capita148. 
48 The opportunity cost of capital is calculated by use of the capital asset pricing 
model: OC, = [r. + fl(r., - rý )] * MVE, _, , where rR 
denotes the risk free rate of interest, which 
in the current case was assumed to be the average ten-year Treasury bond rate, r,  accounts for the 
return on the market portfolio for the time period t, and Pb, (beta), captures the sensitivity of the 
security's returns to overall market movements. Beta is estimated by regressing return data for the 
stock against a measure of market return. The last variable, MVE, represents the market value of a 
bank's equity. 
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3.5.5 A summary of the evidence 
This section surveys the empirical literature on economies of scale and scope in the 
banking markets. The bulk of these studies examine the cost structure of US banking 
industry by use of data from small banks (FCA data). Results suggest that economies 
of scale do not appear at more than $100 million of deposits. Later studies that utilise 
data from larger institutions find that such economies appear for these institutions as 
well. European studies appear to suggest that there are economies of scale, but there 
is no consensus as to the level of output at which these economies are exhausted. 
Next, economies of scope, which have been examined by a few of papers do not reach 
any definite conclusions. US studies that concentrate on small institutions find some 
evidence of product complementarities. On the other hand, studies on larger 
institutions find no such evidence. Very few European studies examine the existence 
of economies of scope, and again they report conflicting results. For example, UK as 
well as Italian studies find no such evidence, whereas studies on the French banking 
market find evidence for economies of scope for small- and medium-size banks. 
More recent studies address different methodological issues in an attempt to obtain 
better and more accurate results, noting that standard methodologies employed in the 
cost literature have several limitations. Finally, most studies concentrate in the US 
banking market. However, due to its nature (branch, state-wide, and unit banks), US 
is a totally different market than most of banking industries thought the world". 
Hence, any conclusion drawn from these studies does not necessarily apply to any 
other market. In the current study, with the use of a new data set (see section 3.7), we 
test the existence of economies of scale as well as cost complementarities, in the UK 
banking market. . 
49 For example it would take over 2,000 banking organisations to account for 90% of deposits in the US 
industry, while in most other developed countries 90% of deposits would be accounted for by fewer 
than 10 organisations. 
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3.6 Methodology 
In the current study we utilise the translog flexible functional form to estimate the 
bank's cost function [Mester (1987,1992,1993), Fields et al. (1993), Jagtiani et al. 
(1995), Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996), Rogers (1998a)]. The translog cost function 
for a given bank p at a time t is specified as follows: 
1nTC=a, +Z a, Inw; p, +EPhY,,, 
+-:,: yj In w,,,, w1, + 
2tt Sks 1nY, pt In Y,,, + z;, In w,,,, 1n Y., +c (3.24) k=1 S-1 1-1 k=1 
where: 
wj = price of inputs, 
Yk = outputs, 
TC = total cost 
& s; = normal disturbance term identically distributed, with c- N[0, E(E)], 
and s; - N[0, E(E2)], and contemporaneous correlation E(e,, e,, ) * 0. 
Assuming cost minimising behaviour, the logarithmic differentiation of the translog 
cost function equation with respect to input prices (3.24), using Shephard's lemma 
[Shephard (1953,1970), Cristensen et al. (1973)], produces a set of equilibrium cost 
share equations, each for every output i. The share equations are given by: 
Sr _ä1nTC __ar +1 y InwApr ke +Zzk. . 1n Ypt +er (3.25) ö In w ! f. 1 k. l 
Joint estimates of the system of equations, composed of the cost equation and cost 
share equations produces more efficient estimates than the cost equation alone. The 
system of equation increases the efficiency of the estimates only if the residuals of the 
cost and cost share equation are contemporaneously correlated [Zellner (1962)]. 
Since the cost shares sum to unity, regression errors s; of the cost-share equations are 
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not independent. To avoid singularity of the variance covariance matrix, a share 
equation must be omitted in the estimation procedures [Jagtiani and Khanthavit 
(1996)]. The results are invariant to the equation omitted [Diewert (1982)]. 
For the production and cost functions to be fully integrated, the translog cost function 
(3.24) must satisfy certain conditions. Regularity conditions require that the cost 
function is monotonically non-decreasing in input prices and outputs and concave in 
input prices. 50 Symmetry and homogeneity restrictions must be imposed prior to 
estimation to ensure the monotonicity conditions [Jorgenson (1968)]. The 
homogeneity conditions in input prices imply that: 
n 
Zai =1 
r-1 
(3.26a) 
yj=0J or all i (3.26b) 
Zik = 0, for all i (3.26c) 
t=1 
Symmetry conditions require that second-order output and input parameters satisfy: 
yj = j; , for all i, j (3.27a) 
Zik = Zki, for all k, i (3.27b) 
The translog cost equation (3.24) and a cost share equation (3.25) are estimated as a 
system of equations, using an iterative seemingly unrelated regression technique 
[Zellner (1962)]. 
so The concavity of the cost function with respect to w; can be tested for each point through the 
elasticity of substitution matrix. If the matrix is negative-semidefinite at every data point, then the 
Hessian matrix will be negative-semidefinite and the cost function will be concave at every point. 
Monotonicity condition is based on the notion that Si > 0. If Si <0 then STC/ Sw1 <0 , and this 
in turn 
violates the aforementioned condition. [Fields et al. (1993)]. 
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3.6.1 Overall economies of scale 
As explained in detail in section 3.3, overall economies of scale can be expressed by 
the elasticity of cost with respect to output. Due to the multi-product nature of banks, 
the analysis and the interpretation of returns to scale is to some extent complex, 
because the average costs are only defined for single product process. 
Following Mester (1987,1992), Allen and Rai (1993), Fields et al. (1993), Jagtiani et 
al. (1995) and Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) we evaluate economies of scale as the 
sum of the first-order partial derivatives of the estimated cost function, with respect to 
output. That is: 
SE=ZainTC=Z A+SkslnY. +zk, Inwj (3.28) 
k_, ö In Yk k=, ;. I r=ý 
where: 
SE = denotes overall economies of scale. 
In a competitive industry, at long-run equilibrium values of SE :51 indicate efficiency 
in the scale of operations corresponding to minimum costs or decreasing ray average 
costs. On the other hand, diseconomies of scale, SE > 1, correspond to increasing ray 
average costs, and indicate inefficiencies in the scale of operations. 
3.6.2 Cost complementarities 
As mentioned in section 3.3, economies of scope between two outputs exist when a 
twice differentiable multi-product cost function exhibits cost complementarities 
between the products. Baumol et al. (1988) illustrates that a sufficient, but not 
essential condition for overall economies of scope, is the presence of cost 
complementarities between output. 
Cost complementarities in joint production of any two outputs, k and C, (COMPkC), 
are estimated as the second-order partial derivatives of the cost function with respect 
to outputs. Cost complementarity exists if the marginal cost of producing one output 
decreases when the production of the other increases. This measure of scope 
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economies was chosen as opposed to the other measures, because it is a local 
measure; Roller (1990) has shown that the translog functional form performs well 
locally. Several studies use the global measure of economies of scope proposed by 
Mester (1987). Following Mester (1987), Allen and Rai (1993), Jagtiani et al. (1995), 
and Rogers (1998a), cost complementarities can be represented as follows: 
coMPks = 
aZTC 
OTk6 Ys 
mnmn 
Sks /3k + Sks In Y. +2: z; k In w; * 
(, 
6, +Z Sks, In Yk+E zo In wi 
, C-1 i=1 
k=1 i=1 
(3.29) 
Cost advantages in joint production result from cost complementarities, i. e. falling 
marginal costs of one output associated with an increase in the level of another output. 
When COMPkg S 0, an increase in the level of output reduces the marginal cost of 
producing output k, and there is cost complementarity between k and ý. Operating 
efficiency is characterised by COMPk; <_ 0, which implies constant or decreasing 
marginal costs. Cost inefficiencies in joint production are indicated by COMPký > 0. 
However, in such a case one must assume that the cost structures of single and multi- 
product firms are comparable. Another problem arises at zero output level: as 
mentioned in section 3.2, translog cost function is undefined for zero output. Many 
studies replace the zero value of the output with a very small number, i. e. 0.001. 
Gilligan and Smirlock (1984) use the value 0.001, whereas Allen and Rai (1993) use 
the value 0.00015. Kim (1986) and Mester (1987) select 10 percent of the mean the 
minimum values, respectively. Consistently, in the current study, we replace the zero 
value with 0.0015. 
To conclude both measures are based on the estimated cost frontier and, therefore, 
indicate whether a bank minimising cost of producing a particular output bundle could 
lower costs proportionately by choosing another level of output, or by changing its 
output mix. 
! fir 
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3.7 Data description 
One of main reasons for the limited number of studies based on UK and European 
banking markets in general relates to the data availability problem. Studies in the UK 
concentrate on building societies (see section 3.5.4.2). 
The time span of the present data set is 1981 to 1995; this time interval is chosen 
because all major changes in the banking industry, at national and international level, 
occurred during this period. As mentioned in Chapter 1, British banking started 
changing radically with the beginning of 1980s. During that decade, banks 
experienced deregulation, internalisation of financial services, improvements in 
technology, and the path towards the single markets. During 1990s, national 
implementation of the EU Banking Directives came forth, whereas banks started to 
adjust to the new environment. 
In order to provide a comprehensive treatment of the industry and to determine 
whether the results are stable over time, the data set has to be uniform over time. 
Thus, the sample covers all UK established banks that begun business on or before 
1981, and were still in operation by the end of 1995. Only 78 banks are found to be in 
operation for all the selected time period. To attain such information, the Bank of 
England's Banking Act Reports were utilised. This annual publication presents a list 
with the institutions that are authorised by the Bank of England to accept deposits in 
the UK, or each year. However, from a sample of 78 the final data set comprises only 
60 banks. The names of the banks constituting the sample employed in the current 
thesis are given in the Appendixes to Chapter 3, Table 3-25. (section 3.11.4. ). No 
information concerning the rest twelve banks could be found. 5' After gathering all the 
relevant information, the data was collected from the Income Statements and Balance 
Sheets of each individual bank for a period of fifteen years, from 1981 to 1995. 
Appendix to Chapter 3 provides a description of the data for each year of the 1981- 
1995 period (Tables 3-6 to 3-20). 
51 Each individual bank was contacted but only four banks provided the requested information. Next we 
contacted the Companies House, which is the institution from which we obtain the raw data. The 
institution provided us with a microfiche copy for each company file. Hence, for each year and for 
each individual bank, the information was retrieved manually to create the data set employed in the 
current study. 
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As already mentioned, to provide a comprehensive treatment of the industry and to 
determine whether the results are stable over time the data employed is uniform. 
Nevertheless, the are certain disadvantages by using a consistent data sample. Because 
the time span is quiet extensive (1981-19950, a large amount of institutions that have 
been established after 1981, are excluded from the sample. Thus, with the 
establishment date restriction the data sample has been reduced to some extend. The 
small sample is on of the limitations of the current study. Additionally, the inclusion 
of all institution in operation for each year might produce different estimates. Still, 
these disadvantages do not outweigh the benefits of a consistent data sample. What 
we are trying to assess in the current study is the evolution of the UK banking system. 
By changing the data set from year to year one would get consistent results. 
Furthermore, UK banking is characterised by oligopolistic behaviour, as 70-80% of 
total market deposits is concentrated in three to four large banks (see Chapter 5). 
Hence, any additions/deletions in the number of institutions is unlikely to produce 
significant changes. 
3.8 Bank input and output specification 
The literature has exposed considerable difficulties in the definition and measurement 
of input and output in banking, since banks are multi-product firms producing joint or 
independent services rather than physical products. As a result, economist disagree on 
the correct definition of output and input in the banking industry, because each 
definition embeds a particular set of banking concepts. A detail analysis on the 
definitional problems of banks' input and output, together with the different 
approaches employed in the literature was given in Chapter 2, section 3. 
We employed two different approaches to assess the empirical validity of the 
competing views concerning the classification of inputs and outputs, and to examine 
the sensitivity of the results to different model specification. The first one, the 
intermediation approach considers banks as intermediators of financial services, and 
is chosen based on its advantages over the production approach [Mester (1992), Bauer 
et al. (1993), Fields et al. (1993), Kaparakis et al. (1994), Jagtiani and Khanthavit 
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(1996)]. First, it is more inclusive of total banking cost, as it does not exclude interest 
expenses. The inclusion of both categories of costs may be more appropriate as profit 
maximising banks minimise total cost. Furthermore, according to Berger (1993) any 
exclusion of interest cost may result to bias towards finding scale economies, because 
banks tend to substitute interest-cost intensive purchased funds for operating cost 
intensive produced deposits as scale increases. In general, interest costs constitute a 
substantial portion of banks total cost and their exclusion may distort the empirical 
results. 
The second, is the value-added approach [Nathan and Neave (1992), Berger et al. 
(1993), Berger (1993), McAllister and McManus (1993), Jagtiani et al. (1995), Clark 
(1996)]. The difference of this method is that it considers all liabilities and assets 
categories having some output characteristics, rather than distinguishing inputs and 
outputs in a mutually exclusive way. In this approach the identification of activities 
as inputs and outputs is based on the share of value added, which means that items of 
balance sheet with substantial share of value are considered important outputs. Still 
total costs include both operating costs as well as interest costs. Two models are 
estimated (see eq. 3.24), Model I based on the intermediation approach, and Model II 
based on the value-added approach. 
") Next, we proceed with the choice of the appropriate inputs and outputs. Because data 
availability changes intertemporally due to differences in accounting requirements, we 
have to include variables that are consistent for all banks for the whole sample period, 
to ensure that results are comparable. Moreover, most US studies distinguish between 
different types of deposits, i. e. demand, time and savings, and CDs, and utilise some 
of them as output and the others as inputs (purchased funds) [Berger and Humphrey 
(1990), Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996)]. However, in our case, this cannot be applied 
as only the total amount of deposits is disclosed. Hence, consistent with Berg (1991) 
and Berg and Kim (1991), who argue that purchased funds do not qualify as an output 
because they do not use real resources, we utilise the total amount of deposit as an 
output. 
Specifically, total cost (TC) is proxied by the sum of all operating costs incurred by 
each individual bank in the production of output and services together with interest 
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payable. The outputs used under Model I, all measured in sterling pounds, are Total 
Deposits (yl), and Total Loans (y2). As Roger (1998) states, in recent studies deposits 
and loans are used to measure output. As far as Model II is concerned, a third output 
is included, Security Investments (y3) (see Table 2-1 for information about input and 
output measurement in the literature). 
In both models, inputs selected are labour (xi), and physical capital (X2). Labour is 
measured by the total number of employees at the end of the period, while physical 
capital is the net book value of total fixed assets. The price of labour (w1) is derived 
by taking the total expenditure on employees divided by the number of employees. A 
proxy for the price of capital (w2) is calculated by dividing the total expenditure on 
fixed assets with the net book value of fixed assets. 
3.9 Empirical Results 
The cost function in equation (3.24) and one of the two cost share equations are 
estimated as a system of equations employing an Iterative Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression technique imposing the linear homogeneity (3.26) and symmetry (3.27) 
restrictions. Since we have two inputs, labour and capital, we also have two share 
equations. Nevertheless, because cost shares equations sum to unity, the capital cost 
share equation is omitted to avoid a singular covariance residual matrix. All the 
estimation procedures in the current chapter and in the rest of this thesis have been 
obtained with the use of the LIMDEP econometric software. 
An advantage of the translog function over other models used in the literature is that it 
allows homogeneity of degree one. " However, one limitation of the translog function 
is its inability to handle zero values. The translog requires zero costs when any 
output/input level is zero. In our study, due to the presence of banks with different 
product mixes, this constitutes a problem. To overcome this, the zero output was 
replaced with the value of 0.0015, following Gilligan and Smirlock (1984), Allen and 
Rai (1993). 
52 See Jagtianin and Khanthavit (1996). 
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Two models are estimated (see eq. 3.24): Model I, based on the intermediation 
approach, according to which banks are considered as intermediators of financial 
services, and Model II, based on the value-added approach, where the identification of 
input and output is based on the share of value added. Both models are estimated in 
the same way: a maximum likelihood procedure was used to estimate the parameters 
of the system of equations for each of the fifteen years. Parameter estimates for the 
each year's translog cost function for both models are shown in Appendix to Chapter 
3, (Tables 3-21 and 3-22). 
By looking at Tables 3-21 to 3-22 we observe that some parameters vary over time. A 
possible explanation may be changes in the business environment as well as changes 
in banks' initiated adjustments in bank costs and output (see Chapter 1, section 1.2. 
Market developments). For example, during the late 1980s and early 1990s due to 
worsening economic conditions and increasing market competition, banks cut down 
on loans and place emphasis on cost controls and efficiency measures. The result of 
this re-structuring was a sharp reduction in the number of employees. The only factor 
that increased was the continuously heavy investments in information technology. 
This gives us an indication as to why the w1, the price of capital, varies from -1.3 to 
+1.6., as the major alterations in the value and the sign in the coefficients of w2 
occurred during this period. 
Further to the above we estimate the cost function (eq. 3.24) for all the years (Model 
I) using Ordinary Least Squares to perform diagnostic tests. The estimated parameters 
together with diagnostic test are given in the Appendix to Chapter, section 3.11.3. As 
can be seen from Table 3-23 in some equations the normality hypothesis is rejected. 
Given that the data set it is cross-section and consists of bank of different size, bring 
about a possible explanation this. 
To correct it we re-run the regressions with a reduced sample, after taking into 
accounts the potential outliers in the data sample. In all cases the normality problem 
is eliminated, and most importantly the estimated parameters do not change 
significantly (see Appendix to Chapter 3, Table 3-25). Thus, the results are fairly 
robust to the sample employed. 
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In an attempt to examine which model produces better estimates, we check the R2s of 
the models. As can be seen (Tables 3-21 and 3-22), the values of RZ's for both 
models are in most cases above 0.90, and the difference between the two is minimal. 
Consistent with the high RZ's, most of the explanatory variables found to be 
significant for both models for all years. Consequently, both models appear as 
potential candidates for the measurement of scale and scope economies. 
Table 3-3 presents the estimates for overall economies of scale, and the approximated 
standard errors of the coefficients. Overall economies of scale explain the behaviour 
of cost as output increases or decreases for a given bundle of outputs. The measure 
can be estimated by evaluating equation (3.28), using the estimated parameters from 
Model I and Model II, to examine how changes in scale affect the total cost as this 
measure is based on the estimated cost frontier it indicates whether a bank minimising 
the production cost of a particular output could lower costs proportionately by 
choosing another level of output. 
In a competitive industry values of scale economies lower than one indicate efficiency 
in the scale of operations, brought about by minimum costs or decreasing ray average 
costs. Ray average cost measures the average cost of production associated with 
proportionate increases of all outputs as measured along a ray through the origin in 
the output space. On the other hand, a value greater than one indicates increasing ray 
average cost, which in turn suggests inefficiencies in the scale of operations 
(diseconomies of scale). 53 
s' The test statistic for the economies of scale is linear and has a student-t distribution. The cost 
complementarities are non-linear, hence the t-statistics are asymptotically normal [Theil (1971), 
p. 373. ]. 
107 
Chapter 3 
Table 3-3: Overall Economies of Scales. 
Yeär; ' `ý ;> Model I' Model II 
1995 1.2027 1.2671 
(0.030)* (0.029)* 
1994 1.5686 1.3909 
(0.027)* (0.485)* 
1993 1.1672 1.1887 
(0.0570)* (0.0361)* 
1992 0.7620 0.6344 
(0.037)* (0.039)* 
1991 1.2534 1.4571 
(0.059)* (0.055)* 
1990 1.1867 1.0905 
(0.063)* (0.069)* 
1989 1.3002 1.4962 
(0.034)* (0.040)* 
1988 1.2174 1.4363 
(0.032)* (0.037)* 
1987 1.4174 1.3214 
0.044 * (0.053)* 
1986 1.3789 1.1918 
(0.044)* (0.061)* 
1985 1.2751 1.1606 
0.046 * (0.058) 
1984 1.1385 1.1836 
(0.057)* (0.052)* 
1983 1.2903 1.3023 
0.045 * (0.047)* 
1982 1.2798 1.2777 
(0.045)* (0.050)* 
1981 1.1358 1.1738 
(0.066)* (0.052)* 
Notes: * denotes significance at 5% level. 
Values of standard error in parentheses. 
From Table 3-3 it is clear that the results are invariant to input and output 
specification, as both models yield consistent estimates. For all the periods from 1981 
to 1995 (apart from 1992) the OSE (Overall Scale Economies) coefficient is greater 
than one and statistically significant. This suggests the existence of diseconomies of 
scope, i. e. banks are operating on average at greater than minimum efficiently. A 
possible reason might be the increasing pattern of concentration due to deregulation, 
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which eventuated in the creation of large financial institutions; yet, the increase in the 
volume of activities resulted in the inefficient use of some or all inputs. 
On the other hand, in attempt to become more competitive during the 1990s, made 
heavy investments in information technology. This steamed from the desire for long- 
term benefits and from increased automation of labour intensive activities (credit 
assessments, data processing and storage of customer information). Hence, banks 
may have not yet realised the benefits from deregulation and liberalisation of financial 
services, since the re-adjustment costs are high and have not been fully depreciated. 
Still, these results seem a bit surprising because most of the previous literature finds at 
least on some level economies of scales (Martin and Sassenou (1992), Dietch (1993), 
McKillop and Glass (1994)). The results are in line with the findings of Jagtiani and 
Khanthavit (1996) who suggest that with deregulation banks became too large to be 
efficient, while Mester (1992) indicates that banks are operating at slightly than 
minimum efficient after deregulation. Also the results are consistent with Glass and 
McKillop (1992) who find diseconomies of scope in the Irish banking market. 
In an attempt to identify the source of these diseconomies of scales, we perform 
second stage regressions via OLS. Firstly, as scale economies measures indicate a 
more efficient use of some inputs with an increasing volume of output, an increase in 
size could allow more efficient organisation of resources. Thus, the first test concerns 
the bank size, measured by total assets [Mester (1996), Miller and Noulas (1996)]. 
Further, another determinant of economies of scale is market structure. According to 
the theory, industries that exhibit substantial scale economies may end up in an 
oligopolistic structure in the long run. The diseconomies of scale found here imply 
that the market consists of a large number of firms in the market, hence it is closer to 
perfect competition. Consequently, the next variable to be tested in relation to scale 
economies is the market concentration together with the market share of each firm. To 
estimate the degree of market concentration, the concentration ratio has been applied. 
We employ the three-bank concentration ratio, defined as the ratio of total deposits of 
the three largest banks to the total deposits of the banks in the UK. To measure the 
market share of each bank,, we calculate the proportion of each individual bank's 
deposit in the market relative to the total market deposit. 
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The results obtained are reported in Table 3-4. 
Table 3-4: Results from a regression of scale economies on concentration, market 
share, and total assets. 
Variable - 
Year 
Concentration Market Share Log of Total 
Assets 
1995 2.508 -1.287 -0.012 
(0.44)* (0.72)* (0.019) 
1994 3.404 0.367 -0.045 
(0.77)* (1.39) (0.03) 
1993 2.651 -1.255 -0.033 
(0.47)* (0.78) (0.02) 
1992 1.230 0.397 -0.013 
(0.56)* (0.89) (0.03) 
1991 0.882 -0.238 0.061 
(0.65) (0.16) (0.03) 
1990 3.366 -1.792 -0.010 
(0.80)* (1.35) (0.04) 
1989 2.426 0.445 -0.032 
(0.51)* (0.84) (0.03) 
1988 1.512 -0.461 0.016 
(0.47)* (0.79) (0.02) 
1987 1.484 -0.358 0.098 
(0.68)* (1.11) (0.39) 
1986 2.508 -1.287 -0.012 
(0.44)* (0.72)* (0.02) 
1985 3.404 0.3667 -0.045 
(0.77)*.... (1.39) (0.03) 
1984 2.651 -1.255 -0.034 
(0.47)* (0.783) (0.02) 
1983 1.230 0.397 -0.013 
(0.56)* (0.89) (0.03) 
1982 0.882 -0.238 0.061 
(0.65) (0.16) (0.03) 
1981 3.366 -1.792 -0.100 
(0.80)* (1.35) (0.04) 
Notes: * denotes significance at 5% level. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The negative signs of market share and total assets suggest an opposite relationship 
between the variables and diseconomies of scale. As mentioned above, industries that 
exhibit substantial scale economics may end up in an oligopolistic structure in the 
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long run, thus fewer firms with larger market share. Nevertheless, the variable is 
statistically significant only in two out of the fifteen equations, whereas the size 
variable is always insignificant. On the other hand, concentration is positively 
significant throughout the sample period. The results suggests that the higher the 
concentration the higher the diseconomies of scale. Accordingly, the data supports 
the view that an oligopolistic market structure result in a less efficient organisation of 
resources, and thus in decreasing returns to scale. This is consistent with the `quiet 
life' hypothesis; when banks enjoy greater market power and concentration, 
inefficiency follows not because of non-competitive pricing but because of a relaxed 
environment that produces no incentive to minimise cost [(Hicks 1935) `Quiet Life 
Hypothesis']. In line with the aforementioned, the results suggest that the UK banks 
are not operating at most cost-efficient size. 
Table 3-5 presents the estimates cost complementarities and the approximated 
standard errors of the coefficients. The measure can be estimated by evaluating 
equation (3.29) using the estimated parameters from Model I and Model II. Cost 
complementarities exist if the marginal cost of producing one output decreases when 
the production of the other output increases, indicating cost advantages in the joint 
production. When this measure is lower than zero, suggesting decreasing marginal 
costs, then cost complementarities are present implying economies of scope. In turn, a 
positive value indicates diseconomies of scope, and a value equal to zero suggests 
cost independence. 
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Table 3-5: Pairwise Cost Complementarities. 
Year - Model I Model 11 
Variables yj and y1 yj and Y2 yi and y3 Y2 acrd y3 
1995 -0.0506 -0.0576 -0.0607 -0.4416 
(0.018)*_.. (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.122)* 
1994 0.0034 -0.0042 0.0013 0.0071 
(0.001)* (0.002)* (0.003) (0.008) 
1993 -0.0051 -0.1499 0.1307 -0.1601 
(0.002)* (0.052)* (0.0369)* (0.073) 
1992 -0.0628 -0.5822 0.1604 -0.8022 
................ 
(0.019)* 
........ .. 
(0.160)* 
.... 
(0.110) (0.133)* 
1991 -0.0363 0.0181 0.02002 -0.0006 
(0.051) (0.005)* (0.006)* (0.002)* 
1990 -0.0432 0.0866 -0.0546 0.0099 
(0.025) (0.011)* (0.005)* (0.0005)* 
1989 0.1441 -0.0065 -0.0540 0.0582 
(0.008)* (0.0004)* (0.006)* (0.004)* 
1988 0.0177 0.0385 -0.0205 0.0104 
(0.001)* 
........ 
(0.003)* (0.004)* (0.004)* 
1987 0.0061 0.0952 0.0249 0.0024 
(0.006) (0.008)* (0.004)* (0.0003)* 
1986 0.00617 0.0044 -0.0014 -0.0088 
(0.0036) (0.001)* (0.003) (0.001)* 
1985 0.0436 0.0048 0.0680 0.0121 
(0.001)* (0.0005)* (0.0061)* (0.003)* 
1984 0.0085 0.0147 0.0687 0.0687 
(0.001)* (0.001)* (0.0053)* (0.005)* 
1983 0.0642 0.0509 0.2284 -0.0047 
(0.003)* (0.005)* (0.0196)* (0.006) 
1982 -0.4924 0.0340 0.0708 0.0011 
(0.037)* (0.003)* (0.007)* (0.002)* 
1981 -0.0583 0.0256 0.0196 -0.0020 
(0.015)* (0.003)* (0.0019)* (0.001) 
Notes: * denotes significance at 5% level. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
As regards cost complementarities, the results are found to he sensitive to the model 
specification. Particularly, for Moclel I the values of cost complementaritics indicate a 
strong interdependence between the joint production of loans and deposits for the first 
two years of the sample. On the other hand, Model II suggests diseconomies of scope 
for the same period and, furthermore, the existence of inefficiency in the joint 
production of deposits and loans during the 1980s (with the exception of 1989). The 
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situation changes with the new decade. During the 1990s, estimates indicate a strong 
interdependence in joint production of loan and deposits for both models. Model II 
implying a stronger relationship than Model I. Cost complementarities are also 
present, but to a lesser extent, between loans and investments in 1986 and from 1990 
to 1995 (apart from 1994) with an increasing pattern. However, in earlier years the 
coefficients are positive, and in some cases statistically significant, implying 
diseconomies of scopes. 
On the other hand, findings indicate diseconomies of scope between deposits and 
investments for most of the years. The combining production of deposits and 
investment for years 1986,1992 and 1994 are statistically insignificant, indicating the 
absence of any economies or diseconomies on the current product mix. Further, from 
1981-1985, and for 1987,1991, and 1993, there exists a lack of cost complementarity 
between deposits and investments, indicating inefficiency in the joint production of 
these two outputs. For years 1988-1990, and 1995 there is a statistically significant 
value in favour of the joint production of deposits and investments. 
Thus, although banks appear to be inefficient with respect to the scale of their 
operation, there exist economies in the joint production of deposits and loans, and 
loans and investments during the 1990s. The empirical results for joint production, 
are not in favour of specialisation, indicating that specialisation would result in cost 
inefficiencies. The implication is that the joint production of these outputs resulted in 
lower costs. Consistent with Rogers (1998a), who finds cost and revenue 
complementarities after deregulation, the existence of cost complementarities in 
1990s could be a sign of UK banks becoming more efficient in the face of 
deregulation and increased competition. On the other hand, Jagtiani et al. (1995) and 
Mester (1996) find no evidence of scope economies, whereas Jagtiani and Khanthavit 
find diseconomies of scope. 
With deregulation, banks are able to expand their activities in other markets. The 
findings suggest the benefits of expanding bank powers, with these benefits coming at 
the expense of other financial institutions, rather than bank customers. In turn, these 
results imply that expansion of bank powers into other activities may provide 
downward pressure on prices. 
113 
Chapter 3 
3.10 Conclusions 
The bulk of the empirical literature on economies of scale and scope investigate the 
cost structure of US markets, and report different results depending on the size of 
banks used in their data sample. In general, these studies tend to conclude that large 
bank over-perform small ones in terms of scale efficiency. For the European market 
little work has been done, and although some evidence suggests the presence of scale 
economies, there is no agreement on the level of output at which these economies are 
exhausted. From the above it is clear that more research must be undertaken in the 
area of European cost structure. 
Here, we estimate a cost function for UK banks using the translog specification in an 
attempt we assess scale economies and cost complementarities. The data utilised 
covers the period from 1981 to 1995. Two models are used: the first one that 
classifies banks as intermediators of financial services. The second is based on the 
value-added approach, where the identification of input and output is based on the 
share of value added. Contrary to the findings of Nathan and Neave (1992), both 
models produce on average similar results. 
The results indicate the existence of decreasing returns to scale, implying 
diseconomies of scale for the UK banks throughout the time period, 1981-1995. The 
results are in line with the finding of Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996), Mester (1992), 
and Glass and McKillop (1992). Furthermore, the results suggest lack of cost 
complementarities at the beginning of the data period. On the other hand, with the 
beginning of the new decade, consistent with Rogers (1998a), there is evidence of 
economies of scope in the joint production. These results are somewhat different from 
previous findings in other countries, which, in turn, suggests that national markets and 
industries do not operate identically. 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, information obtained from the estimation of 
scale economies can be used to inform government policy by assessing the effect of 
deregulation on efficiency. Due to the existence of diseconomies of scale mergers 
and acquisitions that lead to a more concentrated financial system may imply higher 
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cost. Thus, government policy should be designed to control the growth of banks, as 
this growth leads to operational inefficiencies in the form of diseconomies of scale. 
On the other hand the existence of cost complementarities in the joint production of 
loans and deposits, and loans and investments, during the 1990s suggests that 
deregulation benefits banks by increasing their power into new activities. This 
benefit, in turn, passes to the consumer in the form of lower prices, as competition 
increases between banks and other financial institutions. 
Nevertheless, the current exploration faces a set of limitations, due to the small 
number of banks in the data set. Firstly, as it can be seen from section 3.5, most of the 
literature employed a vast amount of institutions, which can be divided sub-categories 
according to size (small, medium and large banks). Although the current data set 
consists of banks of different size, diversification cannot be performed due to the 
smaller number of banks included. And last, but not least, data'availability changed 
from year to year due to differences in accounting requirements, which hunted 
substantially the number of potential variables for the period under consideration. 
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3.11 Appendix to Chapter 3 
3.11.1 Data description 
The following Tables give a description of basic statistics for the data for 1981-95 
period. 
Table 3-6: Data description for1995. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 1,033,200 2,612,700 3.605 15.864 2,703 13,240,000 
Inputs 
Labour (x1) 208,280 566,840 3.742 16.772 425 2,907,000 
Capital (x2) 22,957 63,186 3.509 14.956 0.00150 332,000 
Outputs 
Price of Labour (w, ) 46.396 27.056 1.264 4.831 8.991 138 
Price of Capital (w, ) 0.23905 0.22883 1.912 7.616 0.00150 1.227 
Outputs 
Deposits (y1) 10,290,000 26,712,000 3.548 15.051 40,510 135,000,000 
Loans (Y2) 9,143,400 23,610,000 3.463 14.369 36,120 116,000,000 
Investments (Y3) 991,610 2,408,100 3.937 19.897 0.00150 14,630,000 
Table 3-7: Data description for 1994. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 824,880 2,273.500 3.886 17.84 2,471) 11,680,000 
Inputs 
Labour (xi) 190,980 536,570 3.837 17.421 417 2,763,000 
Capital (x-, ) 21,122 58,030 3.342 13.334 0.00150 290,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (w, ) 41.757 23.058 0.751 3.318 0.02567 115.1 
Price of Capital (w, ) 0.24227 0.22254 1.61 5.447 0.00150 0.9941 
Outputs 
Deposits (y, ) 9,248,000 24,923,000 3.806 17.212 25,710 128,000,000 
Labour (y, ) 8,221,600 22,479,000 3.831 17.489 19,600 117,000,000 
Investments (y3) 675,280 1,681,600 3.909 17.944 0.00150 9,250,000 
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Table 3-8: Data description for 1993 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 923,840 2,572,000 3.981 18.764 2571 14,140,000 
Inputs 
Labour (x, ) 184,520 528,340 3.844 17.398 379 2,728,000 
Capital (x7) 21541 61122 3.648 15.916 0.00150 311,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (w1) 41.361 28.292 1.97 8.13 0.04381 164 
Price of Capital (w2) 0.2815 0.25395 1.38 4.749 0.00150 1.135 
Outputs 
Deposits (y, ) 8,942,400 25,207,000 3.925 18.095 16,530 133,000,000 
Loans (y, ) 7,979,200 22,232,000 3.917 18.096 26,140 117,000,000 
Investments (y3) 621,950 1,377,770 3.563 15.560 0.00150 7,378,000 
Table 3-9: Data description for1992. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 1,082,900 3,008,500 3.938 18.333 3,892 16,270,000 
Inputs 
Labour(xi) 236,140 629,770 3.045 11.279 370 2,864,000 
Capital (x2) 19696 55573 3.702 16.478 0.00150 297,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (w) 39.485 28.604 2.069 8.559 0.00573 165.30 
Price of Capital (w, ) 0.23529 0.21056 1.604 5.935 0.00150 1.016 
Outputs 
Deposits (yi) 8,625,400 24,578,000 4.025 18.944 23,720 129,000,000 
Loans (Y2) 7,690,400 22,213,000 4.016 18.857 32,340 115,000,000 
Investments(y3) 492,400 1,183,100 3.974 20.263 0.00150 7,252,000 
Table 3-10: Data description forl991. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 1,273,454 4,002,785 4.525 21.681 4,779 23,987,000 
111puts 
Labour(x1) 141,051 381,142 3.453 11.336 440 1,887,000 
Capital (x, ) 40,512 139,718 4.209 17.701 0.0015 780,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (w1) 35.392 20.2404 1.064 0.891 8.991052 102.502 
Price of Capital (w, ) 0.2529 0.2433 2.167 7.116 0.0015 1.387 
Outputs 
Deposits (y, ) 24,282,574 143,495,072 7.594 58.340 12,439 111,000,000 
Loans (y2) 6,126,727 18,573,952 4.1783 17.976 4,588 97,749,000 
Investments(y3) 367,997 853,008 3.725 14.739 0.0015 4,425,000 
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Table 3-11: Data description forl 990. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 1,131,855 3,347,486 3.9086 15.4419 6,396 17,881,000 
Inputs 
Labour(xi) 133,078 361,303 3.413 10.769 417 1,698,000 
Capital (x7) 36,308 123,616 4.229 18.0737 0.0015 698,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (w1) 35.4949 24.07 1.5505 3.149 8.6997 130.138 
Price of Capital (w, ) 0.2268 0.1932 1.0518 0.356 0.0015 0.75999 
Outputs 
Deposits (y, ) 7,531,907 20,902,263 3.882 15.372 20,440 106,000,000 
Loans (Y2) 6,178,827 18,522,689 4.1075 17.2596 4,695 95,879,000 
Investments(y3) 288,625 610,169 2.9825 8.5017 0.0015 2,821,000 
Table 3-12: Data description forl 989. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 1,072,155 3,090,452 3.5789 11.9301 8,272 14,325,000 
Inputs 
Labour(xi) 130,888 352,503 3.3578 10.2428 379 1,571,000 
Capital (x, ) 33,744 108,887 4.0945 17.3234 0.0015 609,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (w, ) 32.7966 20.0866 1.1444 1.0715 7.5709 95.5714 
Price of Capital (w) 0.23813 0.21310 1.0207 0.2172 0.0015 0.78552 
Outputs 
Deposits (y, ) 7,370,296 20,593,286 3.845 14.929 4,445 104,000,000 
Loans (y2) 6,137,049 18,317,532 4.01299 16.3659 4,281 94,244,000 
Investments(y3) 301,709, 654,719 3.4594 13.9473 0.0015 3,752,000 
Table 3-13: Data description for1988. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 701,784 1,907,213 11.302 3.502 5,414 8,65;, 000 
Inputs 
Labour(xi) 120,073 322,628 10.0483 3.328 370 1,421,000 
Capital (x2) 28,328 91,611 17.324 4.087 0.0015 515,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (w, ) 31.4941 19.4224 0.6149 1.0205 7.232 88.563 
Price of Capital (w) 0.2383 0.2473 6.919 2.159 0.0015 1.3878 
OU) its 
Deposits (yj) 6,270,258 17,370,829 14.667 3.828 4,234 87,034,000 
Loans(y2) 5,321,857 15,296,937 15.246 3.882 2,944 78,179,000 
Investments(y, ) 283,250 679,057 10.849 3.335 0.0015 3,287,000 
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Table 3-14: Data description for 1987. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 675,393 1,809,205 10.751 3.413 6,316 8,291,000 
Inputs 
Labour(x1) 108,115 290,312 10.244 3.367 334 1,259,000 
Capital (x2) 22,637 80,637 24.686 4.839 0.0015 499,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (w, ) 29.40552 18.3027 1.485 1.219 7.484761 89.490 
Price of Capital (w2) 0.256119 0.3276 23.610 4.212 0.0015 2.256 
Outputs 
Deposits (y, ) 5,771,626 15,537,110 13.841 3.713 4,699 76,354,000 
Loans (y7) 4,410,095 12,753,016 14.137 3.763 1,911 63,986,000 
Investments(y3) 286,025 604,125 8.059 2.891 0.015 2,847,000 
Table 3-15: Data description for 1986. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 658,504 1,749,048 10.518 3.392 5,696 8,097,000 
Inputs 
Labour(x, ) 99,676 269,246 10.451 3.378 315 1,204,000 
Capital (x, ) 20,968 75,322 22.534 4.693 0.0015 440,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (w1) 27.439 16.980 1.912 1.241 7.008 87.599 
Price of Capital (w, ) 0.200 0.164 0.586 1.022 0.0015 0.686 
Outputs 
Deposits (y1) 5,641,050 14,980,313 12.018 3.518 3,740 72,761,000 
Loans (y7) 4,304,118 12,211,619 12.407 3.571 1,544 60,459,000 
Investments(y3) 318,199 640,176 7.266 2.753 0.0015 2,955,000 
Table 3-16: Data description forl 985. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 660,763 1,769,348 9.846 3.301 5,155 7,832,000 
Inputs 
Labour(x1) 83,574 230,364 12.453 3.560 290 1,194,000 
Capital (x2) 23,566 78,909 15.404 3.938 0.015 405,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (w1) 26.289 17.276 2.347 1.405 6.592 88.434 
Price of Capital (w2) 0.227 0.196 3.130 1.555 0.0015 0.972 
Outputs 
Deposits (y, ) 5,060,501 13,611,948 10.835 3.406 10,886 64,753,000 
Loans (y2) 4,037,997 11,613,907 11.191 3.454 2,954 54,349,000 
lnvestments(y1) 299,084, 735,873 15.580 3.736 0.0015 4,272,911 
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Table 3-17: Data description for 1984. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 643,010 1,823,595 10.1569 3.3819 4,914 7,659,000 
Inputs 
Labour(x1) 79,296 224,787 14.4081 3.7602 265 1,229,000 
Capital (x, ) 22,892 77,529 15.2880 3.9433 0.0015 397,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (w1) 25.438 17.501 2.4685 1.4289 6.224 89.2676923 
Price of Capital (w, ) 0.262 0.372 34.9040 5.3085 0.0015 2.75396825 
s output 
Deposits (yi) 5,180,488 14,119,902 10.7850 3.4134 9,636 65,515,000 
Loans (y2) 4,203,380 12,150,214 11.1234 3.4572 1,071 55,987,000 
Investments(y3) 214,590 463,318 7.9770 2.9209 0.0015 2,139,000 
Table 3-18: Data description for] 983. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 547,366 1,496,701 9.301 3.256 4,480 6,094,000 
Inputs 
Labour(x1) 75,399 206,941 12.318 3.511 242 1,091,000 
Capital (x2) 19,807 65,150 14.177 3.793 0.0015 338,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (wi) 24.604 17.785 2.662 1.499 5.931727 90.1018033 
Price of Capital (w2) 0.229 0.189 1.959 1.300 0.015 0.88049793 
Outputs 
Deposits (y, ) 4,275,244 11,287,578 11.120 3.412 9,182 55,248,000 
Loans (Y2) 3,403,527 9,498,617 10.723 3.374 6,641 46,015,000 
Investments(y3) 176,527 402,375 7.160 2.886 0.0015 1,639,000 
Table 3-19: Data description for 1982. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness Minimum 
£'000 
Maximum 
£'OOO 
Total Cost 578,489 1,638,527 10.5536 3.3933 3,951 7,703,000 
Inputs 
Labour(x1) 70,214 189,806 12.6821 3.5245 220 1,018,000 
Capital (x, ) 16,699 56,652 15.1200 3.9292 0.0015 300,000 
Price of Ind 
Price of Labour (w1) 23.887 17.452 3.2570 1.5864 6.317 90.936 
Price of Capital (w, ) 0.212 0.200 5.1472 1.9230 0.0015 1.071 
Outj)uts 
Deposits (y, ) 3,808,1 16 10,197,783 11.5574 3.4661 8,152 50,196,000 
Loans (Y2) 3,549,608 10,642,222 14.0357 3.7446 10,194 56,841,000 
Investments(y3) 148,527 355,073 8.3712 3.0442 0.0015 1,583,000 
120 
Chapter 3 
Table 3-20: Data description for 1981. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness Minimum 
£'1100 
Maximum 
£'000 
Total Cost 463,595 1,253,747 8.9726 3.2010 2,989 5,261,000 
Inputs 
Labour(x1) 63,301 163,773 9.1069 3.1528 250 744,700 
Capital (x, ) 14,690 45,388 10.4232 3.4013 0.0015 201,000 
Price of Inputs 
Price of Labour (w1) 23.1540 17.8635 3.4149 1.6755 5.242 91.770 
Price of Capital (w, ) 0.2407 0.2830 21.6182 3.9189 0.0015 1.938 
Outputs 
Deposits (yi) 3,168,711 8,288,995 11.5020 3.4549 5,081 39,709,000 
Loans (y2) 2,450,043 6,783,022 1 1.1 111 3.4345 1,645 32,412,000 
Investments(y3) 118,874 287,926 8.9432 3.1442 0.0015 1,205,500 
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3.11.2 Parameter estimates from the traslog cost function 
Table 3-21: Parameter estimates from Model I 
Variable 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 
Constant 5.682 8.956 9.300 12.644 18.215 13.630 15.709 14.595 
(3.39)* (2.42)* (3.12)* (3.73)* (3.64)* (3.30)* (3.69)* (3.17)* 
w1 -2.672 -2.989 -2.836 -2.931 -3.644 -2.033 -3.071 -3.504 
(0.68)* (0.56)* (0.63)* (0.69)* (0.64)* (0.62)* (0.74)* (0.64)* 
W2 0.291 0.541 -0.544 0.252 -1.310 -0.218 -0.906 -0.943 
(0.46) (0.38) (0.51) (0.55) (0.53)* (0.50) (0.56) (0.47)* 
Y/ 2.642 2.287 2.041 2.416 0.946 1.118 0.778 0.833 
(0.31)* (0.22)* (0.23)* (0.30)* (0.24)* (0.25)* (0.27)* (0.24)* 
Y, -1.962 -1.976 -1.897 -2.594 -2.206 -1.851 -1.642 -1.538 
(0.28)* (0.22)* (0.28)* (0.36)* (0.34)* (0.30)* (0.30)* (0.26)* 
w1. w2 -0.214 -0.271 -0.043 -0.126 0.462 0.168 0.310 0.231 
(0.144) (0.10)* (0.10) (0.11) (0.14)* (0.13) (0.14)* (0.13)* 
Y1. Y2 -0.026 -0.003 0.010 0.027 0.083 0.075 0.069 0.058 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)* (0.02)* (0.03)* (0.03)* 
w]. Y1 -0.535 -0.539 -0.473 -0.488 -0.174 -0.409 -0.293 -0.279 
(0.06)* (0.05)* (0.05)* (0.05)* (0.07)* (0.06)* (0.07)* (0.06)* 
W1. Y2 0.866 0.902 0.855 0.867 0.818 0.736 0.791 0.842 
(0.07)* (0.05)* (0.05)* (0.06)* (0.06)* (0.06)* (0.07)* (0.06)* 
W2. Y, 1.060 0.290 0.298 0.655 0.621 0.370 -0.0174 -0.029 
(0.24)* (0.18) (0.18)* (0.20)* (0.19)* (0.20)* (0.106) (0.09) 
W2. Y1 -1.089 -0.338 -0.218 -0.675 -0.581 -0.411 0.053 0.0766 
(0.25)* (0.19)* (0.19) (0.23)* (0.22)* (0.20)* (0.09) (0.08) 
R2 (cost) 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.96 
R (share)- ' 0.74 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.77 0.74 0.77 0.77 
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Table 3-21 (continued): 
Variable 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 
Constant 13.714 13.738 15.340 12.499 12.077 9.829 10.840 
(3.69)* (3.67)* (4.15)* (3.17)* (3.67)* (3.56) (3.51)* 
wý -1.050 -1.250 -1.352 -0.802 -0.755 -1.135 -0.564 
............ 
(0.81) (0.85) 
..... 
(0.80)* 
....... 
(0.70) (0.77) (0.76) (0.73) 
w2 0.438 1.608 0.875 0.768 1.225 0.093 0.294 
(0.59) (0.98) (0.90) (0.45)* (0.78) (0.60) (0.63) 
Y/ -1.008 -0.831 -1.954 -1.429 0.297 1.647 -0.855 
(0.69) (0.74) 
...... _... ............. .. 
(1.09)* (0.78)* (1.30) (1.10) (1.01) 
0.042 0.060 0.797 0.501 -1.159 -2.139 0.047 
(0.64) (0.67) (0.93) (0.59) (1.15) (0.98)* (0.83) 
WI- W2 0.048 0.006 -0.091 0.061 -0.064 -0.150 -0.025 
(0.08) 
.... . 
(0.12) 
................ ._ 
(0.18) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
w/. Yf 0.319 0.340 0.249 0.536 0.221 0.194 0.469 
.......... ._ 
(0.14)* (0.13)* 
........ 
(0.16) (0.14)* (0.17) (0.17) (0.14)* 
wI. Yz 0.478 0.458 0.543 0.215 0.508 0.562 0.262 
(0.13)* (0.12)* (0.15)* (0.13) (0.16)* (0.16)* (0.14)* 
W2. Yj -0.070 -0.053 -0.007 -0.079 -0.020 0.066 -0.068 
(0.10) (0.17) (0.19) (0-11) (0.17) (0.16) (0.194) 
W?. Yz 0.028 -0.069 -0.162 -0.084 -0.140 -0.156 0.025 
(0.09) (0.17)- (0.17) (0.10) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) 
R' (cost) 0.91 0.89 0.90 0.94 0.91 0.92 0.89 
R- (share) 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.78 0.73 0.74 0.68 
Notes: (1) Standard errors of estimated parameters are shown in parentheses/ * significant 
with 95% confidence interval. 
(2) Certain variables are excluded, due to high multicolinearity. 
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Table 3-22: Parameter estimates from Model II 
Variable 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 
Constant 7.900 7.745 7.652 9.377 13.150 13.015 18.642 17.669 
(3.30)* (2.36)* (2.91)* (3.64)* (3.31)* (3.53)* (4.02)* (3.63)* 
W/ -2.633 -2.673 -2.930 -2.614 -2.682 -1.911 -3.45 -3.501 
(0.65)* (0.55)*. (0.63)* (0.702)* (0.59)* (0.59)* (0.63)* (0.59)* 
_....... W2 .. 0.313 0.438 -0.305 0.852 -0.768 -0.240 -1.59 -1.03 
(0.43) (0.41) (0.43) (0.50)* (0.52) (0.46) (0.47)* (0.39)* 
Y, -0.535 2.319 0.659 0.555 0.424 0.406 0.31 0.43 
(0.95) (0.53)* (0.402) (0.57) (0.241)* (0.23)* (0.28)* (0.24)* 
Y 1.007 -1.754 -0.057 -0.254 -0.992 -1.059 -1.663 -1.600 
(0.757) (0.55)* (0.39) (0.60) (0.23)* (0.27)* (0.31)* (0.27)* 
Y3 -0.103 -0.205 -0.199 -0.034 -0.011 0.047 0.229 0.12 
(0 28) (0.23) (0 25) (0.265) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11)* (0.09)*. 
wl W2 -0.211 -0.248 -0.090 -0.156 0.184 0.050 0.176 0.111 
(0.14) (0.10)* (0.10) (0.104)* (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
Y. Y 0.023 0.008 0.051 0.050 0.049 0.072 0.107 0.094 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)* (0.05)* (0.03)* 
Y,. Y3 0.362 -0.028 0.143 0.272 0.036 0.021 0.045 0.070 
(0.11)* (0.09)* (0.04)* (0.08)* (0.01)* (0.02) (0.02)* (0.02)* 
Y2. Y3 -0.397 0.015 -0.210 -0.334 -0.020 -0.014 -0.05 -0.072 
(0.13)* (0.09) (0.06)* (0.09)* (0.02) (0.019) (0.06)* (0.01)* 
w,. Y, -0.510 -0.536 -0.460 -0.500 0.092 0.062 0.048 -0.022 
(0.06)* (0.. 04)* (0.0-5. ).. *.. 
- 
(O. 05)* (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
w 0.657 0.730 0.520 0.68 0.364 Ö. 238 0.51 0.572 
(0.12)* (0.11)* (0.10)* (0.11)* (0.09)* 0.10)* (0.09)* (0.08)* 
wf. Y3 0.212 0.156 0.357 0.177 0.518 0.614 0.415 0.358 
(0.10)* (0.09)* (0.02)* (0.09)* (0.08)* 0.09)* (0.07)* (0.06)* 
W7. Y, 0.411 0.293 0.375 0.898 -0.480 0.621 -0.254 -0.240 
(0.31) (0.22) (0.17)* (0.19)* (0.12)* 01 1)* (0.07)* (0.06)* 
-0.450 -0.296 -0.227 -0.823 0.015 
. 
0.006 0.011 -0.01 1 
(0.29) (0.21) (0.16) (0.20)* (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
w2. Y 0.023 -0.019 -0.105 -0.21 1 -0.045 0.051 -0.1 14 -0.071 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06)* (0.07)* (0.03) 0.03)* (0.041) (0.03) 
R2 cost) 0.93 0.96 0 96 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.96 
R2 (share) 0 74 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.77 0.74 0.77 0.77 
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Table 3-22 (continued): 
Variable 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 
Constant 23.098 20.554 15.073 14.535 17.52 13.14 14.55 
(5.05)* (5.58)* (4.28)* (3.74)* (4.22)* (4.84)* (3.95)* 
w1 -2.429 -1.522 -0.760 -0.806 -1.174 -1.249 -0.687 
(0.91)* (0.95) (0.88) (0.84) (0.83) (0.82) (0.83) 
w2 0.981 1.861 0.556 0.531 1.446 0.674 0.630 
(0.62) (0.94)* (0.98) (0.54) (0.74)* (0.61) (0.61) 
Y, -0.518 0.699 -0.017 -0.511 1.005 1.836 0.781 
(0.98) (1.22) (1.44) 
. 
(1.26) 
_........ 
(1.72) (1.41) (1.23) 
Yz -1.533 -2.372 -1.185 -0.831 -2.68 -2.81 -2.189 
(1.005) (1... 35)* (1.35) 
........... 
(1.17) (1.60)* (1.23)* (1.13)* 
Yi 0.334 0.163 0.057 0.228 0.337 0.138 0.256 
(0 13)* (0.15) (0.10) (0.13)* (0.15)* (0.14) (0.13)*. 
W1. W) 0.007 0.044 0.399 0.087 -0.045 -0.140 -0.029 
(0.09) (0.12) (0.30) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)* 
Y1. Yý 0.331 0.531 0.289 -0.274 -0.301 -0.548 -0.214 
(0.25) (0.31)* (0.47) (0.20) (0.39) (0.41) (0.21) 
Y/. Yj 0.001 0.0565 0.061 0.032 0.015 0.034 0.051 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 0.05 (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) 
Y3 -0.042 -0.088 -0.066 -0.069 -0.066 -0.053 -0.097 
(0.03) (0.05)* (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)* 
W1. Yj 0.461 0.356 0.168 0.470 0.251 0.210 0.351 
(0.14)* (0.14) (0.16) (0.14)* (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)* 
W]. Y2 0.452 0.467 0.603 0.286 0.526 0.562 0.392 
(0.13)* (0.12)* (0.15)* (0.13)* (0. l6)* (0.16)* (0.15)* 
I 'V/. Y3 -0.040 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 
(0.02)* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
w2. YJ -0.174 -0.204 -0.032 -0.087 -0.096 -0.048 -0.311 
(0.10)* (0.19) (0.19) (0.12) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)* 
w2. Y2 0.064 0.037 -0.053 -0.048 -0.081 -0.050 0.177 
(0.09) (0.16) (0.18) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
wý. Y3 0.022 -0.026 -0.367 -. 0166 0.012 0.058 0.115 
(0.03) (0.19) (0.16)* (0.09) (0.14) (0.15) (0.12) 
R2 (cost) 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.91 
R2 (share) 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.74 11 0.74 0.69 
Notes: (1) Standard errors of estimated parameters are shown in the parentheses/ * significant 
with 95% confidence interval. 
(2) Certain variables are excluded, due to high multicolinearity 
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3.11.3 OLS estimation 
Table 3-23: OLS parameter estimates and diagnostic tests from Model I 
Variable 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 
Constant 6.362 1.975 2.755 -1.223 7.124 7.003 9.211 8.134 
(6.24) (4.99) (4.62) (4.26) (5.01) (3.88)* (3.51)* (3.13)* 
14)1 -0.671 -0.275 -0.403 0.858 -1.067 -0.229 -0.997 -1.402 
(1.43) (1.19) 
.......... ...... 
(1.09) (0.90) (1.08) (0.79) 0.830 (0.76)* 
W2 0.154 0.431 -0.586 -0.705 -1.019 0.016 -0.411 -1.402 
(0.90) 
.. 
(0.80) (0.76) 
. 
(0.74) 
. 
(0.82) (0.57) (0.45) (0.76) 
Y, -4.645 -2.662 -3.909 -1.591 0.625 -0.667 -1.359 -0.914 
(1.17)* 
_......... 
(1.23)* (0.98)* (0.74)* (0.64) (0.57) (0.33)* (0.35)* 
Yz 4.814 3.348 4.359 -1.591 0.619 0.601 1.097 0.840 
(1.09)* (1.49)* (1.12)* 
....... 
(0.74)* 
.............. 
(0.64) (0.55) (0.37)* (0.42)* 
Yi. Yz 0.021 0.008 0.022 0.017 0.027 0.034 0.038 0.028 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01)* 
w/. W2 0.005 -0.021 -0.045 0.069 0.099 0.021 0.049 0.026 
(0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
w1. Yj 1.235 0.814 1.105 0.532 0.297 0.261 0.510 0.434 
(0.30)* 
......... 
(0.31)* 
........ ....... 
(0.25)* 
__ 
(0.18)* (0.17)* (0.17) (0.09)* (0.10)* 
wz. Y, -0.009 -0.023 0.064 - - - - 0.019 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)* (0.04) 
w1. Y, -1.206 -0.822 -1.106 -0.591 -0.222 -0.262 -0.465 -0.349 
(0.27) (0.36)* (0.27) (0.. 19)* (0.18) (0.16) (0.10)* (0.12)* 
W2- Y2 - - - 0.039 0.053 -0.005 0.018 -0.003 
(0.38) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
R 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.96 
Dia Hostie Tests 
Serial 0.500 0.072 1.400 0.047 1.856 0.741 0.709 0.274 
Correlation 
Functional 0.008 4.663 2.143 0.208 1.967 0.023 0.047 0.085 
Form 
Normality 6.081 1.430 7.472 3.411 11.221 0.300 1.384 3.934 
Heterosced. 0.47E-3 0.943 5.897 3.928 0.582 1.9959 0.915 0.941 
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Table 3-23 (continued): 
Variable 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 
Constant 8.437 7.802 8.338 5.342 5.678 6.325 7.131 
(3.20)* (3.49)* (3.83)* (1.96)* (2.13)* (2.27)* (2.24) 
w1 -0.932 -1.201 -1.860 -0.979 -0.656 -0.556 -0.794 
(0.79) (0.93) (0.85)* (0.47)* (0.44) (0.50) (0.49) 
w2 0.121 1.049 1.29 0.551 0.883 0.785 0.253 
(0.64) (0.73) (0.8 1)* (0.31)* 
-(0.44) 
(0.42)* (0.42) 
Yl -0.531 -0.297 0.815 0.218 0.128 0.136 -0.369 
(0.39) (0.73) (0.52) (0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.28) 
Y2 0.335 0.380 -0.715 0.014 0.017 0.109 0.270 
(0.45) (0.47) (0.50) (0.2) (0.30) (0.35) (0.27) 
Y1. Yz 0.029 0.021 0.016 0.019 0.024 0.029 0.031 
(0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01) (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01)* 
WJ. w7 0.150 -0.072 -0.112 -0.061 -0.077 -0.056 0.049 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
W1. Yl 0.206 0.192 -0.032 0.087 0.075 0.043 0.136 
(0.10)* (0.11)* (0.14) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)* 
W2- Yj -0.133 -0.126 -0.052 -0.074 -0.099 -0.109 -0.122 
(0.05)* (0.07)* 
........ 
(0.08) (0.04)* (0.05)* (0.05)* (0.05)* 
-0.123 -0.126 0.140 -0.029 -0.041 -0.015 -0.077 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
W2. Y2 0.097 0.087 -. 0189 0.050 0.054 0.064 0.092 
(0.05)* (0.7) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)* 
R 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 
Serial 1.011 0.579 0.634 0.871 0.0106 0.55E-3 0.368 
Correlation 
Functional 1.606 1.191 14.806 0.335 0.035 0.213 2.529 
Form 
Normality 189.41 848.78 177.535 28.041 8.944 1.961 0.029 
Heterosced. 0.547 0.339 0.084 0.254 0.181 0.772 1.349 
Notes: (1) Standard errors of estimated parameters are shown in parentheses/ * significant 
with 95% confidence interval. 
(2) Certain variables are excluded, due to high multicolinearity. 
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Table 3-24: Reduce sample estimates 
Variable 1995 1993 1991 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 
Constant 4.969 3.764 6.720 11.081 9.163 3.156 7.935 6.627 
(9.68) (5.27) (8.11) (2.40)* (2.28)* (7.92) (2.22)* (2.22)* 
w1 0.562 3.745 -1.112 -1.651 -2.539 -0.858 -2.382 -2.057 
(2.29) (1.36)* (1.94) (1.12) (0.89)* (1.50) (0.747)* (0.58)* 
W2 0.476 -0.239 -0.858 -0.444 1.351 0.102 0.071 0.515 
(1.18) (0.85) (1.56) (0.52) (0.49)* (1.02) (0.41) (0.71) 
Y, -3.043 -0.502 0.111 -1.124 -0.908 0.559 -0.708 -0.465 
(1.67)* (1.03)* (1.02) (0.30)* (0.37)* (0.83) 0.48 (0.57) 
Yz 4.076 6.787 -0.093 0.618 1.126 -0.063 0.858 0.733 
(1.28)* (1.19)* 
. 
(1.01) (0.41) (0.48)* (0.91) (0.42)* (0.55) 
Yi. Y2 0.024 0.017 0.023 0.038 0.014 0.014 0.017 . 0153 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)* (0.011) (0.02) (0.01)* (0.01) 
wl. wý 0.024 -0.368 0.131 0.151 -0.301 -0.040 -0.102 -0.165 
(0.02) (0.15)* (0.25) (0.10) (0.10)* (0.16) (0.07) (0.10)* 
wi. Yj 0.816 1.362 0.115 0.442 0.585 0.003 0.549 0.476 
(0.41)* (0.25)*_. 
... _(0.26) 
(0.15)*....... 
. 
(0.17)* (0.18) (0.22)* (0.27)* 
W?. Yj 0.034 0.112 0.033 -0.028 0.043 0.087 0.097 0.070 
(0.07) (0.05)* 
.. _ 
(0.06) (0.76) (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) (0.11) 
W1. YY -1.046 -1.682 -0.022 -0.324 -0.478 0.045 -0.421 -0.372 
(0.33) (0.29)* (0.27) (0.13)* (0.19)* (0.19) (0.21)* (0.27) 
...... W2- Y, - - - 0.021 0.070 0.101 -0.085 -0.079 
(0.06) (0.07) 0.166 (0.08) (0.10) 
R 0.90 0.96 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.99 
No of ohs 35 35 29 26 29 35 26 29 
Dia nostic Tests 
Serial 0.115 3.327 0.501 0.021 0.154 1.286 0.052 0.101 
Correlation 
Functional 0.507 0.635 3.37 0.25E-3 6.080 0.22E-3 0.810 0.658 
Form 
Normality 2.648 1.498 5.34 0.015 2.705 4.3320 0.238 1.135 
Heterosced. 0.01-8- 
--. -1.0-9-4 
0.094 0.3E-3 1.174 0.051 0.459 0.069 
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3.11.4 Banks in the sample 
Table 3-23 provides a list with the names of the banks comprising the data sample. 
Table 3-25: Banks in the sample 
1. ANZ Grindllays 
2. Alexanders Discount plc 
3. Allied Trust Bank Ltd 
4. Anglo Romanian Bank Ltd 
5. Henry Ansbacher & Co Ltd 
6. Arbutham Latham & Co Ltd 
7. Bank Leumi (UK) Ltd 
8. Bank of America International Ltd 
9. Bank of Cyprus (London) Ltd 
1O. Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi (UK) Ltd 
11. Bank of Wales 
12. Barclays Bank plc 
13. Banque National de Paris plc 
14. The British Bank of Middle East 
15. The British Linean Bank Ltd 
16. Brown, Shipley & Co Ltd 
17. Cater Allen Ltd 
18. Chartered Trust plc 
19. Charterhouse Bank Ltd 
20. Citibank International plc 
21. Clive Discount Company Ltd 
22. Close Brothers Ltd 
23. Clydesdale Bank plc 
24. The Co-operative Bank plc 
25. Coutts & Co 
26. Daiwa Europe Bank plc 
27. First National Commercial Bank plc 
28-Robert Fleming & Co Ltd 
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29. Gerrard and National Ltd 
30. Guiness Mahon Ltd 
31. Hambros 
32. Havana International Bank Ltd 
33. Hill Samuel Bank Ltd 
34. Hoare & Co 
35. IBJ International Bank 
36. Italian International Bank 
37. Leopold Joseph & Son Ltd 
38. King & Saxon Ltd 
39. Kleinworth Benson Ltd 
40. Lazard Brothers & Co Ltd 
41. Lloyds Bank plc 
42. Merril Lynch International Bank Ltd 
43. Midland Bank 
44. Samuel Montaqu & Co Ltd 
45. Moscow Norodny Bank Ltd 
46. Morgan Greenfell & Co Ltd 
47. National Westminster Bank Ltd 
48. Rea Brothers Group 
49. Royal Bank of Scotland 
50. Royal Bank of Canada Europe Ltd 
51. Schroders Leasing Ltd 
52. Henry Schroders Wagg & Co Ltd 
53. Standard Charter Bank 
54. Singer and Friedlander Ltd 
55. TSB Bank 
56. Uster Bank Ltd 
57. London Scottish Bank plc 
58. Wintrust Securities Ltd 
59. Yorkshire Bank plc 
60. Roy Scott Trust plc 
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CHAPTER 4: The X-efficiency of Banking Institutions - Theory and 
Evidence 
4.1 Introduction 
In the current chapter we test the X-efficiency of UK banks by estimating an efficient 
frontier and by measuring the average differences between observed banks and banks 
at the frontier. According to Leibenstein (1966) X-efficiency accounts for differences 
in costs that cannot be explained by differences in scale or other observable 
characteristics. By focusing on scale and scope economies we can only gain limited 
information on efficiency, and thus we want to test more formally on X-efficiency. 
Three models will be applied to check the robustness of estimates to alternative 
specifications. 
As we showed in Chapter 3, several studies have concentrated on the efficiency of 
banking institutions. However, until recently, only scale and scope efficiencies have 
been extensively studied, and relatively little attention is paid to X-inefficiencies i. e. 
to the differences in efficiency or deviations from the efficient frontier. The effect of 
differences in managerial ability to maximise revenue or minimise cost appears to be 
greater than any cost effects brought about by the choice of scale and scope of 
production. The recent literature suggests that X-inefficiencies account for 20% or 
more of costs in banking, whereas scale and product mix inefficiencies account for 
less than 5% of costs [Berger et al. (1993)]. 
Although a considerable amount of general research has taken place on X-efficiency 
since its introduction in the 1960s, published technical research on X-efficiency of 
financial institutions has only appeared in the last few years. Most studies concentrate 
on the US banking system, with only a handful of papers measuring the efficiency of 
banks outside the US. Hence, in terms of maturity and breadth the efficiency research 
has not kept pace with changes in the financial services industry. 
131 
Chapter 4 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the different approaches 
employed on the literature in the measurement of X-efficiency. Section 3 gives a 
detailed description of the literature review. In section 4 the methodology to be 
applied is explained. Section 5 give a description of the data used together with the 
determination of input and output. Section 6 reports the results obtain together with 
the relevant comments. Finally, section 7 summarises and presents conclusions. 
4.2 Parametric and non-parametric approaches for measuring X-efficienc 
In evaluating the performance of banks, the first task is to separate production units 
that -by some standards- perform well from those that perform poorly. This can be 
done through frontier analysis, also known called X-efficiency, which is defined as 
the ratio of minimum costs that could have been expended to produce a given output 
bundle to actual cost expended, and varies between 0 and 100 percent [Berger 
(1995)]. 
Frontier analysis covers all technical and allocative efficiencies of individual firms, 
that are distinct from scale and scope economies. Technically, efficiency determines 
the proportional decrease in input usages, which could be achieved if the firm 
operated on the production frontier, whereas allocative efficiency indicates the 
proportional decrease in cost if the right mix of input had been utilised. Essentially, 
this kind of efficiency is measured, or modelled, as distance measures reflecting a 
firm's own position in relation to its efficient production or cost frontier. The real 
advantage of frontier estimation is that it determines objectively numerical efficiency 
values and ranking of firms that would not be otherwise available [Berger and 
Humphrey (1997)]. 
Due to its advantages, frontier analysis is viewed as the benchmark to the 
measurement of the performance of production units. It permits to individuals with 
little institutional knowledge to select best practice firms within the banking industry 
by having actual numerical efficiency values for each fine. In the case of individuals 
with sufficient knowledge, the analysis allows the identification of best practice areas 
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with complex service operation, a task not always feasible via traditional benchmark 
techniques, e. g. ratio analysis [Berger and Humphrey (1997)]. 
The major econometric problem lies in distinguishing X-efficiency differences from 
random errors that may temporarily appears as relatively high or low costs for certain 
firms. The major frontier efficiency models employed extensively in the banking X- 
efficiency literature are the stochastic econometric frontier approach, the thick frontier 
approach, the distribution-free approach, and the data envelopment analysis. Each of 
these approaches maintains a different set of assumptions on probability distributions 
of X-efficiencies and random errors to distinguish between these two explanations of 
cost dispersion. 
4.2.1 The Stochastic Econometric Frontier Approach (SFA) 
The basic stochastic econometric frontier model states that a firm's observed cost will 
deviate from the cost frontier because of random noise and possible inefficiencies. 
The key to this approach is the two-part composed error term, where one part 
accounts for inefficiencies and one part for statistical noise. These two components 
are separated by assuming that inefficiencies are drawn from a one-sided distribution 
(usually the half-normal) and the random fluctuations are drawn from a symmetric 
distribution (usually the normal). The logic behind this is that inefficiencies must 
have a truncated distribution because they increase costs only above frontier levels, 
whereas random noise can either decrease or increase costs. Both inefficiencies and 
the random error are assumed to be orthogonal to input, output, or environmental 
variables specified in the estimated model. 
The major drawback of this method is that the half-normal assumption on 
inefficiencies is relatively inflexible and embodies the arbitrary restriction that most 
firms operate near full efficiency. To overcome this inflexibility some studies 
[Greene 1990, and Berger and De Young 1997] specified a more general truncated 
normal distribution or a gamma distribution. Although these methods allow for more 
flexibility in the assumed distribution, are closer to the symmetric normal distribution 
assumed for the random error, it becomes more difficult to separate inefficiencies 
from random errors. 
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Under the stochastic econometric frontier approach the cost frontier is formulated by 
estimating a cost function which relates observed costs to output quantities and input 
prices, allowing for random error and inefficiencies [see Ainger et al. (1977)]. This 
frontier can be expressed as: 
C=C(Y, w, 6) 
Where: 
C=a measure of cost, 
Y= a vector of output quantities, 
w =a vector of input price, and 
s=v+u= the error components. 
(4.1) 
The error component v represents the symmetric disturbance, which is assumed to be 
independently and identically normally distributed with zero mean and a, ' variance. 
The error component u is assumed to be half-normally distributed, and captures 
inefficiencies. The economic logic behind this specification is that the production 
process of a firm is subject to two economically distinguishable random disturbances, 
with different characteristics. Each firm's cost must lie on or above its cost frontier. 
The non-negative disturbance u denotes any deviations from that frontier, with 
deviations resulting from factors under the firm's control. On the other hand, the 
frontier can vary across firms or across time for the same firm. Hence, with a 
stochastic frontier, v depends on external factors, and on measurement error. 
4.2.2 Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) 
The thick frontier approach compares the average efficiencies of groups of banks. 
Instead of estimating the actual cost or production frontier edge, the thick frontier is 
estimated. The thick frontier cost function is being formed by the banks in the lowest 
average quartile, which are assumed to be of greater than average efficient and they 
form the thick frontier. Consistently, banks in the high average cost quartile are more 
likely to operate at less than average efficiency. Accordingly, a cost function is 
estimated for banks in the highest average quartile, which are identified as having less 
than average efficiency. 'Differences in error terms within the highest and lowest 
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quartiles are assumed to reflect random error, while predicted cost differences 
between these quartiles are assumed to reflect inefficiencies plus exogenous 
differences in output quantities and input prices. Banks are stratified by size class 
before the quartiles are formed to ensure that a board range of banks are represented 
in each quartile and to reduce the relationship between the quartile selection criterion 
and the dependent variable in the regressions. ' 54 
To decompose the predicted cost differences between the highest and lowest quartiles 
into market factors and inefficiency residuals, after estimating the thick frontier for 
each quartile several measures are calculated [Berger and Humphrey (1991)]. 
Following Bauer et al. (1992), the difference in predicted unit costs is given by: 
Di = 
IAC9j-AcQi 
/ACQ' (4.2) 
where: 
Diff = the proportional increase in predicted unit costs of the Qj data relative to 
the Q; data evaluated at the size class means. 
Q= the set of banks in the highest quartile, 
Q; = denotes the set of banks in the lowest quartile, 
A CQ' = 60'(X Q') / TAQ' , and denotes the predicted unit costs, 
 Qi 
C= the predicted cost function using the parameters of the equations in 
the model, obtained when using Q; data, 
XQ' = the vector of mean outputs and other regressors for the size class for the ich 
quartile, 
TAQ' = the mean total assets for the size class for ith quartile, 
To capture exogenous differences in markets where banks operate, this approach 
further assumes differences in output levels and mix, branch offices, other assets, 
input prices, and purchased funds levels. Consequently, the part of Diff owing to 
exogenous market factors is given by the following expression: 
54 Bauer et al. (1993), p. p. 388. 
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Market= 
[A1*_ 
AýQ` IA6Q1 (4.3) 
where A CQ'' = CQ` (X O) I TAO , which 
is the predicted unit cost for QQ data 
calculated using the efficient Q' technology, rather than the inefficient QQ technology. 
Hence, Market captures the effects of differences in the levels of exogenous variables 
on costs (. Q' versus A Q'), but not in the cost function since costs are evaluated using 
only the parameters from the efficient cost function, C'. 
Any differences in the average cost of assets of the model that cannot be explained by 
exogenous variables are said to constitute the measure of the inefficiency residual. 
This is given by the following expression: 
Ineff =ACS _ ACS'' /A C2' =Df -Market. (4.4) 
The thick frontier approach does not impose any assumptions on the distribution of 
the inefficiencies or the random error. The only assumption is that inefficiencies 
differ between highest and lowest quartiles, and that random error exists between 
these quartiles. One major limitation of this method is that it does not provide exact 
point estimates of efficiency for individual firms, but instead generates an estimate of 
the general level of overall efficiency. 
4.2.3 `Distribution-free' Approach (DFA) 
The distribution-free approach is again based on the two-part composed error term 
(the first part measures efficiency and the second statistical noise) and also specifies a 
functional form for the frontier. Instead of imposing predetermined distributions on 
the X-efficiencies and the random error, this approach is based on the notion that 
efficiency differences across firms are stable over time, and the random error is 
ephemeral and averages out over time. Good management maximises long-run profits 
by keeping costs relatively low over long periods of time, although costs may 
fluctuate because of external shocks and measurement errors. 
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Under this approach the frontier can be expressed as: 
C=C (Y, w, v, u) (4.5) 
Following the definition of the frontier, the cost equation for bank i is specified as: 
In C, =1nC(Y,, w) +Inv, +Inu, (4.6) 
where the terms In v; and In u; are treated as a composite error term. 
Within this approach there are two methods to estimate X-efficiency, the average 
residual method and the bank dummy method [Berger (1993)]. The average residual 
method assumes that the part of the error term that measures inefficiencies is 
orthogonal to the regressors. The fine with the lowest average cost function residuals 
is assumed to be fully efficient, hence to lie on the frontier. Estimates of 
inefficiencies for each bank in a panel data set are defined as the difference between 
its average residual and the average residual of the firm at the frontier. Following 
Berger (1993), Bauer et al. (1998), and Rogers (1998b), under this approach, given 
that the random error In v; tends to cancel out over time, the X-efficiency measure is 
given by: 
x- eff = exp(ln ü,,,; n - 
In ü, ) (4.7) 
where lnz, is the average residuals for the i`h bank, and is an estimate of In u,; 
lnt2 is the minimum ln4,, and it assumes that the firm with the lowest average cost 
function residual is fully efficient. 
In cases where the residual accounting for inefficiency is not orthogonal to the 
repressor, the X-efficiency may be understated. The problem can be resolved using 
the dummy variable method, which drops the orthogonality assumption and is based 
on a fixed effect model [Berger (1993)]. Thus, instead of using the residuals to 
estimate efficiency, a fine-specific dummy variable replaces the In ui in the cost 
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equation. This dummy variable is constant over time, and takes the values of the 
efficiency variable plus the average over time of a constant term a. Any differences 
in the fixed effects estimated across firms are attributed to inefficiencies. 
In the distribution free approach inefficiencies can follow almost any distribution, as 
long as inefficiencies are not negative. But, the major drawback of this method is that 
changes in efficiency over time brought about by external (such as regulatory reform, 
interest rates etc. ) are considered as average deviations of each firm from the best- 
average practice frontier, rather than the efficiency at any point in time [see Berger 
and Humphrey (1997)]. 
4.2.4 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
The Data Envelopment Analysis is a non-parametric method that uses linear 
programming techniques to construct a piecewise linear envelope to a set of observed 
output and input data. This method was named as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
by Charnes et al. (1978,1981) although the genesis of the approach lies on the work 
by Farrel (1957). Farrel considered a single firm that produced one output with the 
use of two inputs, under the condition of constant returns to scale. The assumption of 
constant returns to scale allowed a diagrammatic exposition of all relevant 
information in a simple isoquant. This isoquant represents various combinations of 
the two inputs that a perfectly efficient firm might use to produce a unit of output. He 
then extends his analysis to multi-input and multi-output situations. Later studies 
have extended this approach to the case of variable returns to scale and developed 
corresponding efficiency measures [Fare et al. (1983)]. 
In their original paper, Charnes et al. (1978), introduced the generic term `Decision 
Making Units' (DMU) which describes the collection of firms, departments, divisions 
or administrative units assessed for efficiency which have common input and outputs. 
According to Chames and Cooper (1985) a hundred percent efficiency is attained by 
any DMU only when comparisons with other relevant DMUs do not provide evidence 
of inefficiency in the use of any input and output. 
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For the determination of the overall efficiency under the DEA, the following linear 
programming model is constructed [Aly et al. (1990), Farrier and Lovell (1990)]. 
First, the minimum cost of producing the output of a particular firm is calculated as: 
Minpx 
subject to 
Y <zY 
x_>zX 
Z el? + 
where: 
Y= the m dimensional vector of output produced by a particular firm, 
x= the n dimensional vector of inputs utilised by a particular firm, 
Y= the (k. m) matrix of outputs, where k represents the number of firms, 
X= is the (k. m) the matrix of inputs, 
z= the vector of the weights or intensity parameters attached to each of the 
observations or the firms in the determination of the minimum cost, 
p= the vector of input prices. 
After calculating the minimum cost (MC) the overall efficiency is measured by: 
(4.8) 
OE = MC IC (4.9) 
where C is the actual cost for a particular firm. Overall efficiency represents the 
potential or efficient input to actual usage input. This can be decomposed into two 
components; the technical (T) and the allocative (A) efficiency. Consequently, overall 
efficiency measures the proportional reduction in costs which could have been 
obtained if a firm c had been both allocatively and technically efficient. The 
relationship between overall, technical and allocative efficiency is given by the 
following: 
OE=T+A (4.10) 
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A second linear program is constructed to measure the technical efficiency. This is 
stated as: 
Min T 
subject to 
y SzY 
Tx 
_>zX 
zERk+ (4.11) 
After the T and OE are calculated, A can be derived through substitution into the 
equation of the overall efficiency. 
The unique feature of the DEA is that a piecewise linear surface rests on top of the 
observation, instead of trying to fit a regression plane through the centre of the data. 
The advantage of this method over parametric techniques is that it does not require 
any assumptions about the functional form. The efficiency of the DMU is measured 
relative to all other DMUs with the only constraint that all the DMUs, lie on or below 
the efficient set. 
The major drawback of this non-parametric technique is that it generally assumes that 
there are no random errors, and consequently all deviations from the estimated 
frontier represents inefficiencies. The presumption of no random error, rests on the 
assumptions of no measurement error in constructing the frontier and no luck that 
temporarily gives a decision making unit better measured performance for one period. 
Finally, it does not take into account inaccuracies generated by accounting rules that 
would make measured outputs and inputs diverge from economic output and input. 
Any of these errors that appear in an inefficient unit's data may reflected a change in 
its measured efficiency [Berger and Humphrey (1997)]. 
140 
Chapter 4 
4.3 Literature Review 
The efficiency literature on financial institution is both large and recent. As 
mentioned earlier, empirical evidence suggests that X-inefficiency accounts for 20% 
or more of the costs in banking, whereas scale and product mix inefficiencies account 
only for less than 5% of costs. X-inefficiency has also been found to have a strong 
empirical association with higher probabilities of financial institution failures over 
several years following the observation of substantial inefficiency. In general, the 
empirical literature on the X-efficiency has focused mostly on the US banking 
industry, and only a handful of studies have examined other regions. 
4.3.1 Comparison of different efficiency measurement methods 
Despite intense research efforts there is no consensus on the best method or set of 
methods for measuring frontier efficiency. Most studies have applied a single 
efficiency approach, while only few studies have compared two or more methods by 
use of the same data set. 
Studies that concentrate on a single parametric method suggest that the efficiency 
results appear to be consistent over the years [Berger and Humphrey (1992)]. Also, 
these efficiencies are found to be related in the expected way with standard non- 
frontier measures of performance, such as the return on assets [Berger and Mester 
(1997), Bauer et al. (1998)]. 
Studies that compare two parametric methods indicate that both methods produce 
similar results for overall efficiencies. Bauer et al. (1993) employ both the SFA and 
the TFA on a US data sample. Their results indicate a 15% average inefficiency for 
the sample period by the application of SFA. The second method, TFA, produces 
similar results with the level of inefficiencies amounting to 18%. They conclude that, 
although the two approaches rank individual banks quite differently, they yield similar 
average efficiency findings. Berger and Mester (1997) utilise DFA and SFA and 
suggest that the choice of measurement method makes very little difference in terms 
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of either average industry efficiency or ranking of individual firms. They find a rank 
order correlation of 0.988 between the two techniques. 
Proceeding with the comparison of parametric and non-parametric studies, the 
findings suggest fairly close efficiency estimates. Ferner and Lovell (1990) employ 
the DEA and SFA methods. The results form the DEA indicate an overall average 
inefficiency of 21%, while the SFA results suggest an overall inefficiency of 26%. 
However, they find a rank order correlation of only 0.02 between the two methods. 
On the other hand, Resti (1997) find a very high rank order correlation between the 
DEA and the SFA of 0.73 to 0.83. 
Bauer et al. (1998) apply all four approaches to a single data set. The findings yield 
some mixed evidence. The SFA, TFA, and DFA produce consistent results, i. e. the 
same distributions of efficiency, rank banks in approximately the same order, and 
identify mostly the same banks as best- and worst-practice. On the other hand, the 
DEA yields much lower average efficiencies, while the ranking of banks and the 
identification of best and worst banks are different from parametric methods. A 
common feature is that all methods are consistent over time. 
4.3.2 Deregulation and efficiency 
With the major regulatory changes that occurred during the last two decades, 
regulators aimed to improve efficiency of the banking institutions; however the 
empirical literature on the matter produces mixed results. 
A portion of US studies suggest that the banking efficiency remains relatively 
unchanged to deregulation [Bauer, Berger, and Humphrey (1993)], while others 
suggest the opposite. Grabowski et al. (1994) claim that deregulation forced 
inefficient banks to leave the industry, while overall average results reflect little 
change in efficiency. Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995) indicate that small and large 
banks are affected differently by changing market conditions. Based on group 
specific frontiers the results show that in the pre-regulation environment small banks 
have been more efficient than large banks, while after deregulation both groups 
become equally efficient. Berger and Mester (1997) find evidence of some decrease 
142 
Chapter 4 
in cost efficiency between 1980s and 1990s, while large banks show a considerable 
decline in profit efficiency. 
Contrary to the aforementioned findings, Berg et ah (1992) state that Norwegian 
banks experienced improved efficiency and productivity after deregulation. This is 
also the case. with the Turkish banking industry [Zaim (1995)], which has benefited 
from the more liberalised banking environment. 
In conclusion, deregulation does not always improve efficiency. Industry conditions 
and market structure prior to deregulation are important and might produce different 
results. Nevertheless, measurement over longer time periods may eventually show a 
net improvement in efficiency. As Berger and Mester (1997) noted, competitive 
pressures on banks result in increasing output quality, which in turn raises banks' 
costs, while expecting long-run cost and revenue benefits from higher quality. 
Additionally, new technology has changed the way banks operate and the fixed costs 
of this new technology have not yet been recovered. 
4.3.3 Problem loans, risk and efficiency 
The primary objective of regulations is to ensure soundness the banking industry. 
`Most bank failures are directly related to having a large number of problem loans, a 
low capital position, weak or negative cash flow, and a poor management quality'55 
Bank studies that have examined these issues find evidence that institutions display 
low efficiency prior to failure, together with positive relationship between 
management quality and efficiency. 
A number of studies find evidence that failing banks tend to be located far from the 
best frontier, indicating that they perform at low cost efficiency [Berger and 
Humphrey (1992), DeYoung and Whalen (1994)]. Berger and DeYoung (1997) 
utilise Granger-causality techniques and find that problem loans precede reductions in 
measured cost efficiency. Also, their results indicate that reductions in capital at 
thinly capitalised banks precede increases in problem loans. 
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Some efficiency studies include measures of problem loans and risk. Mester (1996) 
include the average volume of nonperforming loans in the cost function to capture the 
quality of banks, and the average volume of equity capital per bank as a measure of 
bank risk. Her results indicate that the inclusion of these variables lad to an increase 
in efficiency. 
4.3.4 Mergers and acquisitions and efficiency 
One of the major structural changes that have occurred in the banking and financial 
services industries is the significant reduction in the number of independent financial 
institutions. This has partly been the result of the increased number of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). One of the motives for mergers is cost efficiency improvements. 
Cost efficiency could be considerably improved by a merger where a relatively 
efficient bank acquires a relatively inefficient bank and spreads its superior 
management talent over more resources. 56 
The first studies on the effect of M&A activities on the performance of banks 
employed financial ratio analysis. Most of these studies suggest that there are no 
potential benefits on costs from merger activities [Rhoades (1986,1990), Cornett and 
Tehranian (1992), Linder and Grane (1992), Srinivasan and Wall (1992)]. However, 
these studies faced important methodological problems. The utilisation of simple cost 
ratios to account for efficiency does not take into account differences in input prices 
and output mix. 
In an attempt to overcome the aforementioned limitation, later studies employ more 
sophisticated econometric techniques. Nevertheless, cost X-efficiency studies that 
utilised 1980s data produced the same results as the cost ratio studies. Their findings 
indicate no or very little cost improvement from M&As during the 1980s [Berger and 
Humphrey (1992), Rhoades (1993), DeYoung (1997)]. Studies using early 1990s data 
generate mix results. Rhoades (1998b) finds modest efficiency gains, while Berger 
(1998) finds very little improvement in average cost efficiency for M&As of both 
large and small banks. A study on the European banking markets by Molyneux et al. 
ss Berger and Humphrey (1997), p. p. 23. 56 See Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993), and Akhavein et al. (1997) for more discussions of this issue. 
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(1996), found evidence that M&As between large banks, either within domestic 
banking markets or across national borders can create substantial cost savings or cost 
reductions depending on the merger partners chosen. 
The most recent of studies utilise the profit function approach to capture the effects of 
M&As on performance [Akhavein et al. (1997), Berger (1998)]. These studies find 
that M&As actually improve profit efficiency. An advantage of the profit efficiency 
over cost efficiency is that it embodies the scale, scope, product mix as well as X- 
efficiency effects, which maybe the reason for the different results. 
4.3.5 A summary of the evidence 
Estimates of efficiency of financial institutions vary substantially depending on the 
data source and on the efficiency concepts and measurement methods used in the 
studies. However, once a frontier approach is adopted and an output specification is 
selected, efficiency estimates are fairly stable over time, showing a level of 
persistency [Berger and Humphrey (1997)]. 
In general, the estimates from parametric studies generate similar estimates to those 
that apply non-parametric methods, although the later yield slightly lower mean 
efficiency estimates. Berger and Mester (1997b) make an attempt to determine the 
importance of different efficiency concepts and the measurement techniques applied 
to the findings of the studies. They apply multiple efficiency concepts and use a 
number of different measurement methods. From their results it is generally clear that 
the choice made concerning efficiency measurement makes little difference to 
empirical findings. This, in turn, suggests that efficiency estimates are robust to 
different methodologies. 
Table 4-1 provides a summary of the studies of bank frontier in chronological order. 
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Table 4-1: Summary of Bank Frontier Studies. 
Authors Methodology Conclusions 
& Data Set 
Aly, Grabowski, DEA Low overall efficiency, 05%. More 
Paruska, and 322 US banks allocative than technical efficient. 
Ragan (1990) 1986 Efficiency differences exist between 
branching and non-branching banks. 
Ferrier and Lovell DEA & SFA Overall Inefficiency: 
(1990) 575 US banks - 1984 DEA 21%, SFA 26%. 
More allocative than technical 
efficient. 
Berger and TFA Overall inefficiencies: 
Humphrey (1991) 13,951 US banks Branch 24.8%, Unit 20.2%. 
1984 Inefficiencies greater for small 
banks. Technical inefficiencies 
dominate allocative. 
Berger and TFA Overall Inefficiencies: 
Humphrey (1992) 14,000 US banks 1980, Branch 9.9%, 12.7%, 22.6%. 
1984,1988 Unit 14.6%, 14%, 21.3%. 
Increase of inefficiencies over the 
period due to non adjustment to 
deregulation. 
Bauer, Berger, and SFA & TFA Average inefficiencies: 
Humphrey (1993) 683 US banks SFA 18%, TFA 21%. 
1977 to 1988 Consistent estimates between the 
two approaches. 
Grabowski, DEA Overall efficiency 68`%,, Allocative 
Rangan, Rezvanian 4,094 US banks 94%, Technical 72%. 
(1993) 1989 
English, Grasskopf, DEA Banks in the sample both technical 
Hayes, and 442 US batiks and allocative inefficient; hence, not 
Yaisawamg (1993) 1982 revenue maximisers. 
Faver and Papi DEA 1-higher efficiency of banks engaged 
(1993) 174 Italian banks 1991 in non-traditional activities. Overall 
efficiency, Intemediation approach 
87.8%, Asset approach 79.4% 
Berg, Forsund, DEA Swedish banks are the most efficient 
Summen, 503 Finnish, 126 and only one Finish and no 
Hjalmarsson (1993) Swedish, 150 Norwegian bank have efficiency 
Norwegian - 1990 score above 90%. 
Mester (1993) SFA Transfer from mutual to stock S&Ls 
US S&Ls suggests that deregulation of interest 
1991 rates and increased competition 
affected mutual S&Ls. 
On average stock S&L are less 
efficient than mutual S&L. 
Berger, Hancock, DFA Overall efficiencies: 
146 
Chapter 4 
and Humphrey US banks Unit branching 52%, 
(1993) 1984 to 1989 Limited branching 65%, 
Statewide branching 66%. 
Technical inefficiencies dominate 
allocative. Output inefficiencies 
greater than input inefficiencies. 
Berger (1993) DFA Overall inefficiencies: 46% for Unit, 
900-1,010 US banks 46% for Limit, and 32% for State 
1980-1989 banks. Due to the variations of 
estimates from year to year, there 
are doubts about the ability of any 
single period method in obtaining 
accurate results. 
Kaparakis, Miller, SFA Banks become less efficient as size 
and Noulas (1994) 5,548 US banks increases. Further, the more 
1986 branches a bank operates the lower 
the cost efficiency. 
Overall efficiency 90%. 
Grabowski, DEA Banks are more allocative than 
Rangan, and 669 US banks technically efficient - pure technical 
Rezvanian (1994) 1979,1983, and 1987 being the source of inefficiencies. 
Overall inefficiencies: 
1979: 74%, 1983: 76%, 1987: 73%. 
The results do not support the 
hypothesis that deregulation favour 
the efficiency of banks. 
Drake and DEA Only 107 out 190 are found to be 
Howcroft (1995) 190 UK clearing bank efficient, while overall efficiency 
branches amounted to 92%. The results 
suggest considerable diversity 
across branches in terms of 
efficiency levels. 
Elyasiani, and DEA Efficiency of small and large banks 
Mehdian, (1995) 150 small and 150 large is quite similar. But they are 
US banks affected differently on average and 
1979 and 1986 small banks are affected differently 
within the group. The average small 
bank has to `struggle' to keep up 
with the changing market 
conditions. 
Overall efficiency: Small B. 95%, 
92%, Large B. 96%, 97%. 
Miller, and Noulas DEA Overall inefficiency 5%. 
(1996) 201 US banks This is due to the nature of the 
1984 to 1990 sample, i. e. very large and profitable 
banks which are not affected by 
changes in the market structure. 
Mester (1996) SFA Includes two extra variables in the 
214 US banks cost function. 
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1991 to 1992 The first one is the average volume 
of non-performing loans, to capture 
the quality of the banks, and the 
second is the average volume of 
equity capital per bank, as a 
measure of bank risk. 
Overall inefficiency 6-9%. 
Berger, and Mester, SFA & DFA The utilisation of fourier 
(1997a) 6,000 US banks - specification, does not generate 
1990 to 1995 different results from the translog. 
DFA: cost function: fourier-86.8%, 
translog-86% efficiencies; 
Standard profit function: 54.9%, 
53.9%, 
Alternative profit function: 46.3%, 
45.2%, 
SFA: cost function 94.2%, 
alternative profit function 53.1%. 
Berger, and SFA Overall efficiency 92%. The applied 
DeYoung (1997) US banks -1985 to 1994 Fourier-flexible, truncated normal 
specification applied, which is more 
general than the standard translog, 
half-normal model typical employed 
in the literature. This according to 
the authors generates betters 
estimates. 
Berger and Mester DFA Cost efficiencies for all sizes 
(1997b) All US commercial average about 80% over 1984-1989, 
banks and decline to 77% over 1990-1995. 
1984-1995 Profit efficiency for the first sub- 
period is the same for all bank sizes, 
while the second period large banks 
are considerably less efficient than 
small banks. 
Akhaven, Berger, DFA Bank mergers in the 1980s 
and Humphrey US banks significantly improve profit 
(1997) 1980-1990 efficiency. The average profit 
efficiency rank of merging banks 
increased from 74`h percentile to the 
90th percentile of the group of large 
banks. 
Berger, Leusner, DFA Most branches are smaller than 
and Mingo (1997) 832 branches of a single efficient scale, and there are roughly 
US bank twice as may branches as needed to 
1989-1991 minimise bank costs. 
X-inefficiencies are about 5% to 
10% of total branching costs, and 
20%-25% of branch operating costs. 
Athanassopoulos, DEA UK branch network exhibits an 
Soteriou, and UK, Greek and Cypriot overall dominance over the other 
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Zenios (1997) single bank branches networks. Cypriot network is less 
efficient than the Greek one. Greek 
and Cypriot network contain 
mechanisms that can be used by UK 
branches to improve further their 
efficiency. 
Bauer, Berger, SFA, TFA, DFA, & They examine the consistency of the 
Ferner, Humphrey DEA estimates produced from the 4 
(1998) 683 US banks methods. The parametric techniques 
1977-1988 produced consistent results, as 
opposed to the DEA A common 
feature, is that all methods were 
consistent over time. 
Rogers (1998b) DFA He estimates a translog cost and 
More than 10,000 US revenue, as well as profit frontier, 
banks each including non-interest income 
1991-1995 as a measure of non-traditional 
output. Cost and profit efficiency 
increase once traditional activities 
are accounted for, suggesting that 
the sale of non-traditional activities 
increase banks' efficiency. 
Notes: SFA: Stochastic econometric frontier approach. 
TFA: Thick frontier approach. 
DFA: Distribution-free approach. 
DEA: Data envelopment analysis. 
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4.4 Methodology. 
To measure the X-efficiency of the UK banking institutions, the stochastic 
econometric frontier model will be applied here. The major advantage of the SFA 
over the other frontier methods is that it always ranks the efficiencies of firms in the 
same order as their cost function residuals, regardless of the distributional 
assumptions imposed. Accordingly, banks with lower costs for a given set of input 
prices, and any other cost regressors will always be ranked as more efficient. This is 
because the conditional mean or mode of u (inefficiencies, given that the error is 
given by E; =v+u is always increasing with the residuals [Bauer et al. (1998)]. This 
renders the SFA appealing for regulatory purposes since a firm is measured as high in 
the efficiency rankings if it keeps costs relatively low for its given exogenous 
conditions. 
Considering the other three approaches, the thick frontier approach is rejected because 
it does not provide exact point estimates of efficiency for individual firms, but only 
generates an estimate of the general level of overall efficiency. Additionally, it is 
based on a rather arbitrary assumption; namely that the lowest average cost quartile 
within each size class is an adequate thick frontier of efficient firms. The distribution- 
free approach is based on the notion that inefficiencies of firms are stable over time. 
Again, this assumption seems unrealistic in banking.., Furthermore, it considers 
changes in efficiency over time due to outside factors (such as regulatory reform, 
interest rates etc. ) as average deviations of each firm from the best-average practice 
frontier, rather than the efficiency at any point in time [see Berger and Humphrey 
(1997)]. Finally, the data envelopment analysis does not take into account random 
error. However, we cannot assume that all the deviations from the estimated frontier 
represent inefficiencies. 
The stochastic frontier is chosen as the best method of estimation, although it is based 
on the strict assumption that inefficiencies are half normally distributed. To test the 
effect of this assumption on the robustness of the results we are going to estimate 
three models that are based on different distributional assumptions. The first model is 
based on a half-normally distributed error term, a second model is based on the 
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truncated specification, and a third one on the exponential distribution as a special 
case of the gamma distribution. 57 
Furthermore, according to Berger and Mester (1997), choices concerning efficiency 
measurement usually make little difference to empirical findings in terms of either 
average industry efficiencies or rankings of individual firms, suggesting that the 
efficiency estimates are fairly robust to differences in the methodology. These 
authors argue that there is no best frontier method, since the true level of efficiency is 
unknown, and suggest a possible solution to add more flexibility to parametric 
approaches and introduce a degree of random error into the non-parametric approach. 
Now, according to the stochastic econometric frontier model a firm's observed cost 
will deviate from the cost frontier because of random noise and possible 
inefficiencies. This approach modifies a standard cost function to allow inefficiencies 
to be included in the error term. The model consists of a two-part composed error 
term, where one part accounts for inefficiencies and the other one for statistical noise. 
This model is based on specific distributional assumptions to separate the two 
components of the error term. Because inefficiencies can increase cost above frontier 
levels, they are assumed to be drawn from a one-sided distribution, usually the half- 
normal. On the other hand, random fluctuations can both increase or decrease costs, 
hence they are assumed to be drawn from a symmetric distribution, usually the 
normal. 
The methodology for estimating a stochastic or efficient frontier can be outlined as 
follows. We first considered a stochastic cost function model: 
TCr = TC(YM, w; )+ s; (4.12) 
where: 
TCr = the observed total cost of firm i, 
Yr =a vector of outputs, 
w1= an input price vector, and 
57 The half normal distribution is a special case of the truncated normal in which the corresponding 
normal distribution is truncated at the centre. 
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c; = the error term. 
Following Ainger, Lovell and Scmidt (1977) we assume that the error term of a cost 
function can be decomposed into: 
E, =v/+UI 
where: 
v; = random error, and 
u; = inefficiencies. 
(4.13) 
The error component v; represents the symmetric disturbance, which is assumed to be 
independently and identically normally distributed with zero mean and a, ' variance, 
that is v, - N(0, Qv) . The error component u; 
is assumed to be distributed 
independently of v, and to satisfy u; S 0, that is uj- IN(0, Qü )1. Given the 
distributional assumptions for the error terms vi and u;, the density function of the 
composite error term, cp (c, ) can be written as [Aigner et al. (1977)]: 
2 
f(ß)[1-o(E; "1. a-, )] - coe, S +co (4.14) 
where: 
6 =a. 
'+Qy2, 
A. =6u/c, and 
rp(. ) and 0() = are the standard normal density and distribution function respectively. 
This density is asymmetric around zero, with mean and variance given by: 
E(el) = E(u, ) =- 
12 
cr u 
(; r - 2/ 
(4.15) 
V(6j) V(u1)+V(vJ)-6u +Cv 
The relevant log-likelihood function for a sample N observation is: 
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N 
InL=-(N/2)(1n2r+1na2)+g 1nO(-8i2. /o. )-2(e, %/Q)' (4.16) 
r=i 
Jordow et al. (1982) have shown that the standard deviation, o, for u; and v; can be 
used to measure a firm's relative inefficiency, where X=a,, / a, is a measure of 
variation originated from inefficiency relative to noise from the sample. Estimates of 
the model can be computed by maximising the likelihood function directly. They 
further suggest that observation specific estimates of inefficiency, u;, can be 
calculated by using the distribution of the efficiency term conditional on the estimate 
of the composed error term. The mean of this conditional distribution for the half- 
normal model is: 
E(ur l s. ) - 
CA «(E, 2 /Q) + srý (4.17) -1+AZ 1-c(ei, %I Q) Q 
In accordance with Greene (1990) the half-normal distribution proposed by Aigner et 
al. (1977), is somewhat inflexible as it is a single parameter distribution and assumes 
that the density function of the disturbances is most concentrated around zero. In 
view of this, Stevenson (1980) suggests shifting the half-normal distribution by 
allowing a nonzero mode, producing a general truncated normal distribution instead. 
He analyses the case in which u, still truncated at zero, has a truncated normal 
distribution with parameter u (allowed to differ from zero in either direction) and 62 
The conditional distribution for the truncated normal model can be obtained by 
replacing sj2 /6 in equation (4.17) with the following expression: 
-1/2 22 avµ+ausi E; i +µ (4.18) 
av +aü 6 a%, 
where p is the mean of the non-truncated distribution. Its log-likelihood function is 
given by: 
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21 Er 
__ 
Z1 
, u1 (-P/Q)(1+A2)v2 1nL=Ina- 121n 2 +Iný a 
sj. ý+ýJ-In( 
J 
(4.19) 
Finally, we also computed the estimates for the exponential model, which emerges 
when P is constrained to be equal to one in the gamma model58. The mean of the 
conditional distribution is as follows [Greene (1990)]: 
E(ui I cr)=z+o 
O(zla') 
(4.20) 
where: z=s- Oa v'. 
The log-likelihood function of the exponential model is equal to: 
lnL; =1n9+2BZQ, +Oe +Ina 
u' +90v (4.21) 
v 
Going back to the cost function, the single equation stochastic cost function model for 
bank i at time t is specified as: 
1nTC;, =In C, (Y, 'w11)+In s;, (4.22) 
where: 
TC denotes total cost (operating and interest cost) for the bank i, and 
C( Y, w) is a cost function with output quantity vector Y and input price vector w. 
In this chapter, a translog cost model is going to be applied to measure the efficiency 
of the UK banking institutions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the translog 
specification overcomes the main drawbacks of the other major cost function. 
Accordingly, when the minimum total cost function (the cost frontier) is translog, then 
a bank's observed total cost is the following: 
154 
Chapter 4 
1nTC=a, +Ea; 1nwl+ZßkYk+ýZtyUlnw, lnw, + 
i-I k-I i=1 j-1 
Z Ski. InYk In Y. + 1: 1: zik Inwi InYk +ui+v, (4.23) 2 
k-I ; -1 i=1 k=1 
where: 
w1, wj, = price of input i and j, 
Yk YC = outputs k and 
TC = total cost, 
v; = random error, where v, - N(0, o) , 
u; = inefficiencies, where u, - IN(0, U2)1, and 
a;, 8k, yj, ökj, z, k = are independent parameters. 
Next, equation (4.23) is estimated, by use with three models estimated for each year 
of the period 1981-1995. Model I is based on the assumption of half normally 
distributed u;, Model II on the truncated distributional assumption, and Model III on 
the exponential distribution. The three different distributional assumptions are utilised 
to test the robustness of the estimates to different specifications. 
58 For details about the Gamma stochastic frontier model see Greene (1990). 
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4.5 Data sample and determination of bank input and bank output 
As be seen in the previous chapter, the different determination of input and output 
does not yield great variation in the results. As shown in Chapter 3, the inclusion of 
security investments increases the R2 of the model for most years. Hence, in the 
current chapter we employ the value-added approach for the determination of input 
and output. The sample is the same as in Chapter 3. 
Total costs (TC) are proxied as the sum of all operating cost incurred by the bank in 
the production of output and services together with interest payable. Consistent with 
the value-added approach all outputs are measured in pounds sterling. 
The inputs selected are: labour (x1) and physical capital (x2). Labour is measured by 
the total number of employees at the end of the time period, while physical capital by 
the net book value of total fixed assets. 
The price of labour (w1) is derived by taking the total expenditure on employees 
divided it by the number of employees. A proxy for the price of capital (w2) is 
calculated by dividing the total expenditure on fixed assets with the net book value of 
fixed assets. Three outputs are used in the current study, all measured in sterling 
pounds, Total Deposits (Y1), Total Loans (Y2), and Security Investments (Y3). 
156 
Chapter 4 
4.6 Empirical Results. 
As already mentioned, the cost function is estimated three on the basis of three 
alternative distributional assumptions about the part of the error term that captures the 
inefficiencies. Model I is a normal half- normal model, where random disturbances 
follow a normal distribution and inefficiencies, consistent with the stochastic frontier 
approach, follow a half-normal distribution. Model II, is a more flexible model, 
where the random error is normally distributed, but inefficiencies are truncated 
normal. Model III is the exponential model that follows an exponential distribution. A 
maximum likelihood procedure was used for the derivation of the estimates. 
Estimated parameters for all models are shown in the Appendix for Chapter 4 (Tables 
4-6 to 4-8). 
Estimating the stochastic cost frontier (4.24) we obtainc a set of valucsfor u 
(inefficiency), for each firm, each year. Table 4-2 presents the average inefficiency 
values, for the years 1981 to 1995 after estimating Model I, Table 4-3 after estimating 
Model II, and Table 4-4 after estimating Model III. 
Table 4-2: Inefficiency values obtained from Model I -- Half-normal distribution. 
Year Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1995 0.217 0.188 0.098 0.058 0.451 
1994 0.212 0.197 0.073 0.086 0.472 
1993 0.260 0.245 0.124 0.033 0.619 
1992 0.267 0.235 0.130 0.080 0.584 
1991 0.283 0.253 0.151 0.045 0.763 
1990 0.228 0.213 0.081 0.100 0.461 
1989 0.173 0.169 0.054 0.091 0.385 
1988 0.171 0.159 0.061 0.067 0.431 
1987 0.272 0.193 0.263 0.006 1.01O 
1986 0.270 0.208 0.244 0.005 0.984 
1985 0.285 0.200 0.252 0.002 0.867 
1984 0.258 0.216 0,168 0.056 0.994 
1983 0.279 0.242 0.262 0.004 0.883 
1982 0.198 0.178 0.090 0.071 0.615 
1981 0.215 0.191 0.103 0.062 0.707 
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Table 4-3: Inefficiency values obtained from Model II Truncated distribution. 
Year Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1995 0.203 0.192 0.068 0.084 0.3511 
1994 0.212 0.197 0.073 0.086 0.472 
1993 0.255 0.235 0.125 0.074 0.633 
1992 0.213 0.205 0.100 0.028 0.448 
1991 0.272 0.241 0.135 0.049 0.624 
1990 0.228 0.213 0.081 0.100 0.461 
1989 0.114 0.111 0.032 0.066 0.253 
1988 0.184 0.161 0.077 0.066 0.514 
1987 0.284 0.172 0.245 0.041 1.354 
1986 0.287 0.217 0.179 0.044 0.761 
1985 0.235 0.176 0.151 0.076 0.756 
1984 0.258 0.216 0.168 0.056 0.994 
1983 0.288 0.196 0.296 0.004 1.380 
1982 0.183 0.176 0.094 0.045 0.443 
1981 0.213 0.189 0.101 0.061 0.694 
Table 4-4: Inefficiency values obtained from Model III Exponential distribution. 
Year Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1995 0.196 0.190 0.079 0.0519 0.423 
1994 0.188 0.132 0.145 0.0717 0.816 
1993 0.186 0.156 0.108 0.0625 0.727 
1992 0.218 0.174 0.149 0.0766 0.984 
1991 0.260 0.226 0.139 0.0741 0.633 
1990 0.223 0.177 0.139 0.0770 0.719 
1989 0.104 0.098 0.037 0.0562 0.289 
1988 0.179 0.156 0.069 0.0657 0.470 
1987 0.279 0.166 0.314 0.0001 1.496 
1986 0.297 0.197 0.224 0.0010 0.979 
1985 0.267 0.181 0.249 0.0012 0.871 
1984 0.267 0.241 0.174 0.0435 1.099 
1983 0.281 0.159 0.308 0.0012 1.407 
1982 0.190 0.171 0.113 0.0596 0.727 
1981 0.202 0.177 0.126 0.0468 0.759 
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The level of mean inefficiencies for each frontier model over our 15-year period 
(1981-1995) is displayed in Figure 4-1. 
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Figure 4-1: Average inefficiencies over time for the three techniques. 
Although the literature on the efficiency of financial institutions has been quite 
extensive during the past few years, only few studies have compared multiple 
techniques to examine the sensitive of the estimates based on different efficiency 
methods [see Ferner and Lovell (1990), Bauer ei al. (1998), Berger and Mester 
(1997), Bauer et al. (1998)]. Moreover, all these studies applied the SFA by utilising 
the standard nornial/half-normal assumption. The current study proceeds a step 
further and examines the robustness of the results by use of diflcrent distributional 
assumptions. 
Results reported in Tables 4-2 to 4-4 together with figure 4-I, indicate small 
differences in average efficiencies and in efFicicncy dispersion when alternative 
distributional specification are used. The only exception is for the year 1989, where 
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the truncated and exponential models report an inefficiency level of 11% and 10% 
respectively, whereas the half-normal model gives an inefficiency level of 17%. An 
explanation may be the inflexible specification of the half-normal model, as it 
embodies the assumption that the density function of the disturbances is concentrated 
near zero, whereas the other two models are considered to be more flexible. As 
Greene (1990) points out, alternative distributions for efficiency may be more 
appropriate than the half-normal due to the inflexibility of the latter; he further stated 
that the application of different distributions sometimes does matter to average 
efficiencies. This, in turn suggests, that for the year in question, the data is not 
represented by the assumption of the half-normal specification [Bauer et al. (1998)]. 
Apart from 1989, our results are in line with the conclusions reached by Ferrier and 
Lovell (1990), Bauer et at (1993), and Berger and Mester (1997). These authors 
suggest that the choices concerning efficiency measurement usually make little 
difference to the empirical findings. Substantial differences between specification are 
reported by Bauer et at (1998). However, in this study all parametric techniques 
generate similar results, but very different compared with DEA inefficiency results. It 
appears that the choices concerning measurement techniques make very little 
difference in terms of average industry efficiency or the rankings of individual firms 
in the current data set. Thus, we conclude that the efficiency estimates are fairly 
robust to differences in methodology. 
Following the Bauer et at (1998) we proceed with the correlation of the different 
inefficiency measures obtained from different distributional specifications. These are 
reported in Table 4-5. 
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'Table 4-5: Correlation among the inefficiency scores. 
Truncated 
Half-normal I 
Exponential 0.838 1 
Truncated 0.859 0.910 1 
Table 4-5, in accordance with the aforementioned stated, suggests that there is a high 
correlation between the results obtained from the three models. The highest 
correlation (0.91) is between the exponential and truncated models. 
Now, going back to Tables 4-2 to 4-4, and Figure 4-1, starting from 1981 and 1982 
the average level of inefficiency is around 20%, and rise rapidly the next year to an 
average of 8% and remains fairly constant at around 28% until 1987. This was in line 
with the national and international economic events. In 1983 a notable number of 
countries experienced debt-servicing difficulties. This resulted in an increase in bad 
debt provision accounts to banks engaged in business with these countries. An extra 
increase in provision came into effect in 1987. During that period, there was a 
modest growth of world trade together with a difficult economic situation in several 
countries (including the UK) that experienced a moderate rate of growth. Due to the 
worsening economic conditions, banks' loans remain constant over this period (see 
Chapter 1). Given that loans constitute a major source of income for the banking 
industry, this stable pattern together with the increases in bad debt provisions, lowers 
banks' profits, and this in turn raises costs. Furthermore, the global changes in the 
financial markets together with the internalisation of financial services and 
deregulation pattern raise the competitive pressures in the industry. This leads banks 
to restructure their balance sheet and to undertake heavy investment in information 
technology in conjunction with higher depreciation charges, and to increase output 
quality. All these introduce temporarily increased costs to the banking industry, 
resulting in the high levels of inefficiency. 
In 1988 the inefficiency level started to drop, reaching its minimum level in 1989. 
An explanation of this result maybe found in the considerable increase in residential 
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and personal loans, which in turn increases the level of output. Nevertheless, in the 
next decade the inefficiency levels start to rise representing the difficult trading 
conditions for that period. Moreover, the beginning of the new decade is 
characterised by increased competition and in the light of the second banking 
directive and the single economic market several banks are reviewing their activities. 
The UK economy starts to recover only after 1993 where this was again reflected in 
the inefficiency estimates. By 1995 the inefficiency level for the UK industry 
amounts to 20%. Considering an average for the whole period, the inefficiency levels 
range between 18 to 28 % with an exception in 1989. 
The heavy costs that banks experienced during the 1980s start to diminish with the 
beginning of the next decade, as inefficiency levels are around 20%. In line with the 
results of Berg et al. (1992), Zaim (1995), and Rogers (1998b) our results suggest that 
in the 1990s UK banks started to realise the benefits from deregulation, where this 
deregulation helped banks to reduce their inefficiencies level. On the other hand 
Berger and Mester (1997,1999) suggest that there is a slight increase in inefficiency 
from 1980s to 1990s in the US banking industry. Nevertheless, the US banks, which 
are more heavily regulated, might have not fully adjusted to the changes in the 
business conditions brought about by deregulation. In the UK, always in the author's 
best knowledge, efficiency on bank level has never been tested; only two studies at 
branch level suggest an 85 - 90% of efficiency [Athanassopoulos (1995,1997)]. 
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4.7 Conclusions 
The literature on financial institution efficiency is both large and recent. On average 
X-inefficiency accounts for a considerable portion of cost, and is a greater source of 
performance problems than scale and product mix inefficiencies, while a number of 
studies find evidence that failing banks perform at high cost inefficiencies. Moreover, 
frontier efficiency is superior for most regulatory and other purposes than standard 
ratio analysis commonly used by regulators, financial analysts, and industry 
consultants when trying to assess performance, as it pen-nits overall objectively 
determined numerical efficiency values and ranking of firms. 
In the current study the efficiency of the UK banks for the period 1981 to 1995 has 
been examined by estimating an efficient frontier and by measuring the average 
differences between observed banks and banks at the frontier. Three different model 
specifications and applied to check the robustness of estimates to different 
specifications. 
Empirical findings are in line with those of the current literature and indicate that X- 
inefficiencies account for 20 to 30 % of costs in UK banking. Moreover, the results, 
consistent with other studies, suggest that choices made concerning measurement 
techniques make very little difference in terms of average industry efficiency or 
rankings of individual firms in the current data set. Thus, the efficiency estimates are 
fairly robust to differences in methodology and are in line with those obtained from 
US banking studies. Finally, in line with the results of Berg et al. (1992), Zaim 
(1995), and Rogers (1998b) our results suggests that in the 1990s UK banks started to 
realise the benefits from deregulation, which helped banks to reduce their 
inefficiencies level. 
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4.8 Appendix to Chapter 4 
Table 4-6: Parameter estimates from Model I- Half-normal distribution. 
Variable 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 
Constant 4.289 3.891 -7.081 -2.051 5.251 8.943 10.444 1.658 
....... 
(9.86) 
........ -. 1- -..... 
(24.75) 
....... .... .. 
(5.43) 
.., 1111 ...... 
(5.08) (9.29) (4.99) (9.84) (7.09) 
wi 0.256 -0.920 0.844 1.560 -2.748 -1.578 -1.417 0.636 
(2.9) (3.39) (1.36) (1.381) (2.44) (1.39) (3.01) (1.97) 
W2 -0.2E-02 0.453 0.203 -0.531 -1.156 0.063 -0.240 -1.262 
(1.27) (1.71) (1.20) (1.00) (1.25) (0.74) (0.85) (0.71) 
Y/ -2.940 -2.216 -3.963 -0.930 1.886 -0.406 -0.811 -2.586 
(4.08) (3.59) (2.66) (2.69) (3.02) (0.97) (1.39) (1.45) 
Yz 2.668 2.689 6.133 1.174 -1.360 0.386 0.324 2.762 
(4.273) (3.80) (3.29) (2.92) (3.15) (1.1 1) (1.42) (1.82) 
Y3 0.510 0.027 -0.766 0.434 -0.097 (nil) 0.180 0.135 
(0.80) (0.80) (0.72) (0.59) (0.21) (0.17) (0.13) 
wf. W2 -0.063 -0.094 -0.403 0.353 0.166 -0.031 0.0368 0.102 
(0.48) (0.458) (0.28) (0.34) (0.40) (0.24) (0.33) (0.27) 
Y1. Y2 0.39595 0.627 0.402 0.764 -0.349 0.064 -0.494 -0.635 
(1.83) (1.70) (1.12) (0.67) (0.33) (0.03) (0.48) (0.32) 
Y1. Y3 0.30079 -0.144 0.028 0.504 0.044 0.0413 -0.005 -0.069 
(0.41) (0.34) (0.31) (0.38) (0.10) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
Y2. Y3 -0.305 0.163 -0.015 -0.599 -0.028 -0.032 -0.8E-02 0.048 
(0.52) (0.328) (0.366) (0.35) (0.10) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
w1. w1 -0.388 0.072 0.249 -0.329 0.845 0.479 0.248 -0.400 
(0.67) (0.79) (0.35) (0.43) (0.65) (0.31) (0.57) (0.36) 
w,. w2 -0.050 0.029 -0.179 2.2E-02 -0.237 (nil) -0.076 -0.121 
(0.11) (0.16) (0.06) (6 E-02) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) 
Y1. Y1 -0.459 -0.532 -0.056 -0.432 0.157 (nil) 0.378 0.535 
(1.16) (1.11) (0.66) (0.46) (0.20) (0.32) (0.26) 
Yz. Y2 0.106 -0.095 -0.353 -0.235 0.212 (nil) 0.240 0.158 
(0.79) (0.63) (0.54) (0.31) (0.21) (0.22) (0.13) 
Y3. Y3 (nil) 0.7E-02 -0.001 -2.7E-05 -0.4E-03 (nil) -0.060 -0.5E-03 
(0.02) (0 0l) (0.01) (1 E-02) (0.06) (6E-03) 
wj. Yj 2.59 3.499 1.321 1.2E-02 -0.731 0.217 0.286 0.565 
(1.77) (1.97) (1.34) (0.89) (1.18) (0.53) (0.80) (0.57) 
w1. Y2 -2.261 -3.286 -1.94 -5.2E-02 0.770 -0.242 -0.210 -0.483 
(1.63) (1.88) (1.37) (0.93) (1.18) (0.54) (0.70) (0.57) 
W1. Y3 -0.268 -0.165 0.387 1.7E-02 -0.4E-02 -0.030 -0.035 -0.008 
(0.28) (0.43) (0.19) (0.23) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Y1 -0.078 0.044 0.368 0.558 0.147 -0.213 0.108 0.266 
(0.81) (0.50) (0.34) (0.54) (0.314) (0.34) (0.43) (0.25) 
w_. Y, 0.101 -0.019 -0.231 -0.459 -0.098 0.209 -0.115 -0.120 
(0.815) (0.46) (0.32) (0.50) (0.34) (0.34) (0.43) (0.22) 
ItiV). Y3 -0.019 -0.077 -0.128 -0.128 0.3F-02 0.024 0.011 -0.032 
(0.16) (0.20) (0.14) (0.19) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
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2.997 0.421 1.541 2.316 2.44; 0.845 0.714 0.532 
(2.28) (41.88) (2.27) (2.21) (1.65 (1.36) (1.77) (2.08) 
22 
3. " + (7' 
0.754 
(0.48) 
0.392 
(7.82) 
0.417 
(0.70) 
0.640 
(0.61) 
0.632 
(0.12) 
0.442 
(0.28) 
0.374 
(0.26) 
0.314 
0.21 
Table 4-6 (continued): 
Variable 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 
Constant 16.976 10.734 14.907 3.659 5.436 1.120 5.102 
(8.35) (22.84) (3.54) (6.53) (3.53) (4.43) (5.40) 
w1 -3.123 -2.296 -2.448 -0.192 -1.815 0.375 -0.870 
(2.01) 
. ...... _(6.57) 
(1.48) (2.19) (1.59) (1.20) (1.51) 
W2 1.063 0.176 -0.237 0.129 0.718 0.222 -0.179 
(1.17) 
. ........ 
(2 45)... (0.574) 
.... 
(0.90) (0.83) (0.83) (0.98) 
Y, -0.398 0.255 0.642 -0.549 1.410 0.313 -0.503 
(0.73) (4.32) (0.68 (1.36) (1.73) (1.48) (1.33) 
Y2 -0.563 -0.491 -1.75 0.862 -1.027 0.296 0.670 
(1.13) (5.46) (0.67) (1.57) (1.42) (1.51) (1.57) 
Y3 0.095 -0.082 (nil) -0.133 -0.095 -0.207 -0.072 
(0.19) (0.68)... (0.183) (0.13) (0.17) (0.19) 
w,. W2 0.249 0.241 0.284 -0.015 -0.087 0.013 0.335 
(0.37) (0.83) (0.29) (0.33) (0.31) (0.27) (0.34) 
Y1. Y2 0.313 0.296 0.126 -0.126 -0.214 -0.258 -0.312 
(0.39) (0.80) (0.04) (0.35) (0.46) (0.45) (0.21) 
Y, -Y3 0.019 0.022 
0.0936 -0.3E-03 0.063 0.044 -0.018 
(0.03) (0.21) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) 
Y2. Y3 -0.024 -0.032 -0.108 0.010 -0.048 -0.020 0.024 
(0.04) (0.23) 
_.... 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.103) (0.07) 
w,. w1 0.388 0.477 0.437 -0.149 0.331 -0.120 0.028 
(0.41) (1.29) (0.31) (0.41) (0.44) (0.25) (0.30) 
W2. W2 0.139 0.008 -0.163 -0.077 0.104 -0.037 0.071 
(0.11) (0.32) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) 
Y1 . Y1 -0.137 -0.147 (nil) 0.165 
0.066 0.168 0.202 
(0.28) (0.67) (0.23) (0.25) (0.28) (0.18) 
Y2. Y2 -0.084 -0.082 (nil) -0.082 0.174 0.110 0.155 
(0.13) (0.39) (0.17) (0.25) (0.20) (0.13) 
Y3. Y3 0.002 0.018 (nil) 0.006 -0.9E-04 -0.003 -0.2E-02 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.9E-02) 
w,. Y1 0.477 0.235 -0.655 -0.020 -0.306 -0.252 0.221 
(0.48) (1.40) (0.40) (0.50) (0.72) (0.36) (0.36) 
w,. Y2 -0.176 -0.144 0.858 0.094 0.412 0.229 -0.104 
(0.41) (1.30) (0.37) (0.53) (0.76) (0.41) (0.41) 
w,. Y3 -0.024 0.027 0.017 0.026 0.007 0.038 0.044 
(0.08) (0.23) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
w2. Y1 -0.326 -0.182 0.123 -0.120 -0.051 -0.096 -0.197 
(0.16) (0.59) (0.33) (0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.18) 
w2. Y2 0.142 0.148 0.051 0.095 -0.005 0.06 0.193 
(0.08) (0.45) (0.35) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.14) 
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w2. Y3 0.284 
0( 03) 
-0.048 
(0.13) 
-0.054 
(0.05) 
-0.017 
(0.04) 
0.037 
(0.04) 
-0.017 
0.04 
-0.018 
(0.05) 
6u / ß 82.608 126.29 295.48 2.392 85.947 1.155 1.239 
(2155) (0.1E+05) (0.3 E+05) (1.23) (2617) (0.85) (0.72) 
ý2 + oz 
0.656 0.892 0.723 0.369 0.453 0.332 0.351 
(0.9E-01) (0.12) (0.6E-01) (0.7E-01) (0.5E-01) (0.9E-01) (0.7E-01) 
Notes: (1) Standard errors of estimated parameters are shown in parentheses/ * significant 
with 95% confidence interval. 
(2) Certain variables are excluded, due to high multicollinearity. 
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Table 4-7: Parameter estimates from Model II Truncated distribution. 
Variable 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 
Constant 4.289 3.891 -7.08 -2.389 5.25 8.715 10.453 5.751 
(9.86) (24.75) (5.43) (5.29) (9.35) (10.76) (10.72) (5.61) 
wI 0.256 -0.920 0.844 1.541 -2.747 -1.578 -1.416 -0.958 
(3.0) (3.39) (1.36) (1.42) (2.56) (2.42) (3.01) (1.30) 
W2 -0.2E-02 0.453 0.203 -0.535 -1.156 0.063 -0.239 -0.864 
(1.2) (1.71) (1.20) (1.03) (1.32) (0.98) (0.94) (0.72) 
Y, -2.940 -2.216 -3.963 -0.864 1.886 -0.406 -0.810 -1.951 
(4.08) (3.59) (2.66) (3.32) (3.30) (1.22) (1.41) (1.33) 
Yz 2.668 2.689 6.133 1.170 -1.3599 0.38580 0.32457 1.92846 
(4.27) (3.80) (3.26) (3.32) (3.450) (1.409) (1.429) (1.4779) 
Y3 0.510 0.027 -0.766 0.419 -0.097 (nil) 0.180 0.166 
(0.80) (0.80) (0.72) (0.60) (0.22) (0.17) (0.11) 
w/. W2 -0.063 -0.094 -0.402 0.364 0.166 -0.031 0.037 0.022 
(0.48) (0.458) (0.28) (0.35) (0.48) (0.24) (0.34) (0.25) 
Y,. Y2 0.395 0.627 0.401 0.796 -0.349 0.064 -0.444 -0.572 
(1.83) (1.70) (1.12) (0.93) (0.33) (0.04) (0.48) (0.31) 
Y1. Y3 0.301 -0.144 0.218 0.518 0.044 0.0413 -0.5E-02 -0.044 
(0.41) (0.34) (0.30) (0.39) (0.11) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) 
Y'. Y; -0.305 0.163 -0.148 -0.599 -0.028 -0.031 -0.8E-02 0.024 
(0.52) (0.32) (0.37) (0.37) (0.10) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
w1. w1 -0.388 0.007 0.249 -0.344 0.845 0.478 0.246 (nil) 
(0.67) (0.79) (0.35) (0.44) (0.72) (0.50) (0.57) 
W2. W2 -0.050 0.3 E-03 -0.179 0.17 -0.237 (nil) -0.075 -0.104 
(0.10) (0.16) (0.05) (0.06) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) 
Y1. Y, -0.458 -0.532 -0.556 -0.458 0.157 (nil) 0.301 0.461 
(1.16) (1.11) (0.66) (0.52) (0.20) (0.33) (0.24) 
Y2. Y2 0.106 -0.095 -0.353 
-0.251 0.212 (nil) 0.240 0.175 
(0.80) (0.63) (0.54) (0.52) (0.21) (0.22) (0.11) 
Y3. Y3 (nil) 0.7 E-02 -0.001 -3.6E-04 -0.5 E-03 (nil) -0.6E-02 (nil) 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
W/. Y1 2.589 3.499 1.321 2.2E-02 -0.733 0.217 0.286 0.433 
(1.77) (1.97) (1.38) (1.11) (1.31) (0.69) (0.80) (0.57) 
W1. Y2 -2.261 -3.286 -1.940 -4.1E-02 0.769 -0.242 -0.210 -0.305 
(1.63) (1.88) (1.36) (1.15) (1.30) (0.69) (0.70) (0.53) 
w1. Y3 -0.268 -0.165 0.387 6.1 E-03 -0.4E-02 -0.029 -0.036 -0.02 
(0.28) (0.43) (0.19) (0.23) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) 
w7. Y/ -0.07 0.044 0.368 0.605 0.147 -0.213 0.107 0.231 
(0.81) (0.50) (0.34) (0.56) (0.31) (0.406) (0.46) (0.24) 
w2. Y2 0.101 -0.019 -0.231 -0.506 -0.097 0.209 -0.114 -0.13 
(0.81) (0.46) (0.31) (0.52) (0.34) (0.39) (0.45) (0.22) 
wz. Y3 -0.019 -0.077 -0.128 -0.135 0.4 E-02 0.025 0.01 1 -0.023 
(0.16) (0.20) (0.11) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
,a 
0.1E-05 -5E-09 -0.1 E-04 0.7E-04 -0.2E-06 0.21, -07 -0.3l, '-07 -0.37 
(2.57) (608.4) (9.27) (5.13) (3.50) (84.97) (86.09) (318.7) 
6 / 6ý 2.997 0.421 1.541 1.871 2.448 0,846 0.714 0.478 
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(2.28) (41.88) (2.27) (2.16) (2.26) (12.97) (8.48) (25.27) 
2 2 0.754 0.392 0.417 0.522 0.632 0.442 0.374 0.311 + 
11 " (0.48) (7.82) (0.70) (0.510) (0.49) (3.84) (2.30) (3.85) 
Table 4-7 (continued): 
Variable 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 
Constant 11.614 5.522 7.180 3.121 5.925 1.41 4.736 
(6.39) (9.42) (6.73) (5.81) (4.54) (4.44) (5.13) 
W1 -2.193 -1.608 -1.584 0.199 -1.908 0.539 -0.743 
. ..... 
(1.76) 
.......... 
(2.66) 
..... _............ 
(1.82) (1.93) (1.77) (1.28) (1.4) 
W2 0.341 -0.198 0.254 0.099 0.854 0.240 -0.148 
(1.02) (1.62) (1.36) (0.79) (1.26) (0.85) (1.02) 
......... Y1 -0.671 -0.321 1.462 -0.551 1.471 0.204 -0.517 
....... ........ ..... _ 
(1.06) (2.31) (1.80) (1.05) (1.43) (1.55) (1.33) 
Y2 0.231 0.716 -1.334 0.911 -1.149 0.463 0.735 
................. 
(1.29) 
...... .. 
(2.54) 
........ 
(1.61) (1.19) (1.15) (1.62) (1.54) 
Y3 0.084 -0.175 -0.193 -0.143 -0.072 -0.214 -0.081 
(0.16 (0.25) (0.28) (0.17) 
...... __ 
(0.19) (0.17) (0.17) 
w1. w2 0.155 0.019 -0.083 -0.009 -0.104 0.001 0.322 
(0.39) (0.60) (0.41) (0.27) (0.39) (0.20) (0.33) 
Y1-Y2 0.055 0.012 0.191 -0.132 -0.255 -0.276 -0.313 
(0.32) (0.45) (0.22) (0.21) (0.54) (0.46) (0.22) 
Y,. Y3 -0.012 0.006 0.133 0.9E-03 0.061 0.036 -0.020 
(0.04) (0.09) (0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) 
Y2. Y3 0.005 0.006 -0.113 0.010 -0.050 -0.011 0.026 
(0.04) (0.101) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) 
wI. w/ 0.249 0.162 0.351 -0.191 0.354 -0.161 0.004 
(0.44) (0.54) (0.46) (0.35) (0.48) (0.27) (0.29) 
W2. W2 0.016 -0.051 -0.171 -0.079 0.107 -0.051 0.068 
(0.11) (0.19) (0.14) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) 
Y1. Y/ 0.004 0.045 (nil) 0.168 0.089 0.184 0.203 
(0.22) (0.35) (0.14) (0.26) (0.30) (0.18) 
Y2. Yz 0.010 -0.036 -0.149 -0.007 0.197 0.107 0.152 
........ 
(0.12) (0.19) (0.19) (0.13) (0.29) (0.19) (0.13) 
Y3. Y3 0.004 0.007 (nil) 0.007 -0.5E-03 -0.002 -0.003 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.5E-02) (0.01) (0.01) 
wj. Yj 0.512 0.263 -1.27 -0.017 -0.365 -0.232 0.229 
(0.58) (0.70) (0.78) (0.34) (0.74) (0.36) (0.35) 
W1. Y2 -0.293 -0.155 1.351 0.075 0.472 0.120 -0.124 
(0.54) (0.68) (0.80) (0.35) (0.73) (0.42) 0.50 
W1. Y3 -0.027 0.029 -0.002 0.050 0.011 0.040 -0.124 
(0.06) (0.13) (0.13) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.40) 
W7. Yj -0.257 -0.067 -0.043 -0.103 -0.054 -0.098 0.045 
(0.24) (0.46) (0.24) (0.13) (0.22) (0.22) (0.07) 
w2. Y2 0.182 0.106 -0.007 0.082 -0.021 0.062 -0.195 
(0.22) (0.42) 
....... 
(0.22) (0.13) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19) 
W'- Y3 0.007 -0.044 -0.034 -0.020 0.008 -0.017 0.188 
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0.03 (0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 0.14 
/ 6" -3.168 -3.357 -0.754 -1.094 0.6E-01 -0.611 -0.3E-06 
(16.16) (20.40) 13.03 (4.71) (0.65) (18.97) (8.35) 
Q" / 6v 13.090 13.487 1.220 2.7668 104.30 1.095 1.226 
(24.56) (26.50) (3.18) (2.14) (2600) (2.00) (1.64) 
z z 1.544 2.226 0.506 0.462 0.458 0.342 0.348 +6 r " (3.20) (5.36) (0.83) (0.39) (0.12) (0.67) (0.37) 
Notes: (1) Standard errors of estimated parameters are shown in parentheses/ * significant 
with 95% confidence interval. 
(2) Certain variables are excluded, due to high multicollinearity. 
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Table 4-8: Parameter estimates frone Model III- Exponential distribution. 
Variable 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 
Constant 4.518 5.064 -6.969 -2.24 6.082 9.96 10.51 5.750 
(8.62. ) (5.48) 
... .. 
(4.73) 
....... 
(4.33) (9.56) (7.85) (9.78) (5.72) 
w1 0.256 -1.064 0.844 1.541 -2.596 -1.724 -1.418 -0.958 
(2.63) (137) (1.26) (1.20) (2.45) (2.32) (3.00) (1.31) 
W2 -0.2E-02 0.304 0.203 -0.535 -0.535 -0.025 -0.239 -0.863 
(1.21) (1.01) (1.09) (0.94) (1.19) (0.94) (0.81) (0.73) 
Y, -2.940 -2.511 -3.963 -0.863 1.185 -0.180 -0.811 -1.951 
(2.63) (2.15) (2.26) (2.48) (2.64) (1.25) (1.40) (1.35) 
YZ 2.667 2.677 6.132 1.170 -0.682 -0.012 0.324 1.928 
(2.88) (2.28) (2.56) (2.65) (2.59) (1.40) (1.41) (1.49) 
Y3 0.510 0.246 -0.766 0.418 -0.064 (nil) 0.180 0.166 
(0.62) (0.49) (0.72) (0.52) (0.22) (0.16) (0.11) 
w1. W2 -0.063 -0.078 -0.402 0.364 0.017 0.032 0.037 0.022 
(0.48) (0.34) 
... 
(0.25) (0.30) (0.403) (0.22) (0.325) (0.25) 
Yl. Y2 0.395 0.879 0.401 0.796 -0.354 0.077 -0.443 -0.572 
(1.02) (0.95) (1.08) (0.72) (0.23) (0.03) (0.48) (0.32) 
Y1. Y3 0.300 -0.216 0.022 0.517 0.024 0.033 -0.5E-02 -0.043 
(0.28) (0.21) (0.27) (0.36) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) 
Y2. Y3 -0.305 0.212 -0.015 -0.599 -0.012 -0.029 -0.7E-02 0.024 
(0.34) (0.19) (0.33) (0.34) (0.08) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
w1. wj -0.388 0.119 0.249 -0.344 0.791 0.486 0.248 (nil) 
(0.61) (0.579) (0.34) (0.40) (0.53) (0.48) (0.56) 
W2. W2 -0.050 0.091 -0.179 1.7E-02 -0.163 (nil) -0.076 -0.104 (0.09) (0.11) (0.053) (0.05) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
Y1. Y1 -0.458 -0.675 -0.055 -0.458 0.163 (nil) 0.379 0.461 
(0.65) (0.61) (0.62) (0.44) (0.164) (0.323) (0.24) 
Y7. Y1 0.106 -0.168 -0.353 -0.251 0.219 (nil) 0.240 0.175 
(0.52) (0.35) (0.51) (0.37) (0.1) (0.22) (0.11) 
Y3- Y3 2.590 0.009 -0.1E-02 -6.6E-04 -0.3E-03 (nil) -0.6E-02 (nil) 
(1.57) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.8E-02) (0.6E-02) 
w1. Y -2.261 3.959 1.321 2.3E-02 -0.301 0.127 0.286 -0.305 
(1.45) (1.05) (1.19) (0.88) (1.11) (0.71) (0.81) (0.57) 
w1. Y2 -0.268 -3.770 -1.94 -4.1E-02 0.292 -0.132 -0.210 -0.027 
(0.24) (1.03) (1.15) (0.89) (1.09) (0.70) (0.71) (0.03) 
W1. Y3 -0.078 -0.191 0.387 6.3E-03 -0.013 -0.021 -0.036 -0.131 
(0.78) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.22) 
W2- Yj 0.102 -0.148 0.368 0.605 0.147 -0.042 0.108 0.231 
(0.77) (0.37) (0.33) (0.47) (0.26) (0.39) (0.44) (0.24) 
w2. Y, -0.019 0.159 -0.231 -0.507 -0.121) 0.440 -0.115 -0.132 (0.12) (0.34) (0.30) (0.45) (0.31) (0.39) (0.44) (0.22) 
wz. Y3 (nil) 0.2E-03 -0.128 -0.135 -0.41? -03 (nil) 0.011 -0.023 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
0 2926 2.039 5.986 4.547 2.952 5.853 9.638 4.987 
(1.21) (0.32) (5.17) (2.90) (0.77) (10.77) (30.02) (5.68) 
0.355 2.7E-06 0.261 0.299 0.25966 0.344 0.315 0.232 
(0.11) (7E-02) (0.8E-01) (0.9E-01) (0.9E-01) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) 
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Table 4-8 (continued): 
Variable 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 
Constant 10.984 8.506 9.372 3.967 7.469 1.646 5.376 
(4.19) (8.70) (4.81) (5.83) (3.21) (4.06) (5.01) 
W, -2.406 -1.831 -0.573 -0.219 -2.592 0.244 -0.908 
.......... ._.. 
(1.17) (2.45) (1.18) (1.95) (0.96) (1.06) (1.37) 
W2 0.2E-03 0.180 -1.294 0.137 0.920 0.213 -0.194 
(0.60) (1.35) 
.... . 
(0.97) 
_(0.79) .. _ 
(0.64) (0.75) (0.92)... 
Y, -0.094 0.230 0.840 -0.425 1.527 0.409 -0.521 
(0.91) (1.36) (0.56) (1.26) (1.16) (1.35) (1.22) 
YZ -0.283 -0.112 -1.52 0.705 -1.311 0.148 0.673 
(1.14) (1.81) (0.56) (1.42) (1.14) (1.38) (1.43) 
Y3 0.014 -0.2140 -0.222 -0.124 -0.020 -0.200 -0.072 
(0.09) (019) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.16) (0.18) 
w1. W2 0.143 0.033 0.646 -0.016 -0.202 0.028 0.344 
..... 
(0.22) 
.. 
(0.42) (0.31) 
........ .. 
(0.28) 
... 
(0.19) (0.23) (0.32) 
Y, -Y2 -0.055 -0.048 0.120 -0.111 -0.361 -0.278 -0.314 (0.19) (0.36) (0.04) (0.29) (0.30) (0.41) 0.18 
..... _ Y1. Y3 0.831 0.047 0.075 0.005 0.055 0.044 -0.315 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
..... _ 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.18) 
Y2. Y3 -0.009 -0.018 -0.081 0.004 -0.049 -0.021 -0.019 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) 
w,. w, 0.395 0.087 0.154 -0.169 0.483 -0.084 0.025 
(0.20) (0.51) (0.30) (0.34) (0.24) (0.21) (0.07) 
W2. W2 -0.020 0.196 -0.118 -0.080 0.071 -0.026 0.042 
(0.07) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.27) 
Y1. Y1 0.049 0.021 (nil) 0.140 0.135 0.172 0.075 
(0.16) (0.28) (0.21) (0.17) (0.26) (0.12) 
Y2. Y2 0.0795 0.056 (nil) 0.004 0.261 0.129 0.203 
.... .... . 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) 
Y3. Y3 -0.2E-02 0.176 (nil) 0.006 -0.3E-03 -0.003 0.158 
(0.5E-02) (0.54) (0.01) (0.7E-02) (0.01) (0.11) 
w,. Y, 0.241 0.029 -0.656 0.015 -0.374 -0.280 -0.003 
(0.45) (0.54) (0.35) 
......... 
(0.40) (0.34) (0.32) (0.01) 
w,. Y2 -0.047 -0.014 0.706 0.064 0.520 0.264 0.235 
(0.45) (0.06) (0.34) (0.43) (0.33) (0.37) (0.33) 
w,. Y3 -0.018 -0.067 0.097 0.027 -0.003 0.037 -0.119 
(0.04) (0.19) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.37) 
w2-Y, -0.166 0.156 -0.074 -0.123 -0.079 -0.093 0.045 
(0.11) (0.16) (0.13) (0.20) (0.12) (0.21) (0.07) 
w2. Y2 0.132 0.158 0.125 0.096 -0.002 0.062 -0.194 
(0.11) (0.17) (0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.19) (0.15) 
w2. Y3 -0.013 -0.048 -0.102 -0.017 0.015 -0.018 0.192 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.027) (0.04) (0.12) 
0 2.257 1.971 2.197 5.805 2.841 6.825 7.013 
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0.34 (0.32) (0.34) (1.96) (0.51) (3.16) 3.31 
or., 0.1E-04 
(0.4E-01) 
0.2E-05 
(2.85) 
0.6E-06 
(0.6E-01) 
0.169 
(0.4 -01 
0.2E-04 
0.5E-01 
0.217 
0.5E-01 
0.232 
0.6E-01 
Notes: (1) Standard errors of estimated parameters are shown in parentheses/ * significant 
with 95% confidence interval. 
(2) Certain variables are excluded, due to high multicollinearity. 
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CHAPTER 5: Market Structure and Profit Relationship in Banking 
5.1 Introduction 
The primary objective of the current chapter is to examine the relationship between 
market structure and profit the UK banking industry. Many studies in the banking 
literature (especially in the US) examine the connection between profitability and 
measures of market structure (concentration or market share) and find a positive 
statistical relationship. There are two different interpretations of this phenomenon: 
the first is the market power hypothesis, and the second is the efficient structure 
hypothesis. The market power explanation suggests that firms in concentrated 
markets exercise market power in pricing and earn supernormal profits [Shepherd 
(1982)]. The efficient structure paradigm links concentration to high profitability 
through efficiency [Demsetz (1973)]. The main problem of the literature has been the 
interpretation of the positive relationship between profitability and market structure, 
and whether this supports the market power or the efficient structure hypothesis due to 
the exclusion of a direct efficiency measure [Berger (1995a, 1997), Berger and 
Hannan (1998)]. To overcome the problem of most of the previous literature, direct 
measures of both market structure and efficiency are included. 
Following deregulation, banking industry is consolidating rapidly. Hence, it is 
important to understand which market structure best serves the deposit and credit 
needs of an economy. The different explanations of differences in profitability across 
banks have direct opposing implications for antitrust policy. If high profits are 
created by market power, then antitrust actions are likely to be socially beneficial by 
moving prices towards competitive levels and allocating resources more effectively. 
On the other hand, if high efficiency is the reason for high profits, then antitrust 
actions such as breaking-up efficient firms that have gained large market share, or 
disallow efficient firms to acquire other firms, will probably raise costs and lead to 
prices less favourable to the consumers [Berger (1995a, 1997), Berger and Humphrey 
(1997)]. 
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The structure of this chapter is the following: section 2 distinguishes between the four 
hypotheses, namely the two market-power hypotheses, and the two efficient-structure 
hypotheses, and gives an overview of the different performance and market structure 
variables utilised in the literature. Section 3 reviews the literature. Section 4 
describes the methodology, by giving the structural models underlying the various 
hypotheses, outlines the equations to be estimated in hypothesis tests, and provides a 
brief description of the efficiency measures. Section 5 describes the data set 
employed. Section 6 summarises the empirical results, and section 7 concludes. 
5.2 The theory behind the relevant hypotheses 
There are two different interpretations for the positive statistical relationship between 
profitability and market structure found in the literature: the market power hypothesis 
[Shepherd (1982), Clark (1986), Berger and Hannan (1989), Golberg and Rai (1995)], 
and the efficient structure hypothesis [Smirlock (1985), Evanoff and Fortier (1988), 
Jackson (1992)]. 
The first one, the market power hypothesis (MP), states that banks in concentrated 
markets are able to extract monopolistic profits by their ability to offer lower deposit 
rates and charge higher interest on loans [Berger and Hannan (1993), Berger (1995a, 
1997), Goldberg and Rai (1995)]. The theory is divided into two hypotheses. The 
structure conduct performance (SCP) hypothesis states that the positive relationship 
between profitability and market structure reflect the setting of prices that are less 
favourable to consumers, i. e. lower deposit rates higher loan rates, in more 
concentrated markets due to competitive imperfections. This hypothesis is based on 
the model of oligopolistic behaviour of firms, where collusive arrangements are less 
costly to maintain in a concentrated market. 
The relative market hypothesis (RMP), which is related to SCP, states that only firms 
with large market shares and well differentiated products are able to exercise market 
power in pricing of these products and earn supernormal profits. The difference 
between the SCP and RMP is that the latter does not assume concentrated markets, 
and moreover, anti-competitive advantages due to size can exist non-concentrated. 
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On the other hand, according to the efficient structure hypotheses (ES), efficient firms 
increase in size and market share because of their ability to generate higher profits 
that, in turn, usually lead to higher market concentration [see Demsetz (1973)]. This 
hypothesis suggests that both profitability and market structure reflect important 
efficiency differences across firms. ES is divided into two sub-hypotheses. The first 
one is the X-efficiency (ESX) hypothesis, according to which firms earn abnormal 
profits steaming from lower costs due to superior management or production 
technologies. The second is the scale efficiency (ESS), which states that firms have 
essentially equally good management and technology, but some firms produce at a 
more efficient scale than others do. Consequently, they obtain lower unit cost and 
higher market profits [Smirlock (1985), Berger and Hannan (1993), Berger (1995a, 
1997), Goldberg and Rai (1995)]. 
There is an important public policy question on which of these two hypotheses 
represents the market. If the first hypothesis is valid, then motivation for mergers 
may arise from the desire to set unfavourable price for consumers, which will have as 
a result the decrease in the consumer and the producer surplus. On the other hand, if 
the ES hypothesis is valid, then mergers may be motivated by efficiency 
considerations that would increase total surplus. The first category suggests that 
antitrust or regulatory action may be productive, whereas the second category 
suggests that such actions are likely to be counterproductive and socially costly 
[Berger and Hannan (1993,1998)]. 
5.2.1 Defining Bank's Performance 
Previous studies have mainly used two types of measures for the evaluation of banks 
performance. The first is related to the price of a particular product or service, while 
the other one uses profitability measures. A survey of 73 US studies by Molyneux et 
al. (1996) indicates that the most commonly used price measures are the average 
interest paid on loans, the average interest paid on deposits, and the average interest 
charge on demand deposits [e. g Berger and Hannan (1989,1992), Calem and Carlino 
(1991), Jackson (1992), Beger and Hannan (1993,1998)]. However, the use of price 
measures has been criticised on the grounds that price measures combine flow 
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variables with stock variables S9 Furthermore, studies that use price as an indicator of 
bank's performance have a very small adjusted R2 (always below 0.50). As Gilbert 
(1984) points out `the estimated effects of market concentration on the average 
interest rates on loans may be biased if the measure of market concentration is 
correlated with the omitted variables '6o. 
The other category is the profitability measures. There are two major advantages for 
the use of profitability measures. The first one is that by use of a single number one 
can consolidate information about a multiproduct firm; by definition, banks are 
multiproduct entities. And second, they are very simple to calculate. Nevertheless, 
they face the same drawback as the first category, as they combine flow variables with 
stock variables. The most commonly used profitability measures are return on assets 
(ROA) and return of capital employed (ROE) [e. g Smirlock (1985), Evanoff and 
Fortier (1988), Clark (1986), Thorton and Molyneux (1992), Berger (1995a, 1997)]. 
5.2.2 Concentration Measures 
To account for market structure, most US studies have used different concentration 
measures. The most commonly used are the concentration ratio and the Herfindahl 
index. The concentration ratio is the proportion of output produced by the top n firms 
in the industry [e. g Rhodes (1980,1981), Rhodes and Savage (1981), Marlow (1982), 
Clark (1986), Jakson (1992), Thorton and Molyneux (1992), Goldberg and Rai 
(1995), Berger (1997)]. The major criticism of the above measure is that it measures 
only one point on the concentration curve61 (since it is derived directly from the 
concentration curve), and so the ranking of industries depends critically on the points 
chosen. Further, it does not take into account the dispersion of bank size in the 
market and, also, it does not reflect the number of competing companies. 
Hannah and Kay (1976) have introduced a measure that takes into account all firms in 
the market [e. g Kwast and Rose (1984), Hannan (1984), Goldberg and Rai (1995), 
59 For example, they use interest on loans over one period, which is a flow variable, with loans due at 
the end of the year, which a stock variable. 
60 Gilbert (1984) p. p. 631. 
61 The concentration curve is constructed by plotting the cumulative shares of a market output to the 
cumulative number of firms from the larger to the smallest. 
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Berger (1995a, 1997)]. This measure is an asymmetric strictly concave function and 
its simplest form is given by: 
R=ýrsi (5.1) 
where S; " is the market share of firm i, and a is the elasticity parameter, i. e. the value 
which determines the weights given to large firms relative to small ones. For 
example, as a tends to zero, the index is simply the numbers of the firms; on the other 
hand, as a becomes larger, the weight given to small firms becomes negligible. The 
Herfindahl index, has a value of a =2 and R is given by: 
RH =. Sj (5.2) 
This measured is considered superior compared to the first one, because it overcomes 
its problems, as reflects the number and dispersion of firms in the market [Molyneux 
et al. (1996)]. Nonetheless, empirical studies find that these two measures are so 
highly correlated and that the choice of measure is not of critical importance for 
hypothesis testing [see Rose and Fraser (1976), and Heggestad (1979)]. 
5.2.3 Market Share 
Most studies use a weight to measure the market share of each bank, which is usually 
the proportion of each individual bank's deposit in the market relative to the total 
market deposit [e. g Smirlock (1985), Berger and Hannan (1989,1992,1993,1998), 
Jakson (1992), Berger (1995a, 1997), Goldberg and Rai (1995)] 
5.2.4 Control Variables 
The major control variables that have been utilised from previous studies are the 
following: 
1. The size variable is the most common variable used to account for cost 
d+ifferences across banks and to control for the ability of larger banks to diversify, 
and in most cases it is the amount of total assets of each individual bank. Cost 
differences related to bank size will lead to a positive coefficient if there are 
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economies of scales; a negative coefficient implies that increased diversification 
leads to lower risk, and thus lower required returns. In some studies the log of the 
total assets is used to reduce the scale effect. [e. g Clark (1986), Goldberg and Rai 
(1995)] 
2. The wage rates62 is used to capture the effect of wages and, in turn, of operating 
cost, on profits. It is expected to be negative when the efficient structure 
hypothesis holds, because efficient banks are expected to operate at lower costs. 
The same argument can be applied if the market power hypothesis holds. [e. g, 
Thorton and Molyneux (1992), Goldberg and Rai (1995)]. 
3. A variable used to account for different risk levels between banks is the loan to 
asset ratio. This is used as a proxy of portfolio risk based on the view that loans 
tend to be risky relative to other assets held in bank's portfolio. A lower ratio 
indicates a more risky position [e. g Smirlock (1985), Goldberg and Rai (1995)]. 
4. Most US studies include a variable for entry barriers due to the nature of the US 
banking industry usually measured by total market deposits. Entry conditions are 
included in the structure performance models in order to evaluate their impact on 
bank performance and to see their relationship with to concentration. The majority 
of studies that account for this variable assume that lower entry barriers (the ability 
to undertake branching) enter the performance equation only as a shift parameter. 
The literature suggests that higher entry barriers lead to higher profitability [e. g. 
Rhoades (1980,1981,1982a), Rhoades and Rutz (1982), Smirlock (1985), Berger 
and Hannan (1989)]. 
62 Wage rate is usually proxy for the cost of labour, and is calculated as the ratio of total wages and 
salaries to the number of employees. 
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5.3 Literature Review 
Four approaches have been considered in the literature to distinguish among the 
different hypotheses, and each has its benefits and limitations. The first one, regresses 
profits on the market structure variables, concentration and market share. Studies that 
utilised this method find a statistically significant positive relationship between profit 
and market share, whereas the coefficient of concentration is found to be insignificant 
[see Table 5-1, Gilbert (1984), and Berger and Hannan (1993)]. The limitation of this 
approach lies in the interpretation of the findings. Some argue that these findings 
constitute a support for the ES hypothesis based on the notion that both profits and 
market share are correlated with efficiency, which is excluded from the empirical 
specification [Smirlock, Gillian, and Marshall (1984,1986), Smirlock (1985)]. Others 
state that the findings support the MP hypothesis since firms with larger shares can 
exercise greater market power and earn higher profits [Shepherd (1986)]. 
The second approach tries to overcome this problem by including a direct measure of 
efficiency in the profitability equation. According to this approach, if efficiency is 
properly controlled for, then the market share coefficient should reflect solely market 
power effects. Some studies include a proxy of scale efficiency to reflect the scale 
version of the ES hypothesis [Allen and Hagin (1989)]. More recent studies have also 
included explicit measures of X-efficiency in the profitability equation to control for 
the ESX hypothesis [Timme and Yang (1991), Berger (1995a)]. 
The major drawback of the two approaches mentioned above is that the dependent 
variable, profitability, may include a considerable amount of noise. A portion of this 
noise may be generated by difficulties in using accounting data [Fisher and McGowen 
(1983)]. Moreover, profits may be affected by other factors such as loan loss 
provisions, which are unrelated to either structure and cost efficiency [Berger and 
Hannan (1993)]. 
The third approach emerges from the need to overcome the problem due to the use of 
profit as the dependent variable. Instead of profit data, some studies utilise more 
precise information on the prices of individual bank deposit and loan products [Berger 
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and Hannan (1989), Hannan (1991), Jakson (1992), Berger and Hannan (1992)]. 
These variables are regressed on the market share variables to test the MP hypothesis. 
With lower deposit rates and/or higher loan rates, i. e. prices less favourable to 
consumers, the MP hypotheses is supported. The major advantage of this method is 
that exact prices (paid or received) are more accurate indicators of the market power 
than profits. On the other hand, it may be considered as problematic due to the 
exclusion of efficiency measures in the analysis. 
The last approach, which has been applied only by a handful of new studies, 
distinguishes among all the four hypotheses, SCP, RMP, ESX, and ESS, by using 
direct measures for both market structure and efficiency. This approach is flexible in 
the sense that all four hypotheses are represented by different variables, so that any (or 
all of them) may be found to be consistent with the data employed [Berger and 
Hannan (1993,1998), Berger (1995a, 1997), Goldberg and Rai (1996)]. 
These studies directly relate market structure to efficiency. Concentration and market 
share are regressed on the efficiency measures to test the efficient structure condition 
that efficiency creates greater concentration or market share [see Berger 
(1995a, 1997)]. `For the efficient structure hypothesis to determine the positive 
relationship between performance and structure spuriously, efficiency must be 
positively related to both performance and structure. Under the MP hypotheses, 
market structure is associated with market power, and firms may take some of the 
benefits of this power as a more relaxed environment in which there is less pressure 
to maximise efficiency'. 63 As suggested by Hicks (1935), the reduction of competitive 
pressure in concentrated markets may result in higher cost per unit of output because 
of slack management. Under this `quiet life' addition to the MP hypotheses, higher 
concentration and market share may be negatively related to efficiency. 
63 Berger (1997), p. p. 8. 
180 
Chapter 5 
5.3.1 US empirical evidence 
Early literature concentrated on testing of SCP hypothesis, based on the notion that 
the positive statistical relationship between market concentration and measures of 
firm or industry profitability reflects the setting of prices; the latter are unfavourable 
to consumers in more concentrated markets as a result of collusion or other forms of 
non-competitive behaviour. Demzet (1973,1974) and Peltzman (1977) question this 
assumption with the introduction of the efficient structure hypothesis. They stated that 
firms possessing a comparative advantage in production become larger and, hence, 
they gain a higher market share. This dispersion of efficiency within markets creates 
higher levels of concentration and results in a greater than average efficiency within 
these markets, which in turns yields a positive profit concentration relationship. 
Consequently, high concentration is due to the high market share of efficient firms. 
Thus market share proxies for relative efficiency and therefore will be positively 
correlated with profitability. 
Gilbert (1984) provides a survey of forty-four empirical studies that examine the 
relationship of market structure with the performance of banking institutions. From 
these studies thirty-two report some evidence of significant association between 
market structure and measures of bank performance, with the direction of influence of 
market structure as indicated by the SCP hypothesis. In seven studies the coefficients 
of the measures of market structure are found to be insignificant. However, these 
studies face important limitations. First, average interest and service charge rates are 
poor measures of bank performanceTM, whereas bank profits are more appropriate 
measure of the performance. Second, the effect of regulation on bank's performance 
is missing from most of these studies65. Since there is no theoretical foundation for 
the effects of regulation on the relationship tested, the results can not provide any 
64 (1) For a period of time due to the effect of Regulation Q, the deposit ceiling rates were below the 
market rate, so the average interest paid on time and saving deposits does not represents markets 
structure, but most likely a function of the maturity distribution of bank's deposits. (2) For all those 
measures the numerator is an annual income or expense flow, where the denominator is a balance sheet 
item recorded as of a point in time. 
65 Gilbert states that changes in the regulation do affect the relationship. He presents as an example the 
influence of entry regulation. If this is controlled by the regulators, the firms already in the market 
determine to what extent the pricing and the availability of services reflects monopolistic and 
competitive behaviour. On the other hand, in the case of unregulated environment, pricing of banking 
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information for the influence of changes in the regulatory system on structure 
performance relationships [Gilbert (1984)]. Third, there is great variation in the 
measure of market structure and bank performance. Studies that use the most 
appropriate measures for bank performance find significant influence of market 
structure on these performance measures. However, statistical results from most of 
the studies are very small. Finally, these studies do not include a market share 
variable. Hence, the effect of concentration reported in these studies is spurious and 
most probably due to the correlation between profitability and the omitted market 
share variable [Smirlock (1985)]. Table 5-1 provides a summary of the early studies 
together with their conclusions. 
services is influenced by the threat of entry by new firms, irrespective of the existing structure of the 
industry. 
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Table 5-1: Review of the early literature on market structure and performance 
relationship66 
Authors Measure of Bank R2 or R2 
Measure of Are the 
performance Market coefficients on 
Structure the Market 
Structure 
Significant 
Edwards Interest rates on 0.36-0.64 CR3 Yes Ior 1955 
(1964) business loans No for 1957 
Flecking Interest rates on 0.16-0.48 CR3 No 
(1965) business loans 
Meyer (1967) Interest rates on 0.67-0.73 CR3 Yes for 1955 
business loans No for 1957 
Philip (1967) Interest rates on 0.51-0.64 CR3 Yes 
business loans 
Bell and Estimated service 0.22-029 CR3 Yes 
Murphy charge on demand 
(1969) deposits 
Brucker Elasticity of loans 0.57 CR3 Yes 
(1970) demand 
Fraser and 1. IL/TL 0.41-0.54 CRI 1. No for 1966 
Rose (1971) 2. IT/TS 0.03-0.14 Yes for 1967 
3. SC/DD 0.21-. 030 2. No 
4. NI/C 0.07-0.15 3. No 
4. No 
Vernor NI/C 0.21 CR3 Yes 
(1971) 
Jacobs (1971) Interest rates on 0.18-0.25 CR3 Yes 
business loans 
Ware (1972) SC/DD 0.49-0.51 CR2 No 
NI/C 0.26-0.45 No 
IL/TL 0.42-0.43 No 
IT/TS 0.49-0.61 No 
Edwards NI/C 0.05 CR3 No 
(1973) 
Yates (1974) IL/TL 0.14-. 035 1-i Small effects 
IT/TD Changes in 11 of 
NI/TA Market share, concentration, 
Portfolio selection stability important 
effect for 
changes in 
concentration 
Sources: (1. ) Gilbert, A. "Bank Market Structure and Competition", Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, Vol. 16, No. 4, November 1984, p. p. 617-645, ( 2. ) Molyneux, P., Altunhas, Y and 
Gardener, E., "Efficiency in European Banking", USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996, (3) Individual 
articles. 
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Fraser and NI/TA _ 
Dummy No for all 
Alvis (1975) NUC variables for performance 
IUTL markets with variables 
SC/DD relatively high 
IT/TS CR1 
Fraser and IL/TL 0.21-0.24 H No 
Rose (1976) IT/TS 0.26-0.28 No 
SC/DD 0.40-0.42 No 
NI/TA 0.42 Yes 
Mingo (1976) NI/TA 0.006 H No 
Heggested Interest rate on new 0.17 H times a Yes 
and Mingo car loan dummy 
(1976) Monthly service 0.194 variable for Yes 
charge on demand areas with low 
deposits H 
Heggested NI/TA 0.08 CR3 Yes 
(1977) 
Whitehead IL/TL 0.39-0.45 N No 
(1977) IT/TS 0.37-0.45 CR3 Yes 
NUC 0.39-0.43 H No 
Whitehead ILJTL 0.160- CR3 Yes 
(1978) IT/TS 0.263 No 
NI/C 0.095- No 
0.129 
-0.025- 
0.066 
Gradly and SC/DD 0.34 H No 
Kyle (1979) IT/TS 0.25 No 
IIJTL 0.37 No 
Savage and NI/TA 0.160 CR3 Yes 
Rhoades IJTL 0.131 Yes 
(1979) SC/DD 0.096 Yes 
IT/TS 0.210 
Rhoades and IIJTL 0.22 CR3 Yes 
Rutz (1979) SC/DD 0.19 Yes 
NI/TA 0.05 No 
Rose and IL/TL 0.087 N No 
Scott (1979) IT/TS 0.034 CR1 Yes 
Hannan Wage and salary 0.91-0.93 Dummy Yes 
(1979a) expenditure variable when 
Number of banks CR3 is greater Yes 
employees than 63% 
Hannan Interest rate paid Used CR3 Yes 
(1979b) on passbook saving Tobit H No 
a/cs maximum N Yes 
likelihood 
analysis 
Glassman NI/TA 0.12-0.13 CR3 Yes 
and Rhoades 
184 
Chapter 5 
(1980) 
Rhoades NI/TA 0.02 CR3 Yes 
(1980) 
Osborne and SC/DD 0.30 H No 
Wendel Service charge 
(1981) rates on DD 
Rhodes IL/TL 0.14-0.32 CR3 Yes in 4 yrs 
(1981) SC/DD 0.08-0.23 Yes in 3 yrs 
IT/TS 0.12-0.24 Yes in 4 yrs 
NI/TA 0.05-0.18 No in all yrs 
NI/C 0.10-0.29 Yes in 2s 
Rhodes and NUTA 0.05 CR3 of No 
Savage deposits in the 
(1981) state in which 
bank is located 
Rhoades and NI/TA 0.003-0.06 CR3 Yes 
Rutz (1982) Coefficient of Yes 
variation of NI/TA 
Equity / asset ratio Yes 
Loan / asset ratio Yes 
Net loan asset / No 
total loans 
Rhoades NI/TA 0.0034 CR3 Yes 
(1982a) 
Marlow Interest rates on 0.25-0.31 N Yes 
(1982) residential CR3 Yes 
mortgage CR5 Yes 
loans 
Kwast and NI/TA 0.42-0.58 H Yes 
Rose(1982) 
Smirlock NI/TA 0.03-0.05 CR3 No 
(1983) NI/C 
Hannan Passbook saving 0.04-0.05 H Yes 
(1984) rate No 
Total weekly 
banking hours 
NI = net income. 
TA = initial asset. 
C = capital. 
IL = interest and fees on loans. 
TL = total loans. 
IT = interest payment on time and saving deposits 
TS = time and saving deposits. 
SC = revenue from service charge on demand deposits. 
DD = demand deposits. 
CR(n) = n-firms concentration ratio 
H= Herfindahl index. 
N= Number of loans in the market. 
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5.3.1.1 Profitability, concentration, and market share 
To overcome the limitations of early studies Smirlock (1985) utilises profit rates and 
takes into account both market share and concentration. He suggests that market 
concentration is not a signal of collusive behaviour but rather of superiority of 
efficient leading firms in the industry. Accordingly, a positive coefficient of market 
share together with an insignificant coefficient for concentration indicates a support 
for the ES hypothesis. This is based on the notion that firms with high market share 
are more efficient and earn rents because of their efficiency, in contrast with the rest 
of firms. On the other hand, an insignificant coefficient for market share and a 
positive coefficient for concentration provide support for the structure performance 
hypothesis. In this case, rents reflected in higher profitability are the result of market 
concentration. The findings of Smirlock (1985) support the ES hypothesis reporting a 
positively significant market share variable and insignificant concentration variable. 
Other negative results for banking concentration are reported by Evanoff and Fortier 
(1988) who argue that the major linkage is between market share and profitability. 
Contrary to the above findings, Clark's (1986) results are highly supportive of the 
SCP model, with quantitatively a large and statistically significant estimated 
coefficient of market concentration. 
5.3.1.2 Deposit Rates, concentration and market share 
Despite the criticisms for having the interest rate as a measure of bank performance, a 
portion of more recent studies examine the SCP hypothesis in the retail deposit 
markets by utilising deposit rates interest [Berger and Hannan (1989,1992), Calera 
and Carlino (1991), Jackson (1992)]. For the structure performance hypothesis to 
hold a negative price-concentration relationship must exist, as prices employed in 
these tests are paid to consumers (instead of being paid by consumers). In the case of 
the efficient hypothesis, if banks in concentrated markets are more efficient on 
average in gathering deposits and transforming them into profitable investments, then 
a positive relationship between price and concentration must exist. The findings by 
Berger and Hannan (1989) and Calem and Carlino (1991) are strongly consistent with 
the implications of the SCP hypothesis. However, according to Berger and Hannan, 
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these price concentration results do not rule out the possibility that the efficient 
structure hypothesis also plays a role in the profit concentration relationship. 
Jackson (1992) employes the same data set as Berger and Hannah (1989) and finds 
that the sign and the significance of the estimated coefficient on the market structure 
variable, changed for different subsets of data. In the low concentration group the 
coefficient is found to be negative, large and significant, while for the middle 
concentration group it is small and insignificant. The estimated coefficient for the 
high concentration group is positive and significant. This, in turn, suggests that the 
price concentration relationship is not linear over the relevant range, and may be U- 
shaped. He concludes that results can not support the SCP. On the other hand, results 
could support the ES as high level of market concentration may signal the gaining of 
market share by most efficient firms. 
In their reply to Jackson (1992), Berger and Hannan (1992) utilise the same data set 
and find that, at least on average, the price concentration relationship for deposits is 
negative. Results suggest that the price concentration relationship varies over time and 
the argument that the relationship becomes positive at high levels of market 
concentration. 
5.3.1.3 Direct test for the SCP, RMP, ESX, and ESS 
All the aforementioned studies face a common limitation: the exclusion of direct 
measures of efficiency hypotheses in the performance equation. The exclusion of the 
efficiency variables generates several problems in estimating and interpreting the 
statistical results. First, no clear distinction can be made between various hypotheses. 
Some researchers argue that the common finding of a positive coefficient for market 
share and an insignificant coefficient for concentration provides justification for the 
acceptance of the relative market power hypothesis, which relates market share to 
market power. On the other hand, several authors consider this as an acceptance of 
either the ESX or the ESS hypothesis, because they relate the market power variable 
to the excluded efficiency variables. Further, a necessary condition for the efficiency 
hypotheses to hold is that efficiency is positively related to concentration and/or 
market share [Berger 1995a]. 
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In an attempt to overcome this problem, some later studies include a direct measure of 
efficiency in the profitability equation. Allen and Hagin (1989) develop a relative 
direct cost measure of scale economies to examine the hypothesis that market share 
increases profits through the benefits of scale economies. The results provide minor 
support in favour for the hypothesis. Berger (1991) enters the debate between market 
power and ES explanations of the profit-concentration relationship in banking, by 
adding direct measures of X-efficiency to the empirical analysis. Results are 
consistent with the X-efficiency version of the ES hypothesis and limited support is 
also found for two of the other hypotheses, SCP and RMP. However, none of the 
hypotheses tested appear to be of overwhelming importance in explaining bank 
profits. 
The major development in tests for the market structure and profit relationship 
emerges with the direct inclusion of structure and efficiency variables in the analysis. 
One of the first studies that includes both structure and efficiency variables in the tests 
is Berger and Hannan (1993). With the use of US data for the year 1985 they 
calculate direct efficiency measures in regressions of survey and profit data on market 
structure, they compare the results obtained from profit and survey data regressions, 
and analyse the effects of efficiency on market structure. From their results it is clear 
that the SCP is strongly supported by the data. In regressions explaining deposit and 
loan rates, the coefficients of concentration are both economically, and statistically 
significant and have the signs implied by the SCP hypothesis. Moreover, a negative 
relationship is found between X-efficiency and concentration, which supports the 
quiet life hypothesis, a supplement of the MP hypothesis. On the other hand, there is 
no support for the RMP hypothesis from the data. In most regressions the coefficient 
of the market share is either insignificant, or enters with the opposite sing to that 
predicted by the hypothesis. 
As far as the efficiency measures are concerned, results are somewhat mixed. Both 
scale and X-efficiency measures are found to be positively associated with 
profitability. However, they are not associated with more favourable prices for 
consumers, as would be expected. Although this is not a necessary condition for the 
hypothesis to hold, it raises certain doubts about the ES hypothesis. Moreover, the 
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data does not support a necessary condition for the hypothesis: the market structure 
variables are not consistently positively correlated with the efficiency measures. 
A later study by Berger (1995a) uses two profitability measures, return on assets and 
return on equity. As a concentration measure the Herfindahl index is applied and the 
distribution-free approach is utilised for calculating X-efficiency and scale efficiency. 
Finally, a set of control variables is used to account for differences across markets. 
Tests of the MP and ES hypotheses are performed by regressing profits against 
measures of concentration, market share, X-efficiency, and scale efficiency. The 
author also examines whether efficiency affects market structure, a necessary 
condition for the ES hypotheses. The findings provide support for the two of the four 
hypotheses. There exists a partial support for the ESX; however, the test for the 
necessary conditions for this hypothesis to be valid is very weak. The other 
hypothesis supported by the results is the RMP. After controlling for the effects of 
concentration and efficiency the market share variable is positively related to 
profitability in most cases. From the results there is no evidence of support for the 
SPC or the ESS hypotheses. Contrary to the above results, Berger (1997) employs 
the same methodology and finds support for the SCP hypothesis and its `quiet life 
addendum'. 
Berger and Hannan (1998) examine whether market power exercise by banks in 
concentrated markets allows them to avoid cost minimisation, as opposed to the 
traditional concern about concentration in product markets, which focuses on the 
social loss associated with mispricing. Using data from the entire US banking 
industry for 1988, they regress efficiency on concentration and a set of control 
variables to estimate the aggregate cost from concentration-induced losses in bank 
efficiency. This cost is compared to estimates of social loss associated with 
misallocation of resources from non-competitive pricing (traditionally measured by 
the welfare triangle). The findings suggest that the estimated efficiency cost of 
concentration is several times larger than the social loss from mispricing. 
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5.3.2 International and European Studies 
Most studies on market structure-performance relationship utilise data from the US 
market, and only a handful of papers employ data from other regions. The reason is 
the lack of publicly available regional banking market data. Therefore, as it is very 
difficult to obtain data on local banking markets, concentration ratios and individual 
market shares are calculated at a national level, as opposed to US banking studies. 
A study that examines the relationship between market structure and profitability at 
international level is Bourke (1989). He employes data from 12 countries or 
territories, 67 and utilises a single form model on data from 90 banks, for the period 
1972 to 1981. Based on previous literature he considers three different dependent 
variables, return on capital, return on assets, and a value-added return on total assets. 
68 
To account for concentration he estimates concentration ratio (CR3)69, while the set of 
control variables employed consists of internal and external determinants of bank 
profitability (staff expenses, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, government ownership, 
interest rates market growth, and inflation). His results support the view that 
concentration is positively and moderately related to profitability. Molyneux and 
Thorton (1992) replicate Bourke's methodology to evaluate the determinants of 
European banks' profitability. Their sample covers data from 18 European banks for 
the period 1986 to 198970, and the results obtained are in agreement with the SCP 
hypothesis. The findings also confirmed Bourke's results, apart from the relationship 
between government ownership and profitability, where in contrast to Bourke's 
estimates they find positive relationship. 
By utilisation of the same data set as in Molyneux and Thorton (1992), Molyneux and 
Forbes (1995) examine both the traditional SCP and the ES hypotheses. They 
estimate a profit equation with the use of return on assets, a ten-firm asset 
67 Countries and/or territories used: Australia, California, Massachusetts, New York, Canada, Germany, 
Ireland, England and Wales, Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Spain. 
68 Value added return on total assets: 1. the ratio of net income before taxes plus staff expenses to total 
assets, and 2. the ratio of net income before taxes plus staff expenses plus loan losses to total assets. 
This measure is used to capture the differences in accounting systems between countries. 
69 Concentration basis is taken as the share of the largest three banks of either total deposits or assets 
depending on data availability for each country. 
70 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweeden, Turkey, UK. 
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concentration ratio as a measure of market structure, and a firm specific share 
measure together with a vector of controlling variables to account for firm and market 
specific characteristics. The efficiency hypothesis is tested indirectly by the use of a 
market share variable, which should be greater than one, while the market structure 
variable should equal zero. Their results support the SCP hypothesis, with a 
significant and positive concentration ratio together with a negative and insignificant 
market share coefficient. Moreover, the capital asset ratio is always positive and 
significant, whereas the size variable is negative and statistically insignificant, 
pointing out that the size of a bank has no impact on profitability. Finally, they state 
that government owned banks are more profitable than privately owned ones. 
Lastly, Goldberg and Rai (1996) employ data for the largest European banks 
established in eleven countries7' for the years 1989 to 1992. They apply the same 
methodology as Berger (1995a). For measuring scale and X-efficiency they utilise the 
stochastic cost frontier. They use four measures of performance (return on assets and 
equity, and net interest margin on asset and equity), and two for concentration (three 
banks concentration, Herfindahl index). Finally, four control variables are employed. 
After dividing the sample between banks located in countries with high and low 
concentration, they conclude that there is evidence for the support X-efficiency 
hypothesis for banks located in low concentration countries. Finally, they state that 
results are very sensitive to the measure of performance used. 
5.3.3 A summary of the empirical literature 
It appears that results of empirical findings are mixed. Most early studies find a 
positive statistical relationship between market structure and measures of bank 
performance. However, due to the exclusion of a direct efficiency measure, their 
findings are interpreted differently. Further, each study includes different control 
variables. This, in turn, alters the statistical significance of the estimated regressions. 
What is clear from the literature is that little work is done outside the US market, and 
distinction between the four hypotheses is needed with the use of direct measures of 
both market structure and efficiency. In the current study the market structure-profit- 
7'UK, Germany, France, Swiss, Belgium, Finland, Austria, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, and Spain. 
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relationship is examined for the first time with the application of UK data, with direct 
measures for all the four hypotheses. 
5.4 Methodolou 
5.4.1 Outline of the models describing the hypotheses 
In this section we establish structural forms for efficient structure and the market 
power hypotheses to derive a single reduced-form model that includes all four 
hypotheses. Based on Berger (1995a) the structural model underlying the ESX and 
ESS is the following: 
r, =f (EFF, CVu'n)+E,. ',  
MS, = f2(EFFý, CV. m)+s , 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
CONm =f3 (MS; for all i in m) (5.5) 
where: 
Ir = profitability per unit of output, 
EFF = represents which ever efficiency concept is model, 
MSj = market share of bank i, 
CON. = concentration at market m, 
CV;.. =a set of control variables for i banks in market m, and 
s;,  = error term. 
Equation (5.3) suggests that profits differ due to variations created by efficiency. This, 
in turn, suggests that profit variations are generated by X-efficiency or scale 
efficiency, depending on whether the exact hypothesis is ESS or ESX. According to 
Berger (1995a) the positive relationship between profits and a measure of cost 
efficiency is a theory that could true or false, and should not be considered as an 
identity. Efficiency may not be related to profit if banks do not have systematic 
differences in costs or if these differences are offset by variations in revenues. 
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Equation (5.4) states that more efficient firms have higher market shares. This could 
occur for a number of reasons. First, if bank products within a local market are 
undifferentiated, each market may be in a competitive equilibrium with a common 
price equal to every bank's marginal cost. Hence, more efficient banks are larger and 
have greater market shares if they have lower marginal cost at every scale. Second, 
bank products may be differentiated by location, more efficient firms may set more 
favourable prices to consumers and, thus, attract customers from other locations. 
Lastly, larger efficiency of banks may result to a larger market share in equilibrium, 
due to past out-of-equilibrium behaviour, when more efficient firms gained share 
through price competition or through acquisition of less efficient banks. 
Identity (5.5) indicates that the concentration measure is a (deterministic) 
transformation f3 of market share into a concentration measure. This function is the 
same for all markets. Profitability and market structure are spuriously positively 
related because profit, concentration and market share are all positively related to 
efficiency. This can be seen from equations (5.3)-(5.5). Equation (5.3) states that 
more efficient firms have higher profitability; equation (5.4) asserts that more 
efficient firms have higher market share; where in identity (5.5) market share is 
positively related to concentration. 
Concerning the market power hypotheses (MP), SCP and RMP, they are given by the 
following structural model: 
"l =J4 (Zl CVtm) + eim (5.6) 
Zi = fs (MKTS1, CVlm) + slm (5.7) 
CONm=f3(MS, foralliinm) (5.5) 
where: 
Zt = is a vector of output prices, and 
MKTS = is a measure of market structure (concentration or market share, depending 
on the hypothesis tested). 
The rest of the variables are defined as before. 
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In equation (5.6), as opposed to equation (5.3), profits are determined by differences 
in prices charged to consumers instead of cost differences. This does not rule out the 
possibility that efficiency affects profits, since a model of non-competitive behaviour 
does not preclude cost efficiency differences from affecting performance. Instead, the 
influence of efficiency on profits is viewed as less important than the exogenous 
effects of market power. Consequently, the EFF variable may appear as part of the set 
of control variables. 
Equation (5.7) implies that prices charged to consumers are determined by market 
structure. Under the SCP hypothesis, the setting of prices is unfavourable to 
consumers under high degree of concentration, whereas under the RMP hypothesis, 
banks are able to exercise market power in pricing due to well-differentiated products 
brought about by advertising, location or other advantages; this results in a larger 
market share. Again, efficiency variables can affect market structure when included 
in the control variables, but their effect is assumed to be small. 
The model of the MP hypothesis produces a spuriously positive relation between 
profit and market structure because concentration and market share are positively 
correlated by equation (5.6). 
Most of the previous literature did not consider a direct measure of efficiency. Instead 
they estimated the following regression: 
; ri =ao +a, CON. +a2MS, +a3_nCVim +Cim (5.8) 
In equation (5.8) the variable MS is considered as indicator for testing the RMP and 
the ES hypotheses. Concerning the RMP hypothesis, MS represents the market power 
of banks. When results generate a small and statistically insignificant coefficient of 
concentration, then profit and concentration are only spuriously related because both 
variables are correlated with the market share. Once the market share enters the 
equation, this relationship disappears. As far as the ES hypotheses are concerned, 
again they are tested through the MS variable based on the view that more efficient 
firms have greater market power. Support of the ES hypotheses comes from the 
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notion that concentration and profitability are only related, because they are both 
correlated with efficiency. Once the MS (which in the current case is a representative 
of efficiency) enters the equation, this relationship disappears. To overcome this 
problem, the following equation is estimated, which includes a direct measure of all 
hypotheses, i. e.: 
, 
(5.9) ýc; = f6(CONm, MS1, X-EFF,, S-EFFI, CV; m)+s7 
where: 
;r= profitability per unit of output, 
X-EFF1 = X-efficiency for firm i, 
S-EFF, = scale efficiency for firm i 
MS, = market share of bank i, 
CON, = concentration at market m, 
CV, "m =a set of control variables for i banks in market m, and 
£im = error term. 
The reduced form equation (5.9) allows all four hypotheses to be valid 
simultaneously, where some of the explanatory variables become insignificant for 
some of the hypotheses. Under the ES hypothesis the coefficient of the appropriate 
efficiency variable is positive, whereas the coefficients of all other variables are either 
relatively small or zero. Under this hypothesis the zero coefficients of market share 
and concentration indicate that market structure has no direct effect on price and 
profit. Further, by utilising a model that directly incorporates efficiency, we assume 
that prices are set competitively and efficiency is strictly a function of lower cost with 
banks operating at efficient scale levels [Berger and Hannan (1993)). Moreover, 
conditional on efficiency, market share and concentration are not related to profits. 
This is based on the notion that they are correlated with profits only because they 
reflect the effect of the control and efficiency hypotheses variables. 
However, there are important limitations in the reduced form equation (5.9). It only 
tests one of the necessary conditions of the ES hypotheses. A positive relationship 
between efficiency and both profit and market structure variables must exist to 
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explain the spurious profit structure relation. The following two equations are also 
tested to ensure that the necessary conditions hold. We estimate the following 
reduced form of concentration and market share from the ES model: 
MS; = f7(X-EFFI, S-EFFF, CV; ')+s.,  (5.10) 
CON, 
 = 
f8(X-EFFi, S-EFF, CV; )+ei (5.11) 
Under the ESS more efficient banks gain dominant market shares, as in (5.10). 
Further, following (5.11) efficient firms would be more often in concentrated markets 
since the large market shares create market concentration. The statistical significance 
of this positive relationship between market structure and efficiency will verify that 
more efficient firms have higher market share and cause concentration. 
Under the MP hypotheses, market structure variables (concentration or market share) 
have a positive relationship with profits, whereas the rest of the coefficients will equal 
zero. When the RMP holds, the coefficient of concentration is zero because it is only 
related to profits through its correlation with the market share. When the SCP holds, 
concentration has a positive coefficient. The efficiency variables are appropriate 
exogenous variables, but are just viewed as relatively unimportant. Other critical 
differences from the ES model is the absence of a hypothesised positive causal 
relationship running from efficiency to market structure variables, as expressed by 
equations (5.10) and (5.11). According to Berger and Hannan (1993), and Berger 
(1995a, 1997) one can form the following `reverse causation' model from market 
structure to efficiency, although it is not usually a part of the market power 
hypothesis: 
X- EFF, = .f9 
(CON., MSt. CVrm) + 6%n (5.12) 
S-EFF = f10(CON., MS,, CVii, '°)+s;, ° 
(5.13) 
Equations (5.12) and (5.13) embody a version of Hicks' (1935) `quiet life' hypothesis 
in which firms with greater market power may take part of the gains from non- 
competitive pricing not as profits, but as a more relaxed environment in which less 
effort is put on maximising cost efficiency. If the `quiet life' life hypothesis holds, it 
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tends to offset the positive profit-structure relationship, since gains from pricing are 
partially offset by cost increases from poorer efficiency ratios. 
5.4.2 Description of the efficiency measures 
A detailed analysis of the scale and X-efficiency measures is given in Chapter 3 and 
4, respectively. In this section we briefly sketch efficiency estimation. X-efficiency 
provides a measure of how effectively banks use their inputs to produce a given level 
of output. As already mentioned, the most important difficulty in estimating X- 
efficiency is to isolate inefficiency differences from differences due to random error 
that temporarily alter costs. To distinguish between the two, in the current study we 
use the stochastic econometric frontier approach. The key to this approach is the two- 
part composed error term, where one part represents inefficiencies and the other part 
for statistical noise. These two components are separated by assuming that 
inefficiencies are drawn from a one-sided distribution (usually the half-normal) and 
random fluctuations are drawn from a symmetric distribution (usually the normal). 
The logic is that inefficiencies must have a truncated distribution, because they only 
increase costs above frontier levels, while random noise can either decrease or 
increase costs. 
The cost equation estimated for each year is specified as follows: 
1nTC, =1n C(Y,, w, ) + In u, + In v, (5.14) 
where: 
w; = price of inputs for the bank i, 
y= outputs for the bank i, 
TC = total cost for the bank i, 
v; = random error, 
ui = inefficiencies, and 
C(y, w) = is a cost function with output quantity vectory and input price vector w. 
Equation 5.14 is estimated for each year by use of a translog specification. As in 
equation (5.14), u; measures inefficiencies in the empirical test we substitute X-EFF 
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defined in equation (5.9), that captures the X-efficiency level of each bank, with the 
X-INEFF inefficiency variable[see Goldberg and Rai (1996)]. The estimate X- 
INEFF, derived from the stochastic cost frontier, represents an inefficiency measure 
for each bank. As a result, the coefficient of X-INEFF in the regression of the 
efficient structure hypothesis will have the opposite sign from X-EFF specified in 
equations (5.9), (5.10), and (5.11). Hence, when the predicted sign of the coefficient 
of X-INEFF is negative, this implies that the lower the inefficiency the higher the 
profits. To test the validity of the results in different efficiency measures, we utilise 
two different measures both based on the stochastic frontier approach. The X- 
INEFF1 is based on the assumption that inefficiencies are half-normally distributed, 
whereas X-INEFF2 assumes that inefficiencies follow an exponential distribution. 
Scale efficiency indicates whether banks with similar production and management 
technology operate at optimal economies of scale. Economies of scale are computed 
from the parameters of a system of equations consisting of the cost function (5.14) 
and the input share equation. The scale measure is given by the sum of the first-order 
partial derivatives of the estimated cost function, i. e.: 
SE=5°1nTC 
k=, ö1nYk 
(5.15) 
The aforementioned scale measure is estimated for each bank at its respective level of 
output, for each year. When SE < 1, banks operate below optimal scale level and 
have the ability to lower costs by increasing output further. When SE > 1, banks are 
required to downsize to achieve optimal input combinations. Because both SE >1 and 
SE <1 imply inefficiencies, a measure of inefficiency, S-INEFF, is used in the actual 
regression [see Goldberg and Rai (1996)], i. e.: 
S-INEFF = SE -1 when SE >1, 
and 
S-INEFF =1-SE when SE < 1. 
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Again, the sign of the coefficient will be opposite to that predicted in equation (5.9), 
i. e. a negative sign. Consequently, the further the bank is from its efficient scale, the 
lower the profitability. This measure assumes that as banks deviate from the efficient 
scale the impact of efficiency is similar, i. e. banks' profitability increases 
monotonically whether they are downsizing or increasing in size towards the optimal 
scale [see Goldberg and Rai (1996)]. 
5.5 Data and Variables 
The data employed is the same as the previous chapters (for a detail analysis on the 
data, see Chapter 2). To estimate the market concentration and the market share of 
each individual bank for each year, total indices are required, i. e. the total market 
deposits, collected from the annual financial statistics. 
As far as the rest of the variables are concerned, a brief description is given below. 
To measure bank performance, two profitability ratios are used: the return on assets 
(ROA) and the return on equity (ROE). Return on assets is the ratio of net income 
divided by total assets and measures the efficiency of total assets employed by a firm. 
Return on equity is the ratio of net income to shareholders' equity, and appraises the 
efficiency of common shareholders' equity utilised by the firm. 2 
To estimate the market concentration, the concentration ratio is applied. The three- 
bank concentration ratio (CR3) is defined as the ratio of total deposits of the three 
largest banks to the total deposits of the UK banks. To measure the market share 
(MS) of each bank, we calculate the proportion of each individual bank's deposit in 
total market deposit. 
For efficiency variables there are to separate measures. The first one concerns the X- 
efficiency (X-EFF) variable. As mentioned in the Chapter 4, X-efficiency indicates 
how effectively banks use their inputs to produce a given set of outputs, i. e. the ability 
of bank managers to maximise revenue or minimise cost. Due to the variations of 
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cost frontiers from bank to bank, we need to estimate a stochastic cost function. Here 
the stochastic econometric frontier is applied, where the methodology and the data 
used are described in Chapter 4. The findings from the estimated cost frontier 
indicate the deviations from the efficient frontier. Accordingly, the X-EFF variable is 
replaced by X-INEFF. Consequently, the X-inefficiency variable will have a negative 
relationship with profit, i. e. increases in X-inefficiency will decrease profits. 
Next, we need a measure for scale efficiency (S-EFF). This indicates whether banks 
with similar production and technologies operate at optimal economies of scale. 
Economies of scale imply the decline of cost when output increases. The 
methodology and the data used in estimating this variable is described in Chapter 3. 
When the estimate of S-EFF is greater than zero, banks have to lower production to 
achieve the optimum level of output. When S-EFF is lower than zero, banks have to 
increase production to achieve the optimum level of output. As this measure indicates 
inefficiencies, so S-EFF will be replaced with S-INEFF, which has a negative 
relationship with profitability. 
Finally there is a set of three control variables. The first one is the size variable 
(LTA), represented by the logarithm of total assets of each individual bank to control 
for differences in size and to capture the ability of banks to diversify [Mester (1996)]. 
A positive relationship with profits exists if there are positive economies of scale, 
while there is a negative relationship if diversification leads to lower risk, and 
consequently, lower returns. 
The second one is a risk measure (RISK), given by the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. A high risk ratio suggests less capital and higher leverage. This, is turn, 
results to high borrowing cost and hence to lower profitability. On the other hand, a 
lower risk ratio will result in higher profitability. Consequently, the coefficient of this 
variable can be either positive or negative. 
The last control variable (WAGES) and accounts for the employees' cost. This is 
used to capture the effect of wages and in turn of operating cost, on profits. It is 
72These are the most commonly used profitability measures in previous literature [see Molyneux et 
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expected to have a negative relationship with profits, especially in the case where the 
ES hypotheses are tested because higher costs represent lower efficiency levels. This 
variable is measured as the ratio of total wages and salaries to the number of 
employees. 
5.6 Empirical estimation 
The current study includes in the examination of the market performance hypothesis, 
direct measures of the ES hypothesis. For X-inefficiency two different variables are 
considered: the first variable is calculated based on the assumption of half-normal 
distribution (X-INEFFI) Model I, while the second is calculated based on the 
assumption of exponential distribution of X-inefficiency (X-INEFF2) Model IT Two 
measures are considered to test the robustness of the results to different estimates. 
The empirical analysis focuses on the estimates of equations (5.9) to (5.13). Tables 5- 
3 and 5-4 provide the results from the estimation of the reduced form equation (5.9) 
using as a dependent variable ROA and ROE, respectively. However, before 
estimating (5.9), equation (5.8) is first estimated for both ROA and ROE to test the 
effect of the exclusion of efficiency variables on the regressions. Further, this 
replicates the current literature that finds MS to dominate the CONC and interprets 
this as a support for all hypotheses, except of the SCP. 
The findings from these estimates are presented in Table 5-2. Tables 5-5 and 5-6 
present the empirical results of estimating equations (5.10) and (5.11), while Table 5- 
7 displays the results of equations (5.12) and (5.13). 
For each year we examine separate cross-section regressions and the efficiency and 
profitability measures to provide, first, a comprehensive treatment of the industry, 
and, second, to determine whether the results are stable over time and robust to 
measures selected. Similarly to many of the previous studies, the results are not 
unambiguous. As can be seen from Tables 5-3 and 5-5, ROA and ROE provide 
aL(1996)] 
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different results for most of the years. For example, with ROE as the dependent 
variable, for the 1994 data, none of the hypotheses seem to be valid. However, when 
ROA is the dependent variable, the concentration variable is found to be positively 
statistically significant, and hence the SCP hypothesis is accepted. Results are also 
sensitive to the measure of X-efficiency used. Although some hypotheses are 
accepted when equation (5.9) is used, when the additional conditions are tested the 
results change. Last but not least the results are unstable over time. Details of the test 
are presented below. First, we consider the results from estimating equation (5.8), 
presented in Table 5-2. 
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Table 5-2: Regressions of ROA and ROE on Concentration, Market Share, and other 
control variables. 
Year Variable CONC MS LTA WAGES RISK R2 
ROA -0.123 -0.113 0.005 -0.1 E-4 0.007 0.15 
1995 (0.11) (0.19) (0.01) (0.2E-3) (0.003) 
ROE -0.846 -0.497 0.042 -0.005 0.063 0.44 
(0.49)* (0.85) (0.02)* (0.002) (0.01) 
ROA 0.112 -0.039 0.002 -0.1E-3 -0.098 0.29 
1994 
.... 
(0.027)* (0.04) (0.001)* (0.6E-4) (0.02)* 
ROE -0.375 -0.397 0.078 -0.002 -0.741 0.22 
(0.62) (095) (0.03)* (0.001) (0.53) 
ROA 0.061 -0.065 0.003 0.2E-4 -0.091 0.08 
1993 (0.05) (0.08) (0.002) (0.1 E-3) (0.04)* 
ROE -0.951 -1.012 0.086 0.3E-3 -0.551 0.23 
(0.44)* (0.72)-- 
- 
(0.02)* (0.001) (0.38) 
ROA -0.021 0.013 
_ 0.6E-3 -- 0.3E-4 0.001 0.01 
1992 
..... 
(0.10) (0.16) (0.01) (0.3E-3) (0.01) 
ROE -1.564 1.391 0.035 0.003 0.070 0.01 
(1.10) (8.39) (0.25) (0.01) c0.33) 
ROA 0.068 0.068 0.002 -0.6E-4 -0.088 0.03 
1991 (0.08) (0.08) (0.003) (0.3E-3) (0.06) 
ROE -0.061 -0.035 0.057 0.2E-3 -0.916 0.03 
(1.11) (0.2_1) (O . 05) (0.004) (0.91) ROA __ -0.125 
_ _ 
-0.056 
____ _ ____ 0.002 -0.3E-4 0.085 0.08 
1990 (0.06)* (0.10)* (0.003) (0.2E-3) (0.06) 
ROE -0.909 -0.778 0.033 0.7E-3 0.334 0.09 
(0.44)*__ 
_ 
(0.68) (0.02) (0.001) (0.41) 
ROA 0.198 -0.071 0.005 -0.1E-3 -0.234 0.20 
1989 (0.07)* (0.09) (0.004) (0.2E-3) (0.07)* 
ROE 0.366 -1.181 0.071 -0.001 -1.314 0.11 
(0.59) (0.81) (0.03)* (0.001) (0.59)* 
ROA 0.136 0.087 -0.004 -0.1E-3 -0.044 0.33 
1988 (0.02)* (0.04)* (0.001)* (0.9E-4)* (0.02)* 
ROE 0.195 0.717 -0.025 -0.001 0.353 0.15 
(0.24) (0.35)* (0.01)* (0.8E-3)* (0.21)* 
ROA 0.194 -0.056 0.003 -0.2E-3 -0.201 0.24 
1987 (0.06)* (0.06) (0.002) (0.2E-3) (0.06)* 
ROE 1.135 -1.492 0.089 -0.002 -2.233 0.15 
(1.00)- 
- --(1.03)-- 
(0.03)* (0.003) (0.99)* 
ROA 0.128 0.044 -0.003 -0.2E-3 -0.054 0.39 
1986 (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.001)* (0.3E-3) (0.01)* 
ROE 0.393 0.185 0.024 -0.002 -0.53 ; 0.22 
(0.34) (0.48) (0.01) (0.001) (0.20)* 
1985 ROA 0.079 0.037 -0.003 -0.1 F-3 -0.016 0.37 
(0.02)* (0.02)* (0.9E-3)* (0.71? -4)* (0.01) 
ROE 0.168 0.072 0.8E-3 -0.11; -2 -0.035 0.10 
x. 13) 
- 
(0.17) 1 (0.5E-3) (0.07) 
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1984 ROA 0.129 0.021 -0.002 -0.1E-3 -0.087 0.41 
(0.02)* (0.02) (0.001)* (0.7E-4) (0.03)* 
ROE 0.045 0.131 -0.016 -0.7E-3 0.342 0.02 
(0.35) (0.37) (0.02) (0.001) (0.41) 
1983 ROA 0.164 0.015 -0.9E-3 -0.8E-4 -0.114 0.45 
(0.02)* (0.03) 0.001 (0.7E-4) (0.02)* 
ROE 0.623 -0.075 0.018 -0.5E-3 -0.681 0.04 
0.53 (0.55) (0.02) (0.002) (0.54) 
1982 ROA 0.081 0.044 -0.004 -0.1E-3 -0.083 0.30 
(0.01)* (0.02)* (0.9E-3)* (0.6E-4)* (0.10) 
ROE 0.287 0.196 -0.007 -0.001 0.007 0.08 
(0.13)* (0.19) (0.01) (0.6E-3) (0.08) 
1981 ROA 4.751 4.286 -0.271 0.013 -0.551 0.09 
(2.47)* (3.40) 0.14)* 0.01 (1.32) 
ROE 2.598 2.449 -1.498 0.073 -2.845 0.09 
(1.38)* (1.89) (0.78)* 0.06 2.36) 
Notes: Standard errors in the parenthesis/* denotes significance at 5%. 
From Table 5-2, out of 30 regressions the CONC coefficients is 17 times significant, 
out of which 12 times positively significant, constituting a partial support for the SCP 
hypothesis, over the period. On the other hand, the MS coefficients are negative in 
thirteen cases, and only five times positive and statistically significant. The results 
here provide a partial support for the SCP hypothesis, and no evidence for the 
acceptance of RMP hypothesis. 
Focusing next on cases where the market structure variables are positively significant, 
we observe that results are more stable mostly for the concentration variable during 
1980s. With the use of ROA as the profit variable the CONC is positive statistically 
significant supporting the SCP hypothesis in nine cases. These findings reflect a 
setting of prices in more concentrated markets less favourable to consumers due to 
greater market power. This is the case for years 1981 to 1989, and 1994. Hence it is 
clear that throughout the 1980s the SCP hypothesis has been dominant in the banking 
industry. In the case of the ROE, SCP is accepted only for 1981 and 1982. This, in 
turn, suggests that the findings are subject to the choice of profit measurement. 
Considering now the control variables, again their signs are somewhat mixed 
throughout the time period. LTA (size variable) is twelve times statistically 
significant suggesting that size has an effect on profit. However, as can be seen from 
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Table 5-2 coefficients signs are not fixed. By definition, a positive relationship with 
profits indicates positive economies of scale, while a negative relationship shows that 
diversification leads to lower risk, and consequently, lower returns. During the first 
decade, in most of the case the size variable has a negative coefficient, suggesting that 
the larger banks experience lower profits. Towards the end of the decade and until 
mid 1990s the coefficients become positive, indicating that banks started to benefit 
from their size, and earn profits. This maybe partly due to the changes in the business 
conditions that occurred during that period. Next, the control variable that accounts 
for the cost of the employees is found insignificant, whereas in three times when it is 
significant it has a negative sign, suggesting that higher employment cost result in 
lower profits. Last, a high risk (RISK) ratio suggests less capital and high leverage. 
This, in turn, results to high borrowing cost and hence to lower profitability. On the 
other hand, a lower risk ratio will result in higher profitability. Indeed, the coefficient 
is found to significantly negative in 11 times, and only once significantly positive, 
indicating that banks in the sample have high borrowing costs. The results reported in 
Table 5-2 are in line with the early literature that finds some evidence of significant 
association between the market structure and measures of bank performance with the 
direction of influence of the market structure as indicated by the SCP hypothesis [e. g. 
Rhoades and Rutz (1979), Glassman and Rhoades (1980), Rhoades and Rutz (1982) 
Rhoades (1982a), Marlow (1982)]. 
To have more definitive results next we considered the results from the reduced form 
profit equation for each year. Equation (5.9) incorporates the reduced form of all four 
hypotheses, and each coefficient gives the marginal effect of each hypothesis on 
profitability. The findings are presented in Tables 5-3 and 5-4. 
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Table 5-3: Regressions of ROA and ROE on Concentration, Market Share, Efficiency 
and other control variables - Model I. 
Yr. Var. CONC MS X- S- LTA WAGT RISK 1t' 
INEFFI INEFF 
ROA -0.092 -0.114 0.089 -0.079 0.003 0.31; -3 6E-3 0.19 
1995 (0.13).... (0.19) (0.07) (0.09) (0.01) 1 (61? -4) (21; -3)* 
ROE -0.719 -0.503 0.724 -0.45 0.028 0.9I: -3 0.058 0.50 
(0.54) (0.82) (0.31)* (0.31) (0.02) (0.003) (0. O1) 
ROA 0.129 _ -0.016 0.025 -0.041 0.001 0.21; -3 -0.089 0.35 
1994 
, 
(0.03)* (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)* (0.001) (2E-4) (0.02)* 
ROE 0.042 -0.556 -0.604 -0.122 0.083 -0.001 -0.933 0 25 
(0.79) (0.98) 
_(0.45) 
(0.56 (0.03)* (0.01) (0.55)* 
ROA 0.063 -0.065 -0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.41.; -4 -0.092 0.08 
1993 (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.003) (1 F-4) (0.04)* 
ROE 0.917 -1.037 -0.029 -0.112 0.086 0.7F-3 -0.562 0.23 
(0.45)* (0.73) 0.24) 
- 
(0.21)-- (0.03)* J0.001) (0.39) 
ROA -0.034 0.017 -0.017 0.030 0.7E-3 -0.3E-4 0.001 0.02 
1992 (0.10) (0.16) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.31? -3) (0.01) 
ROE -1.902 2.460 1.222 0.769 0.007 0.001 0.082 0.01 
(5.23) (8.69) (3.15) (1.98) (0.26) (0.01) (0.33) 
ROA 0.058 -0.006 0.013 -0.019 0.003 -0.1E-4 -0.078 0.05 
1991 (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.003) (0.3E-3) (0.06) 
ROE 0.925 -0.031 -1.130 -0.189 0.061 0.8E-3 -1.301 0.14 
(0.14)_ (0.21) (0.47)* (0.25) (0.05) (0.003) (0.89) 
ROA -0.141 -0.052 0.035 0.009 0.9E-3 -0.5E-4 0.099 0.09 
1990 (0.07)* (0.10) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.2E-3) (0.06) 
ROE -0.889 -0.633 0.040 -0.127 0.034 0.001 0.335 0.15 
(0.47)* (0.70) (0.38) (0.10) (0.03) (0.001) (0.43) 
ROA 0.195 -0.056 0.046 -0.008 0.004 -0.71i-4 -0.227 0.20 
1989 (0.07)* (0.10) ( (0.003) (0.00 (0.2E-3) (0.07) 
ROE 0.418 113... 
87 
-0.0 -0.056 0 . 
06) 0.91.3 -1.291 0.11 
(0.62) (0.84) (0.71) (0.14) (0.03)* (0.002) (0.59)* 
ROA 0.138 0.088 0.002 0.005 -0.004 -0.1 E-3 -0.048 0.34 
1988 (0.03)* (0.03)* (0.03) (0.01) (0.001)* 0.9E-4 (0.02)* 
ROE 0.227 0.711 -0.062 0.056 -0.025 -0.001 0.31 0.17 
(0.24) (0.35)* (0.26) (0.06) (0.01)* (0.91: -3) (0.22) 
ROA 0.194 -0.058 -0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.2F-3 -0.201 0.24 
1987 (0.06)* (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.2E-3) (0.05)* 
ROE 1.106 -1.495 -0.7E-3 -0.077 0.089 -0.001 -2.166 0.13 
(1.01) (1.06) (0.17) 
- 
(0.18) (0.04)* (0.002) (1.02)* 
ROA 0.121 0.043 0.003 0.006 -0.003 -0.21`1-3 -0.052 0.40 
1986 (0.03)* (0.02)* (0.01) (0.01) (0.001)* (0.1 F-3)* (0.01)* 
............ ROE 0.421 0.176 -0.035 -0.022 0.024 -0.001 -0.539 0.23 
(0.36) (0.49) (0.10) (0.09) (0.02) (0.001) (0.20) 
1985 ROA 0.081 0.038 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.1E-3 -0.016 ! 0.33 
(0.02)* (0.02)* (0.01) (0.01) (0.001)* (0.71, -4)* (0.01) 
ROE 0.167 0.048 0.074 -0.017 OAF-3 -0.001 -0.043 0.18 
(0.12) (0.17) (0.03)* ! (0.03) 1 (0.01) (0.51: -3)* (0.07) 
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1984 ROA 0.120 0.017 -0.004 0.005 -0.002 -0.1E-3 -0.081 0.42 
(0.02)* (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002)* 0.8E-4 (0.02)* 
ROE 0.002 0.098 -0.087 0.019 -0.015 -0.9E-3 0.396 0.03 
(0.384) (0.37) (0.12) (0.08) (0.01) (0.001) (0.43) 
1983 ROA 0.163 0.015 0.6E-3 0.3E-3 -0.9E-3 -0.8E-4 -0.114 0.44 
(0.03)* (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001) 0.7E-4 (0.02)* 
ROE 0.524 -0.044 0.101 0.007 0.019 -0.5E-3 -0.636 0.05 
(0.57) (0.56) (0.10) (0.109) (0.02) (0.001) (0.56) 
1982 ROA 0.083 0.046 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.1E-3 -0.009 0.31 
(0.01)* (0.02)* (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)* (0.7E-4)* (0.01) 
ROE 0.325 0.199 -0.012 -0.036 -0.008 -0.96E-3 0.2E-3 0.09 
(0.15)* (0.19) (0.11) (0.04) (0.01) (0.6E-3) (0.08) 
1981 ROA 3.360 4.10 1.901 1.273 -0.231 0.009 -0.774 0.15 
(2.02)* (3.40) (1.80) (0.88) (0.15) (0.01) (1.32) 
ROE 1.877 2.354 1.032 0.68 -1.287 0.05 -0.405 0.14 
(1.44) (1.89) (1.00) 0.49 (0.81) (0.06) 0.73 
Notes: Standard errors in the parenthesis/* denotes significance at 5%. 
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Table 5-4: Regressions of ROA and ROE on Concentration, Market Share, Efliciency 
and other control variables - Model R. 
Yr. Var. CONC MS X- S- 1JA WAGE RISK R2 
INEFF2 INEFF 
ROA -0.071 -0.118 0.010 -0.078 0.003 0.4E-3 0.006 0.17 
1995 (0.13) 
_ 
( 
...... 
.. 09) (0.10) (0.01) (0.71', -3) (0.003 )* 
ROE -0.606 0.618 354 -0.526 0.028 0.002 0.058 0.24 
(0.56) 0.86 
. 
. 41) (0.43) (0.02) (0.003) (0.012)* 
ROA 0.142 -0.026 008 -0.043 0.001 0.2E-3 -0.098 0.34 
1994 ( 
.. 
(0.02)*....... 
... 
(0.001. ) 
. 
(0.2E-3) (0.02)* 
ROE -0.317 -0.371 -0.007 -0.075 0.076 -0.001 -0.738 0.22 
(0.76) (099) (0.22) 0.56) 
. . 
(0.03)* (0.01) (0.54) 
ROA 0.069 -0.070 -0.017 -0.003 0.004 0.4E-4 -0.098 0.08 
1993 (0.05) 
.. _ ....... ... _(0.08) 
(0.03) 
. _. _ .. 
(0.02) 
_ 
(0.2E-3) 
.. (0.05) 
ROE -0.824 -1.103 -0.223 -0.113 0.090 0.8E-3 -0.644 0.24 
(0.471__ 
_(0.73) 
(0.27)_ (0.21) ( 
-- -(0.001) 
(0.40)- 
--- ROA 0.056 -0.002 -0.249 -0.054 -0.5E-3 -0.5E-4 
. 
. . 6E-4 
0.53 
1992 
. 
(0.11) (0.03)* (0.02)* (0.003) (0.2 E-3) 
... 
(0.01) 
2.665 0.449 -13.112 -2.479 -0.020 -0.61E-3 0.016 0.51 
(3.76) (6.06) (1.80)* (1.33)* (0.18) (0.01) (0.23) 
ROA 0.053 -0.005 0.028 -0.020 0.002 0.51; -5 -0.072 0.06 
1991 (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) 
... 
(0.02) (0.004) (0.3E-3) (0.07) 
ROE 0.428 -0.121 -0.872 -0.205 0.076 0.3E-3 -1.226 0.09 
(1.13) (0.22) (0.43)* (0.26) (0.05) (0.003) (0.93) 
RDA -0.141 -0.053 0.025 0.010 0.001 -0.5E-4 0.099 0.09 
1990 
........ 
(0.07)* (0.10) (0.03) (0.01) (0.004) (0.11: -3) (0.06) 
ROE -0.871 -0.65 -0.001 -0.126 0.036 0.001 0.320 0.12 
(0.46)* (0.70) (0.22) (0.10) (0.03) (0.001) (0.42) 
ROA 0.198 -0.055 0.067 -0.008 0.004 -0.71? -4 -0.228 0.21 
1989 (0.07)* (0.10) (0.12) 
........ 
(0.02) (0.004) (0.2E-3) (0.07)* 
ROE 0.413 -1.133 -0.023 -0.060 0.069 -0.9E-3 -1.289 0.11 
(0.62) (0.85) (1.05) (0.14) (0.03)* (0.002) (0.60)* 
ROA 0.138 0.088 0.002 0.005 -0.004 -0.1F-3 -0.048 0.34 
1988 (0.03)* (0.04)* (0.02) (0.01) (0.001)* (0.911-4) (0.02)* 
ROE 0.227 0.695 -0.193 0.061 -0.025 -0.001 0 0.18 
(0.24)--- 
-(-0. -35)*___ __(0.24-)-- --(0.06) 
(0.01)* (0.9I? -3)* (0.22) 
ROA 0.192 -0.061 -0.006 0.8E-3 0.003 -0.211-3 -0,197 0.25 
1987 (0.06)* (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.211-3) (0.06)* 
ROE 0.991 -1.689 -0.258 -0.122 0.089 -0.002 -1.947 0.18 
- 
(0.99) (1.03) (0.18) (0.04)* (0.003) (0.99)* 
ROA 0.122 0.040 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.211-3 -0.051 0.40 
1986 ( 0.03)* (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001)* (0.11; -3)* (0.01)* .......... ROE .. 0.409 0.179 -0.020 -0.016 0.024 
-0.002 
-0.537 0.22 
(0.36) (0.50) (0.10) (0.09) (0.02) (0.002) (0.20)* 
1985 ROA 0.081 0.040 0.5E-3 -0.003 -0.003 -0.2E-3 -0.016 0.28 
(0.01)* (0.02)* (0.01) (0.01) (0.001)* (0.71? -4)* (0.01) 
ROE 0.190 0.089 0.056 -0.016 -0.001 
-0.001 -0.037 0.15 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.001) (0.07) 
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1984 ROA 0.121 0.019 0.47E-3 0.005 0.020 -0.1E-3 -0.083 0.42 
(0.03)* (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.8E-4) (0.03)* 
ROE 0.002 0.097 -0.059 -0.002 -0.014 -0.8E-3 0.378 0.03 
(0.39) (0.38) (0.12) (0.001)* (0.02) (0.001) (0.43) 
1983 ROA 0.163 0.015 -0.3E-3 0.4E-3 -0.9E-3 -0.8E-4 -0.114 0.44 
(0.03)* (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.001) (0.7E-4) (0.02)* 
ROE 0.575 -0.052 0.058 0.004 0.018 -0.5E-3 -0.655 0.04 
(0.57) (0.56) (0.09) (0.11) (0.02) (0.002) (0.56) 
1982 ROA 0.084 0.045 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.13E-3 -0.009 0.30 
(0.02)* (0.02)* (0.01) (0.01) (0.001)* (0.7E4)* (0.01) 
ROE 0.326 0.185 -0.078 -0.038 -0.007 -0.001 0.006 0.11 
(0.14)* (0.19) (0.09) (0.04) (0.01) (0.6E-3)* (0.09) 
1981 ROA 3.780 4.582 1.802 1.308 -0.255 0.009 -0.776 0.15 
(2.10)* (3.44) (1.49) (0.88) (0.14)* (0.011) (1.31) 
ROE 2.111 2.627 1.006 0.700 -1.42 0.049 -0.410 0.15 
(1.45) (1.91) (0.83) (0.49) (0.82)* 0.06 0.73 
Notes: Standard errors in the parenthesis/* denotes significance at 5%. 
When all variables are included in the profit equation, from Table 5-3 and 5-4, we 
observe that the CONC has forty-two positive coefficients with twenty-four of them 
statistically significant. On the other hand, the MS coefficients are twenty-nine times 
positive from of which nine are statistically significant. With regards to the ES 
hypothesis out of sixty cases, X-INEFF is thirty-one times positive, statistically 
significant only in five cases, while S-INEFF is twenty-four times positive, but again 
only in five cases significant. On average the CONC and MS coefficients do not 
change in a meaningful way when the ES variables are added to the regressions. 
Furthermore the preceding results suggest that the MS coefficients in the commonly 
specified equation without the efficiency variables do not reflect the effects of 
efficiency. 
From the findings there is some uncertainty as to the quantitative and qualitative 
importance of the inclusion of the efficiency variables. Contrary with the results of 
Berger (1995a, 1997) but consistent with Berger and Hannan (1993), the inclusion of 
the efficiency variables does not alter significantly the R2 of the regressions, where in 
most case increases by a very small percentage or remains the same. In any case, the 
small R2s are persistent in the profit-structure relation literature [see Table 5-1]. 
Apparently this suggest that the variation in profits is due to other factors as well, 
such as portfolio choices and regulatory changes and not only in the structure of the 
industry. 
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Furthermore, in most of the years the efficiency variables are found insignificant or 
with the wrong sign. Consistently with the results for European studies [Molyneux 
and Thorton (1992) and Molyneux and Forbes (1995)] it is clear that in most years the 
dominant hypothesis is the traditional SCP. This suggests that the structure of the 
European banking system is different from the US, since in Europe the market tends 
to be more concentrated, dominated by large multi-branch universal banks. The 
findings further indicate that banks earn higher profits due to competitive 
imperfections in the market resulting from the oligopolistic structure of the industry. 
Focusing now in each year separately, starting with 1981, when the ROA is 
considered as the dependent variable there exists a support for the SCP hypothesis, 
with the CONC variable positive and statistically significant for all X-efficiency 
measures. In both cases, all the other variables are found to be statistically 
insignificant with an exception of the size variable in Model II which becomes 
significant. Comparing these results with previous estimates (Table 5-2) we can see 
that they are consistent, i. e. they still support the SCP hypothesis, but there is 5% 
increase in the R2. Proceeding with the estimates from the ROE, when the direct 
measures of the ES hypotheses are included in the equations, the CONC becomes 
statistically insignificant. 
For 1982 to 1984, we have the same results. With the use of ROA both MS and 
CONC variables are positive and statistically significant, whereas the efficiency 
variables together with RISK are insignificant. The findings of a positive profit- 
concentration and profit-market share relationship when other factors affecting profits 
are controlled for, supports the SCP and RMP hypotheses, respectively. Accordingly, 
the findings for this period advocate that higher market share and concentration result 
in higher profitability. Both LTA and WAGES have a negative sign suggesting that a 
decrease in wage costs and bank size increases profits. Now, in the case of ROE, the 
RMP hypothesis is rejected, whereas the CONC is still significant together with 
WAGES for the second model. 
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Considering Model I for 1985 and 1986, we can see from Table 5-3 that in the case of 
ROA, both the two MP hypothesis are accepted in contract to the rejection of the ES 
hypothesis, with control variables being negative and significant. As regards the 
ROE, none of the variables seem to be significant in explaining profits for the current 
period. Again, consistent with previous studies, it is clear that the results are sensitive 
to the measure of profit utilised, as they produce totally different estimates [Molyneux 
et al. (1996), Berger and Hannan (1993), Berger (1997)]. Consistently in 1987, with 
ROA as dependent variable the data again supports the SCP hypothesis, whereas with 
ROE all four hypotheses are rejected. 
For 1988 once more there is a support for both MS hypotheses with ROA, while with 
ROE only RMP is supported. In the first case profits are positively related to market 
share as well as concentration, whereas in the second case profits are only driven by 
market share. For the next year findings suggest that size and risk only explain ROE, 
with size having a positive relationship with profits and a negative one with risk. On 
the other hand, the SCP hypothesis is supported, when ROA is employed as the profit 
measure. 
It is evident from the above that during the 1980s the dominant hypothesis is the SCP, 
suggesting that higher profits in the industry results from its concentrated structure. 
Nevertheless, following the changes in the UK banking during the 1980s, the 
empirical results for the first part of the 1990s provide a different picture. In 1990, 
although the CONC variable is found significant, it has a negative sign. The findings 
of a mostly negative profit-concentration relationship run strongly contrary to the SCP 
hypothesis. This in tam suggests that higher concentration leads to lower 
profitability. In addition, none of the control variables are found to be statistically 
significant. 
In 1991, with ROE as dependent variable, the X-INEFF variable is found negatively 
significant for the first time indicating that the lower the level of inefficiency the 
higher the level of profit. Consistent with ESX hypothesis, this suggests that banks 
earn excess profits due to superior management or production technologies. When 
ROA is considered none of the variables are found to be significant. In 1992 Model I 
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supporta the notion that none of the variables explains the profit variation. However, 
in Model II both ES hypotheses are accepted since X-INEFF and S-INEFF are found 
to be negative and statistically significant. As we noted earlier, the ES explanation 
for the positive relationship between profits, and concentration or market share, states 
that efficient firms increase in size and market share because of their ability to 
generate higher profits which usually leads to higher market concentration. The 
results suggest that profits increase due to superior management and technologies, and 
because of the more efficient supply of products, which is turn lower costs. 
Data for 1993 support once more the SCP hypothesis, in both models, with the ROE 
as dependent variable, whereas in the case of ROA all hypotheses are rejected. In 
1994 in the case of ROA both models support the ESS hypothesis. This states that 
banks have essentially equally good management and technology but some of them 
supply products at more efficient scale than others do. Hence they have lower unit 
cost and higher market profits. Proceeding with ROE, none of the hypotheses is 
accepted, and the only variable that explains profits is RISK. Finally, for 1995 and 
for both profit measures, none of the hypotheses is accepted. 
In general the above findings are partially in line with the current literature. Most 
studies do not include direct measures for the ES hypothesess and find mixed results; 
Smirlock (1985) and Evanoff and Fortier (1988) find strong support of the ES 
hypothesis, while Clark (1986) Berger and Hannan (1989,1992), and Molyneux and 
Forbes (1995) find evidence supporting the SCP hypothesis. In our case, during the 
1980s in most cases the evidence support the validity of the SCP hypothesis: the 
positive relationship between profit and concentration reflects a price setting that is 
less favourable to consumers in more concentrated markets due competitive 
imperfections in those markets. 
Considering the few studies that include all four hypotheses in their estimation, the 
current results are in line with Berger and Hannan (1993). Nevertheless, in some 
isolated cases during 1990s, there are some evidences in favour of the ES hypotheses. 
A possible explanation for these findings is that the structure of the UK banking 
industry started to change following the national and international deregulation 
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pattern during the 1980s. Banks have faced new competitors and new forms of 
competition have developed. This intensifying competition increases the pressure for 
improvements in cost efficiency. As a result in an attempt to become competitively 
viable banks nowadays operate more efficiently. 
As a next step, we run further regressions to examine whether market power or 
efficiency effects associated with MS that eliminates the positive CONC coefficients. 
According to Berger (1995a, 1997) this is the key point in the debate between MP and 
ES advocates in the literature. Tables 5-5 and 5-6 show the results for equations 
(5.10) and (5.11), which set the necessary conditions for the efficient structure 
hypothesis. Estimates of the market structure, MS, and market concentration, CONC, 
are regressed on X-INEFF, S-INEFF and other control variables. As mentioned in the 
previous section, under the efficient structure hypothesis, the relationship between 
inefficiency and concentration or market share should be negative. 
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Table 5-5: Regressions of Market Share and Market Concentration on X-inefficicncy, 
Scale inefficiency and other control variables- Model I. 
Year Variable X-INEFFI S-INEFF LTA WAGES RISK 
CONC 0.096 0.469 0.037 0.006 
1995 (0.09) (0.09)* (0.001)* (0.003)* (0.7E-3)* 
MC -0.036 -0.171 0.003 0.002 0.6E-3 
(0.06) (0.06)* (0.001)* (0.002) (0.4E-3) 
CONC 0.225 0.371 0.005 0.460 -0.003 
1994 (0.07)* (0.08)* (0.004) (0.07)* (0.7E-3)* 
MC -0.112 0.026 0.021 -0.6E-3 -0.275 
(0.06)* (0.07) (0.003)* (0.7E-3) (0.055)* 
CONC 0.128 0.043 0.008 0.2E-4 0.520 
1993 (0.07)* (0.07) (0.01) (0.4E-3) (0.09)* 
MC -0.038 -0.025 0.021 -0.2F-3 -0.286 
(0.05) 
-- ----(0.04)__ 
(0.004)* (0.3E-3) (0.06)* 
CONC -- 0.052 0.098 0.041 0.1E-3 0.002 
1992 (0.10) (0.06) (0.002)* 0.4E-3 (0.01) 
MC -0.064 -0.007 0.020 -0.3E-3 -0.006 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.003)* (0.2E-3) (0.01) 
CONC 0.147 0.002 0.011 0.001 0.505 
1991 (0.05)* (0.03) (0.005)* (0.4E-3)* (0.08)* 
MC 0.111 -0.30 0.075 -0.002 -0.930 
(0.06)* (0.16)* (0.03)* (0.002) (0.44)* 
CONC 0.326 -0.002 0.006 0.5E-3 0.650 
1990 (0.10)* (0.03) (0.01) (0.4E-3) (0.0())* 
MC -0.177 0.025 0.024 -0.6E-3 -0.301 
(0.07)* (0.02) (0.004)* (0.2E-3)* (0.06)* 
CONC 0.337 0.032 0.006 0.4E-3 0.693 
1989 (0.15)* (0.03) (0.01) (0.4E-3) (0. ()9)* 
MC -0.202 0.014 0.025 -0.7E-3 -0.316 
(0.11)* (0.022) (0.004)* (0.3E-3)* (0.07)* 
C'ONC 0.192 -0.035 0.013 0.9E-3 0.638 
1988 
. 
(0.155) (0.03) (0.005)* (0.5E-3)* (0.10)* 
.................. MC 
-0.109 -0.277 
) (0,11 (0.03) (0.004)* (0.07)* (0.3E-3)* 
CONC -0.8E-3 -0.012 -0.5E-3 -0.2E-3 0.87I 
1987 (0.02) (0.02) (0.004) (0.4E-3) (0.07)* 
ABC -0.011 -0.7E-3 0.027 -0.4E-3 -0.369 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.004)* (0.3E-3) ((). O6)* 
CONC 0.048 0.091 0.026 -0.5F-4 0.399 
1986 (0.04) (0.03)* (0.004)* (0.6E-3) (0.97)* 
AMC -0.037 -0.025 0.014 -0.7E-3 -0.118 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.0()3)* (0.71? -3) (0.05) 
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1985 CONC -0.007 0.032 0.030 0.9E-4 0.426 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.004)* (0.7E-3) (0.08)* 
MC 0.022 0.014 0.014 -0.70E-3 -0.173 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.003)* (0.5E-3) (0.06)* 
1984 CONC -0.010 0.082 0.2E-4 -0.8E-3 0.990 
(0.04) 0.03 (0.004) (0.5E-3) 0.07 * 
MC -0.024 0.013 0.034 -0.5E-3 -0.463 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.5E-3) (0.07)* 
1983 CONC 0.023 0.067 0.8E-3 0.1E-5 0.800 
(0.02) (0.02)* (0.004) (0.4E-3) 0.06 * 
MC -0.010 -0.030 0.032 -0.3E-3 -0.414 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.004) (0.4E-3) (0.07)* 
1982 CONC 0.144 0.101 0.027 0.8E-3 0.384 
(0.12)* (0.04)* . 005)* 0.6E-3 (0.08)* 
MC - -0.117 -0.031 0.018 -0.8E-3 -0.180 
(0.09) (0.03) (0.004) (0.5E-3) (0.06) 
1981 CONC 0.078 0.131 0.034 0.6E-3 0.310 
(0.11) (0.05)* (0.005)* (0.7E-3) (0.07)* 
MC -0.087 -0.026 0.015 -0.8E-3 -0.137 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.004)* (0.5E-3) (0.05) 
Notes: Standard errors in the parenthesis/* denotes significance at 5%. 
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Table 5-6: Regressions of Market Share and Market Concentration on X-inefßcicncy, 
Scale inefficiency and other control variables- Model 11. 
Year Variable X-INEFF2 S-INEFF LTA WAGES 111SK 
CONC 0.016 0.478 0.038 -0.003 0.006 
1995 (0.11) (0.10)* (0.002)* (0.7E-3)* (0.003)* 
MC 0.055 -0.192 0.002 0.7E-3 0.00 
(0.07) (0.06)* 
--- --- 
(0.001) (0.5F-3) 
-- - 
(0.002) 
---- -- - --- -- CONC - 0.023 -- 0.406 0.008 -0.003 0.466 
1994 (0.04) (0.09)* (0.004)* (0.8E-3) (0.07)* 
MC 0.006 0.008 0.020 -0.4E-3 -0.29 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.003)* (0.6E-3) (0.06)* 
CONC 0.210 0.051 0.006 -0.4E-4 0.546 
1993 (0.08)* (0.06) (0.01) (0.4E-3) (0.09)* 
MC -0.044 -0.016 0.024 -0.2E-3 -0.183 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.003)* (0.3E-3) (0.07)* 
CONC 0.132 0.090 0.040 0.1E-3 0.002 
1992 (0.08)* (0.06) (0.002)* (0.4E-3) (0.01) 
MC -0.056 -0.052 0.006 -0.3E-3 -0.006 
(0.03)* (0. ) (0.001)* (0.3E-3) (0.01) 
CONC 0.133 -0.9E-3 0.010 0.001 0.518 
1991 (0.06)* (0.03) (0.005)* (0.4E-3)* (0.09)* 
MC -0.304 -0.262 0.084 -0.001 -0.965 
(0.32) (0.16)* (0.03)* (0.002) ; (0.44)* 
CONC 0.161 0.001 0.008 0.4E-3 0.659 
1990 (0.06)* (0.03) (0.01) (0.4E-3) (0.09) 
MC -0.085 0.023 0.022 -0.6E-3 -0.310 
(0.04)* (0.02) (0.004)* (0.3E-3)* (0.06) 
CONC 0.409 0.031 0.006 0.4E-3 0.703 
1989 (0.23)* (0.03) (0.006) (0.4E-3) (0.09)* 
MC -0.283 0.014 0.025 -0.7E-3 -0.350 
(0.17) (0.02) (0.004)* (0.3E-3) (0.07)* 
CONC 0.086 -0.036 0.014 0.9E-3 0.653 
1988 (0.15) (0.04) (0.005)* (0.5E-3)* (0.10)* 
MC -0.078 0.011 0.021 -0.8E-3 -0.279 
(0.10) (0.03) ((). ()0)* (0.3E-3) (0.07)* 
CONC -0.007 -0.013 -0.6E-3 -0.2E-3 0.876 
1987 (0.02) (0.02) (0.004) (0.4E-3) (0.0)* 
MC -0.014 -0.002 0.027 -0.4F-3 -0.363 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.004)* 0.31: -3 (0.06)* 
CONC 0.022 0.084 0.028 -0.8E-4 0.405 
1986 (0.05) (0.04)* ((). 01)* (0.6E-3) (0.07) 
MC -0.036 -0.021 0.013 -0.71? -3 -0.135 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.003)* (0.51i-3) (0.05) 
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1985 CONC -0.018 0.032 0.031 0.1E-3 0.426 
(0.04) 0.04 (0.005)* (0.7E-3) (0.08)* 
MC 0.005 0.015 0.014 -0.7E-3 -0.170 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.003)* (0.5E-3) (0.06)* 
1984 CONC -0.013 0.083 0.1E-3 -0.8E-3 0.990 
(0.04) (0_03)* (0.004) 0.5E-3)* (0.07)* 
MC -0.036 0.013 0.034 -0.5E-3 -0.464 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01)* (0.5E-3) (0.07)* 
1983 CONC 0.008 0.068 0.6E-3 -0.2E-5 0.804 
(0.02) (0.02)* (0.004) 0.4E-3 (0.06)* 
MC -0.006 -0.030 0.032 -0.3E-3 -0.417 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.004) 0.4E-3 (0.07)* 
1982 CONC 0.057 0.106 0.028 0.8E-3 0.398 
(0.08) (0.04)* (0.01)* (0.6E-3) (0.08)* 
MC -0.067 -0.035 0.018 -0.8E-3 -0.189 
(0.07) (0.03) (0.004)* (0.5E-3) (0.06)* 
1981 CONC 0.008 0.134 0.035 0.6E-3 0.321 
(0.09) (0.05)* 0.005 * (0.7E-3) (0.07)* 
MC -0.088 -0.030 0.015 -0.8E-3 -0.139 
(0.07) (0.04) 0.004 * (0.5E-3) (0.05)* 
Notes: Standard errors in the parenthesis/* denotes significance at 5%. 
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With the concentration as the dependent variable, the X-INEFF is found in twenty 
four times out of thirty to be positive, with eleven cases being statistically significant. 
However, in all cases the coefficients are positive. When the dependent variable is 
MS in only five cases the coefficient is positive with one of them being significant. 
The rest have a negative sign and five times it is found significant. When the CONC is 
the dependent variable the S-INEFF in twenty-five case is positive, with thirteen of 
them being statistically significant. In the case of MS twelve coefficients are positive 
but none significant and eighteen negative, as the relationship requires, with two of 
them statistically significant. This does not support earlier results on the ESX and 
ESS hypotheses. Although some of the coefficients have the correct sign, they are 
insignificant. Thus, overall, there is very little support for the ES hypothesis. 
Additionally, coefficients on CONC or MS are not substantially altered when 
efficiency variables are added in the regressions, suggesting that is the market power 
effects captured by MS drive the profit-concentration relationship, not efficiency 
[Berger (1995a)]. 
Table 5-6 shows the results for equation (5.12) and (5.13), which test Hicks' `quiet 
life' hypothesis. Hicks (1935, p. 8) suggests that `the best of all monopoly profits is a 
quiet life'. According to Berger and Hannan (1993), if this hypothesis holds, it tends 
to offset the profit structure relationship since gains from pricing are partially offset 
by cost increases from the poorer efficiency ratios. The hypothesis states that when 
firms enjoy greater market power and concentration, inefficiency follows not because 
of non-competitive pricing but because of a relaxed environment that produces no 
incentive to minimise costs. The dependent variables X-INEFF1, X-INEFF2, and S- 
INEFF are regressed against CONC, MS and other control variables. To recall, X- 
1NEFF1 and X-INEFF2 measure the X-inefficiencies, and S-INEFF measures the 
scale inefficiencies. For the hypothesis to hold the signs of CONS and MS must be 
positive. Determination of which of the inequalities hold, (5.12) or (5.13), depends on 
the market structure variable associated with market power (concentration or market 
share), and on the dimension of efficiency at which banks with market power become 
unrestrained in pursuing. 
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Table 5-7: Regressions of X-inefficiency, Scale inefficiency on Market Share, 
Concentration and other control variables 
Year Variable CONC MS LTA WAGES RISK 
X-INEFFI 0.232 -0.033 0.003 0.7I? -3 0.001 
1995 (0.21) (0.36) (0.01) (0.51: -3) (0.01) 
X-INEFF2 0.295 0.241 0.002 -0.2E-3 -0.3E-3 
(0.17)* (0.29) (0.01) (0.4E-3) (0.004) 
S-INEFF 0.656 -0.067 -0.025 0.006 -0.010 
(0.16)* (0.28) (0.01)* (0.4E-3)* (0.003)* 
X-INEFFI 0.539 -0.331 0.014 -0.3E-3 -0.324 
1994 (0.19)* (0.29) (0.008)* (0.4E-3) (0.16)* 
_........ X-INEFF2 0.241 0.207 -0.002 -0.3E-3 0.090 
(0.39) (0.59) (0.017) 0.9E-3) (0.33) 
S-INEFF 0.742 0.339 -0.026 0.008 0.026 
(0.15)* (0.23) (0.07)* (0.3E-3)* (0.13) 
X-INEFFI 0.428 -0.105 0.006 0.4E-3 -0.124 
1993 (0.25)* (0.42) (0.01) (0.6E-3) (0.23) 
X-INEFF2 0.468 -0.307 0.016 0.2E-3 -0.386 
(0.22)* (0.36) (0.01) (0.5E-3) (0.187) 
S-INEFF 0.192 -0.198 0.004 0.004 -0.062 
(0.29) (0.47) (0.02) (0.7E-3)* (0.25) 
X-INEFF] 0.016 -0.590 0.019 0.1E-3 -0.005 
1992 (0.24) (0.39) 
.. _..... 
(0.01) (0.6E-3) (0.02) 
X-INEFF2 0.408 -0.158 -0.003 0.11: -3 -0.006 
(0.27) (0.46) (0.01) (0.71: -3) (0.02) 
5-INEFF 0.415 -0.455 0.007 0.002 -0.008 
(0.37) (0.61) (0.02) (0.001)* (0.02) 
X-INEFFI 0.859 0.058 0.002 0.1E-3 -0.380 
1991 (0.30)* (0.03)* (0.01) (0.9E-3) (0.25) 
X-INEFF2 0.555 -0.050 0.019 -0.51; -3 -0.411 
(0.277)* (0.05) (0.01) (0.9E-3) (0.23)* 
S-INEFF 0.028 -0.207 0.015 0.002 0.237 
(0.58) (0.11)* (0.03) (0.002) 0.476 
X-INEFF1 0.391 -0.363 0.019 -0.1E-3 -0.362 
1990 (0.16)* (0.24) (0. ()1)* (0.4li-3) (0. I5)* 
X-INEFF2 0.544 -0.484 0.021 O. 1 E-3 -0.547 
(0.28)* (0.42) (0.02) (0.81: -3) (0.25) . ........ S-INEFF 0.293 1.026 0.015 0.003 -0.108 
(0.58) (0.88) (0.03) (0.002) (0.53) 
X-INEFF1 0.189 -0.183 0.007 -0.81: -4 -0.083 
1989 (0.10)* (0.16) (0.01) (0.41? -3) 1 (0. II) 
X INEFF2 0.099 -0.124 0.005 -0.91: -4 -0.041 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.004) (0.31: -3) ((). os) 
S-INEFF 0.756 0.847 -0.043 0.004 0.427 
j 
-- -- --- 
j0.59) 
- -- 
(0.82) (0.03) (0.002)* (0.59) 
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X-INEFFI 0.108 -0.104 0.002 -0.2E-4 0.068 
1988 (0.12) (0.18) (0.01) (0.4E-3) (0.11) 
X-INEFF2 0.028 -0.118 0.002 -0.3E-3 0.161 
(0.14) (0.20) (0.01) 0.5 E-3) (0.12) 
S-INEFF -0.436 -0.019 -0.003 0.003 0.841 
(0.52) (0.76) (0.02) (0.002) (0.46) 
X-INEFFI -0.036 -0.386 0.013 0.162 -0.7E-3 
1987 (0.7851) (0.82) (0.03) (0.78) (0.002) 
X-INEFF2 -0.036 -0.386 0.013 -0.7E-3 0.161 
(0.78) (0.82) (0.03) (0.002) (0.78) 
S-INEFF -0.381 -0.745 0.003 -0.003 0.696 
(0.92) (0.96) (0.04) (0.002) (0.91) 
X-INEFFI 0.035 -0.571 0.010 -0.002 0.182 
1986 (0.49) (0.71) (0.03) (0.002) (0.29) 
X-INEFF2 -0.183 -0.681 0.013 -0.001 0.342 
(0.45) (0.64) (0.02) (0.002) (0.26) 
S-INEFF 1.215 0.500 -0.026 0.004 -0.339 
(0.55)* (0.77) (0.03) (0.002)* (0.32) 
X-INEFFI 0.187 0.536 -0.002 0.1E-3 0.162 
1985 (0.51) (0.69) (0.03) (0.002) (0.29) 
X-INEFF2 -0.171 -0.034 0.022 (0.5E-5) 0.110 
(0.50) (0.68) (0.03) (0.002) (0.27) 
S-INEFF 0.774 0.929 -0.039 0.6E-3 0.267 
(0.56) (0.75) (0.03) (0.002) (0.32) 
X-INEFFJ -0.121 -0.243 0.002 -0.6E-3 0.400 
1984 (0.40) (0.41) (0.02) (0.001) (0.46) 
X-INEFF2 -0.167 -0.381 0.016 0.3E-4 0.227 
(0.41) (0.43) (0.02) (0.001) (0.48) 
S-INEFF 1.663 0.610 -0.032 0.006 -0.976 
(0.55)* (0.58) (0.03) (0.002)* (0.65) 
X-INEFFI 0.854 -0.261 -0.003 -0.1E-3 -0.371 
1983 (0.70) (0.73) (0.03) (0.002) (0.72) 
X-INEFF2 0.706 -0.345 0.006 0.1E-3 -0.377 
(0.83) (0.87) (0.04) (0.002) (0.85) 
S-INEFF 1.800 -0.598 0.003 0.7E-5 -1.118 
(0.66)* (0.69) (0.03) (0.002) (0.68) 
X-INEFFJ 0.123 -0.179 0.004 -0.3E-3 0.067 
1982 (0.17) (0.23) (0.01) (0.7E-3) (0.10) 
X-INEFF2 0.022 -0.208 0.010 -0.6E-3 0.082 
(0.21) (0.29) (0.01) (0.9E-3) (0.13) 
S-INEFF 1.013 0.148 -0.020 0.001 -0.207 
(0.46)* (0.63) (0.03) (0.002) (0.28) 
X-INEFFJ 0.061 -0.179 0.006 -0.2E-3 0.105 
1981 (0.18) (0.25) (0.01) 0.8E-3 0.10 
X-INEFF2 -0.188 -0.462 0.020 -0.1E-3 0.112 
(0.22) (0.30) (0.01) (0.9E-3) (0.12) 
S-INEFF 0.966 0.411 -0.040 0.004 0.016 
(0.37) (0.51) 0.02)* 0.002 * 0.20 
Notes: Standard errors in the parenthesis/* denotes significance at 5%. 
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Concentration has a positive coefficient in thirty-eight out of forty five cases, where 
fifteen of these coefficients are statistically significant, while the coefficient of market 
share is in ten cases positive but only once statistically significant. This is consistent 
with the joint hypothesis that concentration proxies market power and that firms with 
more market power are less persistent in controlling cost. Our results are consistent 
with those of Berger and Hannan (1993,1998), and Berger (1995a, 1997) that find 
support for Hicks `quiet life' hypothesis. 
As mentioned in the previous section, firms with market power purposely engage in 
some activities that raise cost more than revenues, and such activities will result in 
lower measured cost efficiency. Any gains from the positive profit structure 
relationship will tend to be offset by this cost increase. This may provide an 
explanation for the weak profit-structure relationship in the current test and in the 
previous literature as well. 
5.7 Conclusions. 
This study uses directly calculated measures of bank efficiency to distinguish among 
alternative explanations of the relationship between market structure and bank 
performance in the UK banking industry. An innovation of the current study is the 
utilisation of different efficiency measures to test the sensitivity of the results. 
On average the findings appear consistent for the first decade: for most of the years 
there is a support of the structure performance hypothesis. The positive relationship 
between concentration and inefficiency measures supports the `quiet life' hypothesis, 
offered in addition to the market power hypothesis. On the other hand, the relative 
market power hypothesis, which asserts that firms with larger market shares are able 
to exercise market power in pricing differentiated products, is not supported by the 
data. 
Concerning the efficient structure explanation for the existence of the positive 
structure-profit relationship, the results are somewhat mixed. Examining the relation 
of inefficiency variables with profit, a statistically significant negative relationship 
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between them is found in some cases. This constitutes an acceptance of the ES 
hypotheses. Nonetheless, when the necessary conditions for the ES hypotheses are 
tested, these results are not supported. In addition to the above, consistent with most 
of the literature [see Molyneux (1996)], the findings are not very robust and they are 
sensitive to the measure of performance used, and in some cases sensitive to the 
measure of X-efficiency. 
Last, there are doubts on the ability to improve profits through efficiency or market 
power. Results from estimating equation (5.8) produced results with significantly low 
Res. In some cases the introduction of the efficiency variable raise this value 
substantially (in some cases by 0.20) indicating that to some extent efficiency does 
affect profits. However, the Res for most of the regressions are still below 0.30 and 
sometimes very close to zero. Apparently this suggests that the variation in profits is 
due to other factors as well, such as portfolio choices and regulatory changes. 
To conclude, there is evidence that UK data on average support the structure conduct 
performance hypothesis and its `quiet life' addendum, while there is little support for 
the relative market power hypothesis. In addition, as far as the efficient structure 
hypotheses are concerned, the data support only some of its conditions. Comparing 
our results to other European studies, we find that they are in line with those of 
Vennet (1993) and Molyneux and Forbes (1995) who also find a support for the SCP 
hypothesis, but in contrast with results of Goldberg and Rai (1996) whose data 
support the RMP hypothesis. - 
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CHAPTER 6: The Effects of Regulation on the Performance of UK 
Banking Institutions 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter our goal is to determine whether deregulation altered the profits, costs, 
and efficiency of the UK banking institutions, for the period 1983 to 1995. The 
motivation for this study comes from the notion that the deregulation of the banking 
industry that took place during the 1980s all over the world had an effect on the 
performance of banking institutions. Nevertheless, these effects have only been 
examined empirical by a handful of studies, none of which focuses on to the UK 
banking market, to the best of our knowledge. 
The deregulation process emerged primarily by the globalisation of financial services; 
policy makers recognised that existing regulation was largely set up for the needs of 
the past, and hence it could no longer satisfy present financial needs. Deregulation 
has changed the nature of banking and, consequently, its production and cost 
structure. Banks play a vital role in the economy; their efficiency and productivity 
have significant consequences across a wide range of non-financial firms and 
industries. New regulatory requirements try to capture all risks associated with 
banking markets, such as credit risk, market risk as well as the risk of default. At the 
same time they try to promote competition in order to make financial institutions more 
efficient and productive. 
Section 2 reviews the major regulatory tools utilised in the banking industry together 
with the associated literature. Section 3 discusses the motivation for the deregulation 
process that took place during the last two decades. Its also provides a review of the 
studies that have attempted to quantify these effects on banks' performance. Section 
4 outlines the methodology applied, whereas the next section summarises the data 
utilised. Section 6 discusses the empirical results, and section 7 concludes. 
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6.2 Regulatory tools 
There are two types of regulation traditionally proposed in recent regulatory theory: 
regulation that affects directly the structure of the industry and regulation that affects 
the behaviour of the industry participants. These are the structural and conduct 
regulation, respectively. 
Structural regulation aims at regulating the actual structure of the industry. It 
includes functional separation of institutions, i. e. separation between commercial and 
investment banking. In many countries, there is a separation between banks of 
different types according to their functions. Consequently, a commercial bank needs 
to be separated from an investment bank. Also, there are entry requirements and 
discriminatory rules concerning foreign banks and investors. With structural 
regulation there are certain entry requirements which do not allow free entry and exit 
from the system. This also affects the presence of foreign firms, the size of banks, the 
frequency and type of mergers and acquisitions and the nature of the products that 
will be offered. 
Conduct regulation takes the form of direct restrictions on assets and liabilities, rules 
relating to information disclosures, credit ceilings, limitations on branching and the 
determination of fees, commissions and rates on assets and liabilities. These kinds of 
regulation are expected to provide banks with the incentive to overemphasise 
competitive tools, which are not restricted [Gual and Neven (1993)]. 
The major regulatory tools in use in the banking industry could be classified into five 
broad types [Freixas and Rochet (1998)]: 
1. Deposit interest rate ceilings. 
2. Entry, branching, network, and merger restrictions. 
3. Portfolio restrictions. 
4. Deposit insurance. 
5. Capital requirements. 
Below we give a brief description of each type of regulatory tools. 
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6.2.1 Deposit rate ceilings 
Deposit rate restriction was implemented in many countries during the 1970s and 
early 1980s. In the US it is known as Regulation Q and was imposed until 1986. In 
Europe, it still exists in several countries, such as Germany and France, and has been 
lifted only recently by others. 
Deposit rate ceilings emerge from the belief that unrestricted competition among 
banks would increase deposit rates, and in turn bank costs. To compensate for the 
increase in their cost, banks would shift their portfolios to higher yielding assets. 
purchased at the expense of higher risk. Accordingly, deposit rate ceilings were 
originally imposed to limit inter-institutional competition for deposit as a means for 
reducing deposit costs, and therefore contributing to the financial integrity of 
depository institutions. An opposing view suggests that ceilings might increase bank 
risk by encouraging non-price competition for deposits during periods of fluctuating 
interest rates. This reduces capability of banks and increased exposure to 
disintermediation in periods of rising market interest rates [Benston (1964), Cox 
(1966), Klein (1971), Startz (1979), and Mingo (1980)]. 
The empirical literature on the effect of deposit rate restrictions is quiet extensive. A 
portion of studies examines the effect of these restrictions on banks' risk. In 
summary, early studies on the deposit rate-solvency issue suggest that bank risk 
remains unaffected [Benston (1964), Cox (1966), Koehn and Stangle (1980), 
Smirlock (1984), ] or increases by deposit rate ceilings [Startz (1979), Mingo (1978, 
1980)]. In either case the implication is that the relaxation or elimination of deposit 
rate ceilings does not impair the solvency of the banking system. Later studies 
examine the impact of abolition of restrictions. The results here are somewhat mixed. 
Ahorny et al. (1988) claim that there is a decline in systematic risk, whereas non- 
systematic and total bank risk rise. On the other hand, Allen and Wilhelm (1988) find 
no evidence of an increase in bank risk. Finally, results by Bundt et al. (1992) 
indicate an increase in both systematic and non-systematic risk. 
Some studies attempt to determine to what extent, if at all, deposit rate restrictions 
impact adversely on commercial banks, and whether they constitute a significant 
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cause for bank failures. Cebula and Saltz (1994) and Ostrosky (1997) suggest that 
Regulation Q, among other factors73, has been a statistically significant contributor to 
the growth of commercial banks failure rate in the US during the early 1980s. 
Another issue covers by the literature covers is the wealth effect of deposit rate 
regulation. Ceilings act as a government fixing agreement, which in turn acts as a tax 
on depositors; the existence of deposit restrictions acts as a transfer of wealth from 
depositors to the owner of the institution74 and, thus ceilings impose losses to 
depositors [Pyle (1974), James (1983)]. On the other hand, decreasing costs of 
resources for banks may entail a decrease in the rate they charge to borrowers, as well 
as an increase in the quality of financial services [Freixas and Rochet (1998)]. 
James (1983), by use of event study methodology, finds that significant intra-industry 
wealth transfers result from the imposition of deposit rates ceilings. Wholesale and 
retail commercial banks have experience an increase in their value with the removal 
of ceilings on the CDs, suggesting that ceilings on these accounts have acted as a tax 
on earnings. On the other hand, on the announcement of ceiling changes on consumer 
accounts, retail banks experience a significant decrease in their value, consistent with 
the hypothesis that ceilings applied to consumer accounts provide these institutions 
with a subsidy. 75 Allen and Wilhelm (1988) find that following the abolition of 
deposit rate restrictions the competitive structure of the depository institution 
changed, with the Federal Reserve System banks profiting at the expense of other 
parties in the industry (non-member banks and S&Ls). In an examination of the 
impact of deposit rate ceilings in the French banking industry, Dermine and Hillion 
(1992) find evidence that demand deposits provide rents when zero interest regulation 
is applied. 
73 Other statistically significant factors that are found to affect bank failure in the US are the recession 
during the early 1980s, the real cost of funds to banks, as well as the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
74 Whether ceilings achieve a wealth transfer from the depositor to the owner of the institution depends 
on the elasticity of deposit supply, and the extent to which ceilings can be circumvented through the 
use of non-interest payments. 
75 Peltzman (1976) suggests that if producers differ in their cost structures or if differences in product 
demand exist then certain firms in the regulated industry may earn subsidies while others are taxed by 
regulation. 
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6.2.2 Entry, branching, network, and merger restrictions 
To discourage concentration, US authorities have always imposed restrictions on 
branch and network banking76 until mid 1990s, unlike most banking in the 
industrialised world77. This was seen as one mean for offsetting oligopolistic 
tendencies arising from a regulated sector78. Nevertheless, the recent literature 
suggests that these restrictions have increased bank instability by limiting the ability 
of banks to diversify their loan portfolios and deposit liabilities [Calomiris (1992, 
1993)]. They have also reduced the efficiency of average bank assets and increased 
intermediation costs, primarily by limiting better-managed banks to gain market share 
[Jayarante and Strahan (1999)]. Moreover, geographic restrictions probably increased 
market power by limiting entry [Evanoff and Fortier (1998)]. 
During the 1980s and 1990s restrictions on banks' ability to expand geographically 
have been relaxed with a series of removals of restrictions on interstate and intrastate 
banking. With Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) 
of 1994 interstate banking has been permitted in almost all States. Studies on the US 
market suggest that due to deregulation, there was an increase in Merger and 
Acquisition (M&A) activities in States after they joined interstate banking agreements 
[Jayarante and Strahan (1996)]. Further, with the relaxation of state-wide branching 
restrictions, there has been an increase in the number of new branches as well as in the 
number of entry into local markets via de novo banks [Amel and Liang (1992), Calera 
(1994)]. In addition, following the IBBEA adoption, studies find large positive bank 
stock returns, suggesting that take-over deregulation enhances equity values [Brook et 
al. (1998)]. 
Europe has also been undergoing deregulation. The major step towards the 
elimination of entry barriers in the banking sector has been the implementation of the 
76 Geographic restrictions that prevent banks from branching outside a single county act as a form of 
entry restriction. 
77 The McFadden Act (1927) permitted branching for national banks but required them to obey state 
branching regulation. The Douglas Amendment of the Bank Holding Company Act (1956) gave each 
state the ultimate authority to approve entry by out-of-state banks. Bank Merger Act (1960) gave 
guidelines for mergers. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Efficiency Act (1994), changed the 
Bank Holding Company Act allowing adequately capitalised and well managed BHCs to acquire banks 
in other states. 
78 See Hefferman 1996, p. p. 240-242. 
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Second Banking Directive (1993)79. The most important aspect of this Directive is the 
provision of a single banking license, which enables credit institutions incorporated in 
a Member State to be equally recognised throughout the EU by virtue of their home 
country authorisation. Further to the above, since early 1980s EU member countries 
have continued to deregulate their financial markets and foreign exchange controls, 
and this has give the opportunity to many foreign banks to operate in their markets. A 
study by Salomon Brothers (1990) suggests that the most noticeable characteristic of 
cross-border activity in European banking since early 1980s is large banks acquiring 
much smaller banks, although there have also been various large domestic bank 
mergers. Consequently, it can be argued that deregulation of the internal market has 
resulted in greater concentration and less competition in domestic markets since 
domestic banking firms have merged to improve their competitive position relative to 
potential EU foreign competitors. 
Empirical literature suggests that geographic restrictions may have allowed some 
inefficient banks to survive. The abolition of these restrictions has allowed some 
previously prohibited M&As to occur, which may have forced inefficient banks to 
become more efficient by acquiring other institutions, by being acquired, or by 
improving management practices internally [Berger et al. (1999)]. In other terms 
M&As may allow the institutions to achieve a scale, scope, or mix of output that is 
more profitable, to improve X-efficiency through changing organisational focus or 
managerial behaviour, and as to improve the risk-expected return trade-off. 
In terms of scale almost all studies that have utilised 1980s data suggest that there is 
no significant efficiency to be gained, while there are possibly slight efficiency losses 
to be suffered from M&A involving large banks [Berger et al (1997)]. The same 
results hold for scope and product mix efficiencies [Berger et al (1987), Hunter et al 
(1990), Noulas et al. (1993), Bauer et al. (1993), Clark (1996)]. Nevertheless, a 
recent study by Berger and Mester (1997) that has employed 1990s data finds 
substantial cost scale economies, of about 20% of costs for bank sizes ranging from 
$10 billion to $25 billion in assets. 
79 For details see Chapter 1, section 3. 
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The findings of X-efficiency studies indicate no or very little cost improvement from 
M&As during the 1980s [Berger and Humphrey (1992), Rhoades (1993), DeYoung 
(1997)]. Studies with early 1990s data generate mixed results. Rhoades (1998) finds 
modest efficiency gains, while Berger (1998) finds very little improvement in average 
cost efficiency for M&As of either large or small banks. A study on the European 
banking markets by Molyneux et al. (1996) finds evidence that M&As between large 
banks within domestic banking markets or across national borders can create 
substantial cost savings (or cost decrease) depending on the merger partners chosen. 
6.2.3 Portfolio restrictions 
Another form of regulation is portfolio restrictions imposed to banks as a mean of 
reducing banks' risk. These restrictions can take several forms: the most widely 
known is reserve requirements. The introduction of reserve requirements diminishes 
the business risk of the bank's assets and, as a result, lowers the risk of default 
[Crouhy and Galai (1991)]. Reserve requirements force banks to hold a fixed 
percentage of their deposits in the form of reserves earning no interest. Insofar as 
these requirements are binding, they act as a tax on deposits [Black (1970,1975)]. 
Thus, adjustments in reserve requirements might be expected to influence the value of 
future implicit taxes on e institutions. 
A question that remains open, though, is whether banks or customers pay the 
additional tax burden. Fama (1985) suggests that banks have a comparative 
advantage in monitoring at a lower cost than individuals; hence banks remain the 
cheapest source of funds for many borrowers even after shifting the deposit tax on 
them. 80 To test this hypothesis the author compares the average rates of interest on 
commercial paper and large CDs and finds no significant differences, suggesting that 
holders of large CDs do not bear the tax. This indicates that bank loans possess 
unique informational properties, and that the tax falls wholly on borrowers. 
Consistent with Fama's hypothesis are the findings of James (1987) and Cosimo and 
McDonald (1998). 
80 See Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984,1989, and 1996), Chant (1987), Battacharya and 
Thakor (1993) for a detailed discussion on the importance of informational assymetries in financial 
intermediation. 
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If the Fama hypothesis is correct, then the tax on deposits falls wholly on borrowers 
(or on borrowers and depositors collectively), and shareholders do not bear any tax. 
Hence, a change in the tax rate should not affect bank share prices. Nevertheless, 
empirical literature that examines the impact of specific changes in reserve 
requirements, finds evidence that bank share prices do respond to such changes 
[Kolari et al. (1988), Slovin et al. (1990), Osborne and Zaher (1992), Kenneth and 
Madura (1996)]. These findings state that the tax falls at least partly on bank 
shareholders. The justification provided for these findings is that since reserve 
requirements force banks to maintain non-interest bearing funds, they essentially 
consist a tax which equals the opportunity cost of these funds. Since bank opportunity 
costs are affected by adjustments in reserve requirement, their perceived value should 
be affected as well. 
Another form of portfolio restriction is the Glass-Steagall type of regulation. Under 
the requirements of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 US, commercial banks, are not 
allowed to hold corporate equities, leaving the underwriting of securities to 
investment banks. 81 On the other hand, in Europe commercial banks are universal and 
hence are allowed to hold demand deposits while dealing with corporate equities. 
Nowadays, the deregulation process has lifted many earlier restrictions, whereas in the 
US there is a controversy as to whether or not the Glass-Steagall Act should be 
abolished. 
The reasoning behind the Act is that equity holding by banks may increase their risk 
exposure, and there might exist a conflict on interests. The latter may arise when a 
bank combines lending and deposit-taking with underwriting. The key difference 
between commercial and investment banks arises from loan-making activities of the 
former. If a firm has an adverse shock and the public remains unaware, a commercial 
s' The Glass-Steagall Act prohibits national banks from engaging in securities activities either directly 
or through affiliates. The Act was passed following the allegations of abuse by commercial banks, 
recorded in the Pecora Committee hearings, which conducted an investigation of misdoings of banks. 
Specifically, the First National Bank and The Chase Dank, in regard to their underwriting activity and 
their investment banking affiliates, were accused, among other things, of misrepresenting the quality of 
new securities they had underwritten; of using their commercial and investment banking operations to 
repackage bad commercial loans into securities and passing them into unsuspecting public investors; 
and of pressuring correspondent banks to accept these poor quality securities, thus reducing the smaller 
lender's ability to provide credit at a time when it was crucially needed. 
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bank may have an incentive to underwrite public issues on behalf of the firm and use 
the proceeds for repay earlier bank loans made to the firm. Is has also been argued 
that a commercial bank, unlike an investment bank, may have access to a large 
number of unsophisticated depositors [Krosnzer and Rajan (1996)]. Thus, conflict of 
interest may induce commercial banks to fool the public into investing into securities 
that will turn out to be of low quality. 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case. Several studies 
compare the performance of securities underwritten by commercial and investment 
banks in the US prior to the enforcement of the Act, and find no such evidence. 
Instead, investors appear to have rationally accounted for the possibility of conflict of 
interest and this appears to have constrained banks underwriting high-quality 
securities [Ang and Richardson (1994), Krosnzer and Rajan (1996,1997), Puri 
(1994)]. Moreover, there is evidence that investors are willing to pay higher prices 
for securities underwritten by commercial banks than by investment banks [Puri 
(1996)]. Hence, empirical evidences regarding the conflicts of interest support the 
Glass-Steagall deregulation. 
6.2.4 Deposit insurance 
Banks are subject to runs because of the transformation services that they offer 
[Diamond and Dybving (1983), Freeman (1988)]: since banks transform short-term 
deposits into long-term loans, they are exposed to a systematic risk if depositors 
choose to withdraw their funds. 82 If the net realisable value of the bank's assets 
(loans) falls below that of liabilities (deposits) then the bank will be unable to fully 
service withdrawals. This generates a negative externality for the bank experiencing 
liquidity shortage, since it implies an increase in the bank's probability of failure. 
Moreover, this can generate a negative externality for the banking system in total, 
since investors may be forced to withdraw their deposits from financial trustworthy 
banks in anticipation of failure due to general inability to satisfy withdrawals. In such 
a case a bank run may develop into a bank panic, which is costly to the economy 
82 When depositors observe large withdrawals from the bank, they may fear bankruptcy and respond by 
withdrawing their own deposits. 
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because the interruption of bank services severely affects productive investment if 
assets are prematurely liquidated. 
To avoid bank panics and the associated social costs, governments have established 
deposit insurance schemes. Under such schemes banks pay a specific premium to the 
deposit insurance company, and in exchange depositors have their deposit insured -up 
to a fixed limit- in case of bank failure. Deposit insurance mechanisms were first 
developed in the US, following losses arising from the massive bank failures in the 
early 1930s. Later they have been adopted by most developed countries, but under 
different schemes. In the US, all member banks of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) 
must join the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and pay an insurance 
premium. In turn, the FDIC uses the premia to purchase securities and provides banks 
with a stream of revenue. Through these funds it insures deposits up to $100,000. 
During the 1980s more than 2,000 depository institutions failed. As a result, in 1991 
the Congress enacted a fundamental insurance reform for banks and thrifts, the FDCI 
Improvement Act. The Act requires the FDIC to use a `least cost' approach for 
resolving bank failures. Riskier banks are required to pay higher insurance premiums 
to the FDIC. 83 
In the UK in the event of failure depositors will have 90% of deposits refunded, up to 
a maximum payout of £18,000. The scheme is financed by a flat-rate contribution by 
banks in proportion to their deposits84. For most countries in the EU compensation 
per person of up to EURO 20,000 (approximately $21,000) is obligatory, although 
member countries are free to exceed this level if they wish. Many EU countries offer 
deposit insurance above that level; for example France has a maximum compensation 
85 per depositor of $81,650, Italy of $50,500, and Portugal of $45,175 . 
Credible deposit insurance minimises, one of the primary causes of a bank run since 
deposit convertibility is guaranteed and there is no need for withdrawals. So runs will 
not occur, and premature liquidation of assets is prevented ensuring that losses in the 
banking system due to panics will be avoided. Moreover, no sound bank would ever 
83Hefferman, S. (1996) p. p. 235-238. 
84 Chapter 18 of M. Buckle and J. Thompson (1998) 
95 MacDonald, R. (1996), p. p. 17, and 22-24. 
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fail [Merrick and Saunders (1985)]. Further, Diamond and Dybving (1986) suggest 
that deposit insurance is the only known effective measure to prevent runs without 
preventing banks from creating liquidity; consequently, bank policies should be 
considered in the context of deposit insurance. 
With the existence of deposit insurance banks have no incentives to take too much 
risk, and bank policy should be oriented towards minimising those incentives. 
Nevertheless, the provision of deposit insurance introduces moral hazard by freeing 
economic agents from the consequences of their actions [MacDonald (1996)]. 
Insured depositors no longer feel obliged to monitor the risk-taking behaviour of 
banks where their deposits are held. In such cases, depositors may choose depository 
institutions based on the interest rates they offer, rather than on their financial 
conditions. Further, incentives exist for banks to incur greater risk in an effort to earn 
higher expected profits, since they do no bear the cost in the case of an adverse event. 
In a theoretical model, Freeman (1988) shows that moral hazard distorts the selection 
of bank's portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets even though all assets are free of 
default risk. This forces government to impose constraints that remove (or at least 
reduce) the effects of moral hazard from the selection of bank's assets and liabilities. 
Specifically, the model suggests that banking regulation such as required reserves of 
illiquid assets and limits or rates on returns can be justified as a response to moral 
hazard even in the absence of default risk. 
Consistent with Freeman's notion that extra requirements are needed in the attempt to 
overcome moral hazard, some theoretical literature suggests that moral hazard 
incentives can be attenuated, and fail insurance pricing can be achieved most 
efficiently with the by capital requirements [Kupiec and O'Brien (1998), Gjerde and 
Semmen (1995)]. Others have argued that an increase in minimum capital 
requirements can create incentives for additional risk taking [Kim and Santomero 
(1988), Battacharya and Thakor (1993), Gennotte and Pyle (1991)]. Matutes and 
Vives (1995) indicate that with flat-premium deposit insurance maximum risk 
incentives exist even when there is no moral hazard, while Choury and Galai (1991) 
suggest that capital requirements and/or reserve requirements should complement 
fixed-premium deposit insurance. 
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Since the primary purpose of deposit insurance schemes is the prevention of bank 
runs, a part of the empirical literature examined the effect of deposit insurance on the 
failure of depository institutions. However, the evidence suggests the contrary. 
Cebula (1993) finds that federal deposit insurance has been a significant contributor to 
the S&L crisis in recent years. Wheelock and Wilson (1995) suggest that deposit 
insurance membership (banks members of the FDIC) increases the probability of 
failure. Saltz (1997) finds evidence of a long-run relationship between the bank 
failure rate and the deposit insurance provided by the goverment. Finally, Cebula and 
Belton (1997) indicate that the longer the extent of federal deposit insurance coverage, 
the higher the bank failure rate. The empirical results from the aforementioned 
studies provide support for the FDIC Improvement Act requirement of risk related 
deposit insurance premiums. Studies that examine the effect of the FDCI 
Improvement Act on the riskiness of the commercial banking system find a statistical 
positive relationship [Shiers (1994)]. 
6.2.5 Capital requirements 
A bank's capital is required as cushion to cover up for losses that should be inherent 
by shareholders rather than depositors, as well as to finance the infrastructure of the 
firm [MacDonald (1996)]. 
The Bank of England first addressed the importance of capital adequacy. In 1974 a 
committee was set up and recommended the use of two ratios, the free resource 
(gearing) ratio and the risk asset ratio. 86 These ratios were further revised and 
constitute the basis on which the Bank of England appraises the capital adequacy of 
deposit taking institutions throughout most of the 1980s. 87 The gearing ratio is the 
ratio of current liabilities to capital resources, excluding that part of capital utilised to 
finance infrastructure and other non-banking activities. Because it does not take into 
account the riskness of the bank's assets, it is barely referred to nowadays for 
supervisory purposes. The risk asset ratio refers to the risk of losses generated by the 
use of the assets of the institution to the capital, which is available to finance such 
66 see Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, September 1975. 
B7 see "The measurement of capital" in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin of September 1980. 
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losses". This ratio has become the key ratio in monitoring capital adequacy at 
international level. 
In the US, the first capital requirements were introduced in 1981. Capital guidelines 
required banks to hold a flat minimum percentage capital against all assets. With the 
growth in off-balance sheet activities, there was a need for re-adjusting capital 
requirements to include new kinds of risks to which the banks were exposed. During 
1986 the US Federal banking agencies proposed a risk-based capital measure that 
would take into account differences in risk among financial institutions, as well as off- 
balance sheet items. 
In 1987, new risk-based capital rules were proposed based on a joint US/UK 
agreement in an attempt to encourage co-ordination among supervisory authorities 
from major industrial countries. Nevertheless, the scope of the international effort 
was further expanded with the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and 
Supervisory Practices. 89 With the Basle agreement in July 1988, this Committee has 
proposed a new system of risk weightings and capital definitions, which requires from 
banks to achieve a certain ratio of capitalisation for risk-weighted assets. Specifically, 
all assets are divided into categories, and each category is given a weight according to 
its perceived related risk. All riskless assets, i. e. government bonds, are excluded 
from the risk asset base, while commercial loans are counted as its entirely as risky 
assets. Next, each asset is multiplied by its related risk factor, and then the total risk 
of the risk-adjusted assets is related to the bank's capital. 90 The capital itself is 
classified into two categories: Tier I, consists of equity capital and published 
accumulated profits; and Tier II consists of medium- and long- term subordinated debt 
instruments, general provisions and unpublished profits. The ratio of capital to risk- 
weighted asset must continuously be at least 8%. In the case where a bank does not 
satisfy the above requirements, the regulator must ask the bank to be recapitalised to 
the minimum level, and if this does not occur the regulator must either sell or 
88 The objective of these two capital ratios is first to ensure that the capital of an institution is regarded 
as acceptable by its depositors and other creditors (gearing ratio), and second to test the adequacy of 
capital in relation to the risk of losses which may be sustained (risk asset ratio). 
89 This Committee, set up, in 1975 is established by the central bank governors of Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US. 
90 Off-balance sheet items are firstly transformed into balance items by the use of conversion ratios, and 
then the risk weights are applied to the converted values. 
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liquidate the bank, depending on which is cheaper. These requirements have come 
into effect in most major industrial countries by the beginning of 1993. 
The Basle risk-asset ratio has been criticised on the grounds that is suffers from 
several drawbacks. First, there is almost no measure of portfolio risk. Second, it is 
based on historical cost accounting, so that assets are unlikely to reflect their true 
market value. Third, because it is based on balance sheet information it does not 
adjust quickly to new information. Finally, it is designed to measure banks' 
creditworthiness and says very little about the bank's potential exposure to short-term 
liquidity problems [Tirole (1993)]. 
In an attempt to capture market risk, the Basle Committee in 1996 has amended the 
Basle Accord by setting new minimum capital requirements for a bank's market risk 
exposure. These requirements have come into effect in 1998. Under these new 
requirements a bank must separate its long-term investments from its trading book, 
where trading book refers to the position taken with a view to re-sale or short-term 
profit91. In addition, in 1997 the Committee has published a set of principles for the 
assessment and management of interest rate risk. 
Further to the above the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) has been implemented in 
EU member countries in the beginning of 1996. The Directive sets out the minimum 
capital requirements for credit institutions and investment firms for the market and 
other associated risk. The CAD has also been amended to come in line with the Basle 
amendment. 92 
Turning now to the literature on capital adequacy regulation, it is clear that the most 
important question is whether increased capital standards increase or decrease banks' 
risk. Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), and Rochet (1992) 
use a mean-variance framework and show that improper risk weights may increase the 
riskness of banks. They also suggest that the probability of bank's failure (insolvency 
91 The bank's trading book position in debt, equity and derivative securities as well as commodity and 
foreign exchange positions held by the bank are subject to market risk capital requirements. 
92 See chapter 2 section 3 for a detailed analysis. 
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risk) may increase as a result of an increase in the capital standards. Nevertheless, 
they show that this distortion disappears when the regulators use market-based 
measures of risk. 
Following a different approach Furlong and Keely (1989) and Keely and Furlong 
(1990) examine the case of a value-maximising bank. They show that a bank with 
publicly traded stock that maximises its portfolio will never increase portfolio risk as 
a result of increased capital standards. The key feature of their analysis is that under 
flat-deposit insurance, the bank will take more into account its prospective portfolio 
losses after an increase in capital. These results contrast evidence from mean- 
variance utility maximisation models. Gennotte and Pyle (1991), again with the use 
of a value-maximising model, show that both the portfolio risk and the possibility of 
bank failure may increase after an increase in capital requirements. 
Recently, Blum (1999) indicates that the previous literature concentrates on the static 
effects of capital adequacy, and does not take into account the dynamic perspective of 
banking business. He shows that in a dynamic model with incentives for assets 
substitution, capital requirements might actually increase risk because under binding 
capital regulation there is a reduction in bank's profits. If bank's future profits are 
lower then there is no incentive for banks to avoid default. Further, these 
requirements raise the value of the bank's equity (leverage effect). Hence the bank 
must invest in more profitable -but more risky- assets, and for raising the amount of 
equity tomorrow it might be optimal to increase risk today. 
From the above, we can say that there is no consensus in the theoretical literature on 
the impact of increased capital requirements on portfolio and insolvency risk. The 
results of the empirical literature are contradicting. The empirical examination merely 
tests whether risk-based capital requirements induce banks to shift their portfolios 
away from highly to lower risk-weighted assets. Evidence from the US suggests that 
banks have dramatically adjusted their portfolios towards assets in the low weight 
class (government securities and home mortgages) and away from high weight class 
(business and commercial loans). Some studies suggest that this alteration came as a 
result of the changes in capital requirements [Breeden and Isaac (1992), Haubrich and 
Wachtel (1993), Thakor (1993,1996)]. Nevertheless, the conclusions as to whether 
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this shift from one class to the other has been caused by changes in the capital 
requirements are somewhat controversial. Relevant studies provide at least more two 
different explanations for the reallocation of bank's portfolio. The first one is the 
implementation of leverage requirements by US regulatory authorities that mandates 
banks to hold capital of at least a certain percentage of unweighted assets [Syron and 
Randall (1992), Furlong (1992), and Shrieves and Dahl (1993)]. Second banks 
voluntarily have reduced their risk by having safer portfolios in 1990s as a result of 
the loan losses and commercial estate problems during the 1980s [Hancock and 
Wilcox (1992), Berger (1995b)]. On the other hand, UK banks did not alter their 
portfolios. Instead, they have achieved adjustments in their capital ratios primarily by 
directly boosting their capital [see Ediz, Michael and Perraudin (1998)]. 
To conclude we can say that capital is widely believed to reduce the bank's incentive 
to choose riskier asset. Nevertheless, some suggest that capital requirements may be 
ineffective to act as a controlling tool of bank risk, and might even influence the bank 
to choose riskier assets, while others have argued that capital requirements are less 
effective in determining bank risk than it is widely believed. 
6.3 Deregulation and Bank Performance 
In the previous section we have examined different regulatory tools together with the 
relevant literature. Going through the regulatory requirements, there is evidence that 
in most countries the business of banks did not change significantly from the late 
1940s to the 1970s. The major reason relates to the strict regulatory framework 
followed by each country. However, in the 1980s we have witnessed a revolution in 
both banking practice and banking theory, due to an international deregulation pattern 
that has changed the nature of banking, and consequently its production and cost 
structure. Deregulation aims at liberalising the provision of services and making 
easier the entry of new banks in the market to increase market competition. 
This deregulation pattern have emerged mainly by two mutually reinforcing causes: 
1. increasing internalisation of financial and non- financial sectors, 
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2. existing regulation were largely set up for needs of the past, hence they could no 
longer satisfy the present financial needs. 
For a long time bankers have concentrated on the question of how to circumvent 
regulation and this search has led them outside national borders towards 
internalisation. Taking into consideration the particular features of banking, national 
regulation of banking industry is very difficult. Border controls and transportation 
cost do not constitute any barriers because unlike goods, money can be transported 
virtually without any cost, and to some extent, invisibly. When all countries were 
heavily regulated, this did not constitute a problem. However, as soon as some 
countries opened their financial markets international competition occurred, which 
eventually led to a competition among the regulators. Several regulators saw the 
dangers of business outside domestic financial centres, so the need for regulatory 
adaptations was deemed necessary. In addition, the internalisation of financial 
transactions made it inevitable to establish an extensive prudential practice to ensure 
that bank's foreign operations do not escape from supervision. 
Simultaneously with the search for circumventing regulation during the 1980s, there 
has been an increase of globalisation of the world economy. The major developments 
that have contributed towards internalisation can be summarised as follows. First, the 
growth of international trade outpaced production growth, and over time national 
economies have become more trade dependent. Also, reduced capital controls in 
certain countries made it possible for investors to take advantage of international 
differences in performance, and freedom to enter and exit home and foreign currency 
markets. Furthermore, the benefit of diversification of foreign assets in reducing the 
overall portfolio risk is dictated by modern portfolio risk theory. Finally, in the last 
two decades increasing shares of private wealth are managed by institutional 
investors, who seek to diversify risk though international portfolio management. All 
these factors made reduced controls and regulation both necessary and acceptable. 
Deregulation transformed the banking industry. Geographical barriers have been 
lifted, both in Europe and US, and competition and consolidation activities have risen 
considerably. There have been changes in capital requirements, interest rates ceilings, 
reserve requirements, along with changes in technology. These fundamental changes 
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are likely have had important consequences on industry costs, efficiency and profits, 
and the economic environment. Nevertheless, quantification of these changes has 
been fairly elusive. 
Berger and Humphrey (1992) find that during 1980-1984 banks experienced increased 
cost, primarily due to the deregulation of deposit rates that resulted in an increase of 
competition in the deposit market. The increase in cost was larger for smaller banks, 
which might indicate that smaller banks rely more heavily on deposits in contrast to 
the larger banks. On the other hand, during 1984-1988 the authors find a decrease in 
the average cost for all bank sizes, suggesting that the effect of deregulation was 
exhausted. 
Berger and Mester (1997) compare cost, profit efficiency and productivity during 
1980s and 1990s. Their results suggest that large banks have shown a considerable 
decline in profit efficiency due to changes in the bank business environment, as total 
cost has increased during both periods due to changes in the business environment. 
On the other hand, profits increase during both periods, with the entire change 
reflecting increased profit productivity. Contrary to the above results, Humphrey and 
Pulley (1997) find that large banks have experience a rise in their profits from the 
1977-1981 to the 1981-1984 period, due to a shift in the profit function and to 
changes in the business environment. Small banks are found to increase slightly their 
profits from one period to the other. The increase in profits continues and in the post- 
deregulation period for both groups of banks, but can be essentially attributed to 
changes in the business environment. 
Finally, in a recent study Berger and Mester (1999) use data from the 1990s and find 
evidence of a decline in cost productivity and any increase in profit productivity. The 
authors suggest that banks nowadays provide a variety of new financial services, such 
as mutual funds and derivatives. At the same time they provide higher quality 
services, with extensive ATM networks and branching, and have increased the 
availability of debit and credit cards. All these services trigger additional costs, but at 
the same time generate additional revenues. 
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6.4 Methodology 
Our goal is to determine whether there have been changes in bank cost, efficiency and 
profits for the period from 1983 to 1995 after the deregulation in the UK. Changes in 
cost and efficiency are reflected in the actual industry operating plus interest cost, 
whereas regarding profits, changes are reflected by standard bank profitability 
measures, namely return on assets and return on equity. Following changes in 
regulation, bank profits, costs and efficiency are mainly influenced by two factors: 
9 Internal factors: bank initiated adjustments in output prices and use of input, to 
altered regulatory structure. 
" External factors: contemporaneous changes in banks' business environment, 
reflected in variations in output quantities, input prices, and other included 
variables. 
To capture these effects on profits and costs, an indirect profit function, is estimated 
together with a cost function, to capture the effects on cost and efficiency. Further, 
the internal and external factors are separated to identify the potential effects of 
regulatory changes on banks' profits and costs efficiency. 
To separate these two types of effects and determine both the relative importance of 
bank-initiated adjustments as well as the length of the adjustment period we have to 
make an assumption about the competitive structure of the industry. The standard 
methodology assumes perfect competition, where output and input prices are taken as 
given and banks' responses are limited to changes in input and output quantities. 
However, the assumption of perfect competition may not be valid in actual banking 
industry, where banks are able to exercise local market power for certain deposits and 
loan services. Furthermore, banks have the ability to differentiate intertemporally 
output prices among customer groups, across geographic areas and over time. Hence, 
we shall examine the role of both output prices and quantities based on an alternative 
assumption of imperfect competition. Under this approach banks have some control 
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over output price, whilst output and input quantities comprise the external 
environment. 
Based on the Humphrey and Pulley (1997) methodology, an indirect profit function is 
estimated, to separate the internal (bank-initiated) adjustments from external changes 
in banks' business environment. This separation will enable us to identify the major 
impact of changes in regulation on bank profit and technology. In addition, the same 
methodological specifications are going to be applied in each period's cost functions. 
The effects of regulation on bank efficiency are going to be estimated by utilisation of 
cost frontiers. This approach uses a cost function to measure how close a bank's cost 
is to what a best-practice bank's cost would be for producing the same output 
quantities when facing the same market prices of inputs. 
6.4.1 An Indirect Profit Function under Imperfect Competition 
In its general form, the indirect profit function is derived under the assumption of 
price taking behaviour in both input and output markets, i. e. perfect competition. 
However, the structure of banking industry is not characterised by perfect 
competition. As already mentioned, banks are able to exploit local market power for 
certain deposit and loan services, and have the ability to alter output prices among 
customer groups, and over time. 
In the case of deposits, local market power evolves mainly from the desire of 
consumers to turn deposits into cash at low cost and, most importantly, to use local 
banks to obtain local acceptability of cheques for everyday transactions. In the case 
of loans, local market power rests on the role of banks as delegated monitors of 
customers: banks minimise transaction costs by monitoring loans and signalling in the 
context of asymmetric information. The generation of private information about loan 
customers is too costly to be reproduced by other lenders. 
Although the competitive market assumption cannot be accepted, we cannot either 
accept the opposite model, monopoly. Under monopolistic conditions, input prices 
are determined exogenously, whereas output prices and quantities and determined 
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endogenously. Thus, the profit function is insufficient to represent bank profit 
decisions. 
Therefore, a model that describes bank's profits best must lie somewhere between the 
two aforementioned models. Under such a model banks can exercise a form of 
market power in choosing output prices [Humphrey and Pulley (1997)]. 
The problem now is to model the banks' mix of price taking and price setting 
behaviour. We start with the assumption that banks consider output as being 
exogenously given, as they have greater flexibility with regard to output prices than 
with output levels. "Deposit output expands through growth in the local market, 
through mergers and acquisitions, or through use of purchased funds. All three offer 
only limited flexibility to bank managers in attempt to maximise profits over the 
intermediate term. Balance sheet equalities provide similar restrictions on loan 
outputs. 993 Consequently, we assume that banks do not focus on adjusting output 
quantities, but on negotiating output prices, to maximise profits. 
More specifically, we assume that banks maximise profit, 'r, for given quantities of 
output, y, and input prices w, by choosing output prices p, along with input quantities 
x. The associated indirect profit function is given by: 
'=P'Q=; c (y, w, Z) (6.1) 
where: 
P=(p, w), 
Q= (y, -x)' = vector of netputs 
z=a set of variable expected to influence profitability. 
The major benefit of this profit function is that it gives an appropriate specification 
under market power, as it reflects the bank's assessments of its competitive position 
and its assessment of the willingness of the customers to pay the prices that the bank 
wishes to charge. 
93 Humphrey and Pulley (1997) p. p. 8. 
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Here, we adopt the composite specification of Pulley and Breunstein (1992), and 
Pulley and Humphrey (1993,1997). The general composite profit function associates 
a quadratic structure for output with a log quadratic structure for input prices. Output 
quantity and input prices are linked through interaction terms, and so separability is 
not imposed. The general composite profit function is represented by: 
; r(O) = {(a0 +a. Z. +2: aiy! +2 
ýýajVyjy, +ýý/, 'ikylwk) (6.2) 
* exp(E Sk wk + 
2: 2: Skl wk WI 
WO) +C 
where: 
;r= the profit measure, 
c X13, y, 8= independent parameters, 
wk, wj, = price of input k and 1, 
y; yj = outputs i and j, 
z=a set of variable that is expected to influence profitability, 
e= the error term, 
and (0) refers to the Box-Cox transformation 94 and represents an application of the 
"transform-both-sides" (TBS) to increase flexibility of the model. The application of 
Box-Cox transformation to the dependent variable and to the entire right hand side of 
the profit function, excluding the error term, preserves the composite structure of the 
model. 
94 The Box-Cox transformation was first introduced by Box and Cox (1964). In some cases, researchers 
may have a large amount of information about variables to be included in a particular relationship, but 
face lack of information about the precise form of the relationship. The Box-Cox transformation is 
used as a device to let the data determine what functional form is more appropriate. By transforming 
some of or all the variables in a relationship, a new set of functions is generated, with one particular 
member of this set being defined by specifying a particular value(s) of the transformation parameter(s). 
The functional form determined by the data is the functional form defined by the estimated value(s) of 
the transformation parameter(s). 
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Equation (6.2) can be viewed as a flexible second-order approximation to a wide class 
of specifications. In this model there is no logarithmic transformation with respect to 
input prices; while the logarithmic transformation applied to input prices makes the 
composite function easily restricted to be linear homogeneous in input prices (as 
required theoretically of an indirect cost function), the alternative indirect profit 
function does not require homogeneity. Therefore, we report the results without the 
logarithmic transformation. 
As far as the variables in z are concerned, they are expected to influence profitability, 
and their effects are specified to be linear and neutral with respect to output and other 
variables. Although this specification allows to test the relationship empirically, 
adding a full set of second order terms for the variables in z together with the 
interaction terms with outputs is likely to increase multicollinearity. So it has been 
necessary to delete the second-order input price coefficient in equation (6.2) due to 
lack of input variability [see Berger, Humphrey and Pulley (1997), and Humphrey and 
Pulley (1997)]. 
Hence, the specification for the indirect profit function becomes: 
ßc4) . {(a0 +1: amzm +1: a1Yr +22: 2: aý; y, yj). exP(Eßkwk)}(0) +c (6.3) 
By replacing output quantity with output prices in equation (6.3) the specification of 
the model will become a standard profit function. Nevertheless, since banks are 
viewed as price takers in output quantities and input prices, and price setters in output 
prices and input quantities, the introduction of output prices in the model should not 
contribute substantially to the model's explanatory power. The reason is that the 
effect of output prices is assumed to be reflected through estimated coefficients. And 
last, but not least, output prices are difficult to be measured. 
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6.4.2 Estimating the effects of changing regulation on bank's profits 
The composite profit function (6.3) is separately estimated for three-time periods: 
1. the pre-deregulation period, 1983-1987- Period 1 
2. the concurrent period, 1988-1992 - Period 2 
3. the post regulation period, 1993-1995 -Period 3 
Following Berger and Mester (1997a), Humphrey and Pulley (1997), and Berger and 
Mester (1999) we decompose the profit index into technological changes, reflecting 
bank initiated adjustments, and changes in the business environment. Accordingly, 
the following ratio is estimated: 
_ 
(ß+ , 
X, )(ß, X 
t+1) = 
(Qr+1 Xt+, )(ß, X, 
+1) (6.4) ýt+t l ; rt = A+tXt+i l QtXt - (ßrXt+t(ßß+tXt) (ßtXi+, )(ßßXt 
where: 
, ßt = estimated parameters of the profit function at period t, where t=1,2,3, 
Xt = values of the variable at period t. 
A change in ,6 
from period to period will reflect bank initiated adjustments in deposits 
and loan output prices and use of labour, and capital, in response to regulation. A 
change in X, value of the variables, from period to period represents changes in the 
business environment, reflected in variations in output quantities, input prices, and 
other included variable, thus structural adjustments to regulation. 
Firstly, we estimate the ratio of predicted profits for banks (; r, +, /, c) for periods 1 to 2 
and 2 to 3. Normalising, period 1 equal to unity any divergence from this, comprise 
increase or decrease due to either changes in technology and/or changes in the 
business environment. However, the source of profit changes can be seen more 
clearly when the profit index is decomposed into the associated changes in technology 
and business environment. For example, from equation (6.4), the decomposition of 
the profit index for changes from period 1 to 2 is: 
162 /ill = /-'2X2 
/ß)X1 (6.5) 
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6.4.3 Specification of the cost function 
The cost function relates variable costs to prices of variable inputs, the quantity of 
variable outputs and random error, as well as inefficiency. Mathematically, this can 
be represented as follows: 
TC1r = C, (Yr, wit) err (6.6) 
with its logarithmic transformation given by: 
1nTC;, =1nC1(Y,.,, w,, )+Ine1, (6.7) 
where: 
TCG1 = total cost (operating and interest cost) for bank i at time t, and 
Ct (Y;,, w,, ) =a cost function at time t with output quantity vector Y for bank i at 
time t and input price vector w for bank i at time t, where t=1,2,3. 
The term E;, is treated a composite error term, which accounts partly for inefficiencies 
and partly for random error. 
A translog specification will be applied to estimate the cost function because as it is 
mentioned in the previous chapters, the translog specification overcomes the main 
drawbacks of the other major cost functions (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). 
Accordingly, when the minimum total cost function (cost frontier) is translog, then the 
bank's observed total cost is the following95: 
95 We estimate bank efficiency for our three sub-periods using the stochastic frontier approach (see 
chapter 4). 
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ßkYk+! E» 1nw; lnwj+ 1nTC=ao+I: a11nw; +Z 
i=1 k=I i-1 j-1 
1Zt Skc In Y' In Yc +EEz; k In wj In Yk +u+v (6.8) 2 k=1 S=1 i=1 k=1 
where: 
w;, wj, = price of input i and j, 
Yk YY = outputs k and ý, 
TC = total cost, 
v; = random error, where vi N(0, av) , 
U. = inefficiencies, where u, - IN(0, au )1, and 
ai, Bb yU, 8kj, z, k are independent parameters. 
6.4.4 Estimating the effects of changing regulation on bank's cost 
The cost function (5.3) is separately estimated for three time periods, corresponding to 
pre-deregulation, concurrent, and post regulation. Following Berger and Mester 
(1997a) and Berger and Mester (1999), the total change in industry costs over time 
may be decomposed again into two elements. The first reflects changes in the 
productivity, which are changes in cost for given business conditions, and the second 
gives changes in cost due to business conditions themselves, which are simply the 
exogenous variables specified in the cost function. 
Next, the following ratio is estimated: 
Cr+t / C, = ßr+t X r+t 
/A X= 
(ßr+t X 
r) * 
(, 8, 
+t 
X 
r+t) (6.9) 
where: 
Ct = the estimated `average-practice' cost function, which is estimated using all banks 
and embodies inefficiencies. 
ß' = estimated parameters of the cost function at period t, where t=1,2,3, 
X, = values of the variable at period t, including the inefficiency factor. 
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The first term on the right hand side of equation 6.10 represents productivity changes, 
i. e. changes in the productivity from period 1 to 2 is equal to: 
Productivity Changes = 
82 ` 1ý (6.10) 
, X, 
The second term on the right-hand side of (6.9) represents changes in business 
conditions, i. e. changes in the business conditions from period 1 to 2 is equal to; 
Business Conditions Changes =( 
18 Z `Y 2) (6.11) 
ZX, 
A change in ,3 from period to period will reflect bank initiated adjustments in deposits 
and loan output prices and use of labour and capital, in response to regulation. A 
change in X (value of the variables) from period to period represents changes in the 
business environment, and thus structural adjustments to regulation. A change in the 
scale of operation will be included to a change in business conditions for the cost 
function, since output quantities are included in the exogenous variables of the cost 
function. 
We estimate the ratio of predicted cost for banks (C, +i/C) for periods 1 to 2 and 2 to 
3. After normalising period 1 equal to unity, an increase or decrease is due to either 
changes in productivity and/or changes in the business environment. However, the 
source of these cost changes can be seen more clearly when the cost index is 
decomposed into the associated changes in technology and business environment. 
The results obtained from estimating equations (6.10)-(6.11) are presented in section 
6.6. 
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6.5 Data Description 
Following the major regulatory changes in the UK during the late 1980s and early 
1990s (see Chapter 1) we -consider the 1988 to 1992 period as the concurrent 
regulatory time interval. Accordingly, we have divided the data into three sub- 
periods: 
1.1983 to 1987 is considered as the pre-deregulation period, 
2.1988 to 1992 is considered as the concurrent period, and 
3.1993 to 1995 is considered as the post-regulation period. 
The empirical analysis uses the same data set as the previous chapters. As far as the 
variables utilised is concerned, a brief description is given below. 
For measuring the bank profits, two profitability ratios are used, the return on assets 
(ROA) and the return on equity (ROE). Return on assets is the ratio of net income 
divided by total assets and measures the efficiency with which total assets are 
employed within a firm. Return on equity is the ratio of net income to shareholders' 
equity, and it appraises the efficiency with which common shareholders' equity is 
being utilised within the firm. These are the most commonly used profitability 
measures in the previous literature. 
The inputs selected are labour (x1), and physical capital (x2). Labour is measured by 
the total number of employees at the end of the time period, while physical capital by 
the net book value of total fixed assets. The price of labour (wi) is derived by taking 
the total expenditure on employees and dividing it by the number of employees. A 
proxy for the price of capital (w2) is calculated by dividing the total expenditure on 
fixed assets, with the net book value of fixed assets. The two outputs used in the 
current study, all measured in pounds, are Total Deposits (Y1), and Total Loans (Y2). 
We also include a set of two control variables, contained in vector z, known within the 
banking industry to affect profitability. The first one is a risk measure (RISK), which 
is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. The second control variable 
is the size variable (TA) represented by the logarithm of total assets of each individual 
bank to control for differences in size and to capture the ability of banks to diversify. 
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6.6 Empirical Results. 
6.6.1 Effects of deregulation on profits 
To estimate the indirect profit function the non-linear least square estimation method 
is applied. The composite profit function (6.3) is separately estimated for three time 
periods noted above, pre-regulation, concurrent, and a post-regulation, allowing the 
coefficients to vary to reflect changes in profits, technology and business 
environment. Both ROA and ROE are utilised as depended variables, but because 
both estimates obtained are quiet similar, only those produced by ROE are 
presented. 96 Table 6-1 presents the coefficients obtained after the estimating the 
indirect profit function, equation (6.3), for each period. 
Table 6-1: Parameter estimates for the three sub-periods. 
Variables Post-regulation Concurrent Pre-regulation 
1993-1995 1988-1992 1983-1987 
Constant -0.366 -0.540 0.353 
(0.16) (0.71) (0.19) 
RISK -0.172 -0.040 -0.381 
(0.23) (0.05) (0.15) 
LTA 0.045 0.039 0.9E-02 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) 
Y, -0.014 0.019 0.010 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Y2 0.014 -0.017 -0.015 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Y1Y1 0.2E-02 0.4E-02 -0.6E-02 
(0.9E-02) (0.3E-02) (0.1 E-01) 
Y2Y2 0.2E-02 -0.2E-02 -0.4E-02 
(0.7E-02) (0.4E-02) (0.01) 
Y1Y2 -0.5E-02 -0.3E-02 0.8E-02 
(0.02) (0.6E-02) (0. O2) 
wi -0.7E-03 0.9E-02 -0.1l -02 
(0.6E-03) (0.3E-02) (0.9E-03) 
w2 0.038 0.121 -0.479 
(0.07) (0.35) (0.48) 
Notes: (1) Standard errors of estimated parameters are shown in parcntliescs/ * significant 
with 95% confidence interval. 
`'6A problem that we faced during the estimation procedure, was convergence of coefficients. Because 
of differences in the magnitude of the variables, deposits and loans were scaled down by a factor of -6. 
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From the estimated coefficient attained from equation (6.3) and the values of the 
variables we next estimate equation (6.4) to obtained changes in profit, technology 
and business environment. Table 6-2 presents the results. 
Table 6-2: Changes in Profit, Technology, and Business Environment. 
Changes in Period 1-2 Period 2-3 
PROFITS I TI, / 71 0.980 nI / n, I . S41) 
Technology (32 /ß1 0.841 P3 /(32 1.087 
Business Environment X, / X1 1.166 X3/ X, 1.425 
From Table 6-2 we observe that profits drop during the period when changes in the 
regulation took place, while there is a substantial increase afterwards. Specifically, 
the rate of actual profit of banks (n, +, / n, ) for periods I to 2 was 0.98 showing a two- 
percent decrease. Going to next period, the post deregulation period, the profits 
became 1.54, indicating a rise of 56 percent compared to the previous period. "[lie 
finding are consistent with Berger and Mester (1997,1999) who find evidence that 
following the deregulation in 1980s US banks experienced improvenlents in 
profitability during the 1990s. 
In order to see more clearly the underlying source of these profit changes, we must 
consider the decomposed profit index. The decomposition of the index shows 
changes in the technology, as reflected in the profit (Unction coefficients A1,, and 
changes in the business environment observed in the profit function data X. 
Considering periods 1 to 2, if the business environment is held constant, then changes 
in technology would have generated a profit ratio of 0.84. However, actual profits 
indices were 0.98, implying that the business environment increases f roan 0.84 to 
0.98, which is accomplished by a corresponding ratio of busincss environment index 
of 1.166. On the other hand, if technology is held constant the profit index would 
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have rise by 0.16. Hence, the reduction in profit from period one to period 2 is the 
result of a change in technology (%31,01) by changing deposit and loan prices and the 
use of labour, and capital in response to changes in the regulation (and by changes in 
the coefficients of variables in z). The effect of a changing business environment in 
terms of deposit and loan quantities, input prices, and the variables in z, helps to 
reduce the decrease in profits from period 1 to 2. Nonetheless, the changes in 
technology have a greater effect on profit. It is clear that the new regulatory 
requirements, such as new capital and risk requirements, and the liberalisation of 
capital movements between countries has resulted in a decrease in industry's profits. 
These results contrast the determinants of profits during period of regulatory changes 
with the post-regulation period. Here the profit index jumps by 54%, but this increase 
is entirely due to changes in business condition (X3 * X2). If technology is held 
constant, business environment would increase profit by 42%, whereas if business 
environment were held constant profit would increase only by 8%. The effect of 
technology was relative small from the second to the third period, and this suggests 
that benefits of banks' structural adjustments to deregulation have been essentially 
achieved by 1993. Only between periods 1 to 2 there was a strong positive effect on 
profits from changes in technology. However, we must note that during this period 
there was a recession in the UK economy (see Chapter 1, section 3). Hence the 
reduction in banks' profits may not be solely correlated with changes in the 
regulation. 
The results obtained from the current study are consistent with those of Humphrey 
and Pulley (1997). Although their data sample is from a totally different market (US) 
they find that during the transition period, i. e. from the pre-deregulation to the 
concurrent period, the rise in profits has been the result of a shift in the profit 
function, of changing deposit and loan prices, and of changes in the use of labour, 
capital and funding inputs in response to deregulation. On the other hand, shifts in the 
profit function did not account for the rise in banks' profits for the post deregulation 
period. Instead, the authors find that this rise was due to higher levels of deposits, 
loans and other assets, and changes in input prices, i. e. technological changes. 
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6.6.2 Effects of deregulation on costs and efficiency 
The cost function in equation (6.8) is estimated for the three-tinme periods, using the 
normal half-normal model. According to this model, random disturbances li0llow a 
normal distribution and inefficiencies, consistent with the stochastic frontier approach, 
follow a half normal distribution. A maximum likelihood procedure was used liar the 
estimates. Table 6-3 shows the coefficients obtained aller estimating the cost 
functions (6.8) for the three periods. 
Table 6-3: Parameter estimates for the three sub-periods. 
Variables Post-regulation 
1993-1995 
Concurrent 
1988-1992 
Pre-regulation 
1983-1987 
Constant 2.702 2.569 
-3.423 (3.01) (2.34) (2.00) 
W, -0.587 -0.267 -1.282 
_..... 
(0.99) 
......... 
(0.66) (0.75) 
W2 0.429 -0.787 0.162 
(0.59) (0.32) (0.40) 
Y1 -2.654 -0.200 -0.361 
(0.33) (0.63) 
Yz 2.216 0.584 0.131 
(1.10) (0.41) (0.7(1) 
Y3 (nil) (fill) (nil) 
W1. W2 0.262 0.086 0.12o 
(0.23) (0.10) (0. I. 1 ) 
Y1. Y2 0.158 -0.376 -0.045 
........ .. 
(0.40) (0.07) (l ). l2) 
Y1. Y3 -0.009 -0.002 0.024 
(0.11) (0.01) (0.27) 
Y2. Y3 0.008 0.006 -0.008 
(0.12) (0.01) (0.06) 
w1. w1 -0.084 0.115 0.110 
(0.23) (0.12) (0.19) 
w2. w2 (nil) -0.109 (niI ) 
(0.04) 
Y1. Y1 -0.185 0.217 0.10111 
(0.26) (0.05) (0. o1)) 
Y2. Y2 0.061 0.198 0.00 7 
(0.15) (0.03) ((). u5) 
Y3. Y3 0.005 (nil) (fill) 
(0.004) 
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w1. Yi 2.363 0.236 -0.014 
(0.56) (0.14) (l) 2ý) 
WI X2 -2.417 -0.276 0.140 
(0.58) (0.14) (0.2-1) 
w1. Y3 -0.049 -0.01O 0.020 
(0.07) (0.16) 
w2. Y1 -0.111 0.0446 -0.1 1U 
(0.15) (0.06) (0. I ýº) 
w2. Y2 0.131 0.0151) 0.072 
(0.15) (0.06) (0. I O) 
W2. Y3 -0.058 0.005 -0.020 
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 
Notes: (1) Standard errors of estimated parameters are shown in parentheses/ * significant 
with 95% confidence interval. 
(2) Certain variables are excluded, due to high multicolinearity. 
Table 6-4 presents the total changes in cost, productivity changes, changes in business 
conditions, and changes in average efficiency for pre-, concurrent, and post- 
deregulation periods from estimating equation (6.9). 
Table 6-4: Changes in Cost, Productivity, Business Environment, and Ffliciency. 
Changes in Period 1-2 Period 2-3 
Total Costs Cz / C, 1.132519 C, /C, 1.455199 
Productivity P2 /ß] 0.848679 [13 1/111 8379 1.038371) 
Business Conditions X2 / XI 1.33445 X, /X. 1.401414 
Average efficiency (x-eff2 - x-eff1) 5°o (x cft x-eFf") -? ", ý) 
As can be seen fron Table 6-4 the total predicted cost ot'producing hank's output rose 
by 45% between the first period to the third. Cost rose by thirteen percent lrorn 
period 1 to 2, and by another 32% from period 2 to 3. The increase in cost ti-o, n 
period I to 2 justifies the reduction in profits liar the sine time interval. On the other 
hand, consistent with Berger and Mester (1997,1999), between period 2 toi .3 there 
is 
an increase in both cost and profits, in approximately the same manner. 'Ibis, in turn, 
suggests that profit margins of the industry have remained constant despite the 
increase in the competition from non-bank rivals and I reign competitors ;, fier the 
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liberalisation of financial services. To gain a better idea on the driving forces of these 
increases in cost we decomposed the changes in cost to changes in productivity and 
changes in the business environment, and we consider changes in the average 
efficiency of the industry. 
Considering first productivity, cost declines by an average of 15% from period one to 
2, indicating that banks on the frontier have shifted on average towards less costly 
production, and at the same time the dispersion from this frontier has decreased. 
These results are in line with the changes in efficiency, from which for the same 
period we have an increase of 5%. It is clear in the light of the Single European 
Market and the new capital requirements, banks changed their use of labour and 
capital, as well as the prices of loans, deposits, and securities investment. 
Nevertheless, cost productivity decreased from period 2 to 3. This comes as a 
surprise since the effect of regulation would be expected to reduce cost in light of a 
more competitive environment. These findings are consistent with efficiency 
estimates, as well as with the profits results. As we saw from the previous section 
structural adjustments to deregulation were essentially achieved by 1993, as the 
effects of banks' initiated adjustments were relatively small for the last sub-period. 
Looking at the business condition changes in Table 6-4, we can see that they generally 
worsened from early 1980's to mid 1990's. It is obvious that the increasing patter 
cost followed over the last thirteen years has been due to changes in the business 
environment. 
Considering now efficiency, the first period average is 73%, for the next sub-period it 
amounts to 78%, and for the last period to 76%. From period 1 to 2, there is an 
increase in efficiency of five percent, suggesting better utilisation of inputs. However, 
after the deregulation there is a slight decrease of 2%. Nevertheless, the efficiency 
estimates give a measure of the dispersion of the banks from the best-practice 
frontiers for the three sub-periods, where these frontiers are supposed to be different 
for each period. The decrease in efficiency estimates for period three may not 
indicate that banks are using more resources to produce a given level of output than 
before. Instead, the decrease may be due to frontier improvement. 
256 
Chapter 6 
Possible explanations for this cost increase may be the competitive pressure which led 
banks to increasing output quality, which in turn raised costs. Furthermore, the 
increasingly competitive environment led to an increase in the number of mergers, 
and thus to a more concentrated market. This may have left banks temporarily in a 
disrupt production process and at higher cost levels. Also, due to concentration, as we 
have seen from the previous chapter firms with market power purposely may engage 
in some activities that increase cost more than revenues; such activities will result in 
lower measured cost efficiency, and in turn increase total cost. Another reason might 
be that new capital requirements change the structure of balance sheets resulting in an 
at least temporal cost increase. Apart from regulation, technology has launched new 
products and this has changed the banking business. However, their fixed costs may 
have not been yet recovered. 
6.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have investigated the changes in costs, profits and efficiency for the 
UK banking industry following changes in the regulatory framework. We based our 
analysis on the cost and profit concepts, which are superior to other measures (like 
ratios of cost to input or output to input), since they are derived from economic 
optimisation in response to relative prices rather than optimisation based on physical 
technology [Berger and Mester (1999)]. 
Following the relevant literature, we firstly focus on the major regulatory tools 
currently in use in the banking industry. Regulation could be classified into five broad 
types: deposit interest rate ceilings, entry, branching, network, and merger restrictions, 
portfolio restrictions, deposit insurance, and capital requirements. Deposit rate 
ceilings are imposed to limit inter-institutional competition for deposit as a mean of 
reducing deposit costs. On the other hand, branching and network restrictions 
together with merger restrictions are imposed in an attempt to limit concentration, 
leaving few banks with high market shares. Portfolio restrictions, deposit insurance 
and capital requirements are imposed as a mean of reducing bank's risk. 
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Secondly, we present a summary review of the studies on the effect of deregulation on 
bank's performance. The general conclusion from these studies is that both profit and 
cost increased with the new banking structure. An explanation for this phenomenon is 
the better quality along with more costly services they now provide. 
As far as our results are concerned, we find that productivity and efficiency increases 
from pre-deregulation period to concurrent, whereas business conditions for banks' 
cost worsen from one period to the other followed by a reduction in banks' profits. 
Increasing competition, new competitors in the market, and new technology, have 
adversely affected costs- and profits as well. In the 1990s structural adjustments to 
deregulation have been achieved, as the effects of banks' initiated adjustments were 
relatively small for the post-deregulation period. However, the business environment 
continues to affect bank cost. Surprisingly, although the cost continues to rise, there 
is an increase in profits as well. This, in turn, suggests that profit margins of the 
industry have increased despite the increase in the competition from non-bank rivals 
and foreign competitors after the liberalisation of financial services. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Motivated by changes in the structure of the banking industry that took place during 
the last two decades, the current study has attempted to assess their impact on the 
costs and profits of UK banking industry by use of a new data set covering the period 
from 1981 to 1995. Since the bulk of the literature concentrates mainly on US market, 
the results from this study contribute to our understanding of the effects of regulatory 
and market changes on the performance of banking institutions in a leading European 
banking industry. Moreover, by utilising alternative methodologies we provide an 
insight into the robustness of the findings to different methodological specifications. 
In Chapter 1, we attempt to identify economic and market trends, as well as regulatory 
alterations that stimulated changes in the UK banking industry over the 1980s and 
1990s. Chapter 2 provides the theory of modem banking firm and outlines the rational 
for banks and banking regulation. We also focus in the definitional and measurement 
problems of bank input and output, accompanied by an extensive discussion of scale 
and scope economies, X-efficiencies, and market structure relationship in banking, to 
give an insight to the empirical test that follows. 
In Chapter 3 we estimate a cost function for UK banks using the translog specification 
and we investigate the presence of scale economies and cost complementarities. 
Motivated by the definitional problems on input and output specification in the 
current literature, two models are used: the first one classifies banks as intermediators 
of financial services, while the second is based on the value-added approach, where 
the identification of input and output is based on the share of value added. The results 
are found to be robust to the input-output specification. The findings indicate the 
existence of decreasing returns to scale, which implies the presence of diseconomies 
of scale for UK banks' during this period. Further, they suggest lack of cost 
complementarities at the beginning of the data period. On the other hand, following 
deregulation, there is evidence of scope economies in joint production in the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
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These results are somewhat different from previous findings in the literature, which, 
in turn, suggests that national markets and industries do not operate identically. 
Information obtained from estimating scale economies can be used to inform 
government policy by assessing the effect of deregulation on efficiency. Due to the 
existence of diseconomies of scale, mergers and acquisitions that lead to a more 
concentrated financial system may imply higher cost. Thus, government policies 
should be designed so as to control the growth of banks, as the latter may lead to 
operational inefficiencies. On the other hand, the existence of cost complementarities 
during the 1990s in joint production of loans and deposits, and loans and investments, 
shows that deregulation has benefited banks by increasing their penetration into new 
activities. This benefit is carried over to consumers in the form of lower prices, as 
competition increases between banks and other financial institutions. 
In Chapter 4 we test the X-efficiency of UK banks by estimating an efficient frontier 
and by measuring the average differences between observed banks and banks at the 
frontier. Recent literature suggests that X-efficiencies account for 20% or more of cost 
in banking whereas scale and product diseconomies only count for less than 5% of 
cost [Berger et al. (1993)]. In the current study we employ the stochastic econometric 
frontier approach based on its advantages over the other frontier methods [e. g. Berger 
and Mester (1997a), Berger and DeYoung (1997), Bauer et al. (1998)]. To test the 
effect of this assumption on the robustness of the results we estimate three models 
with alternative distributional assumptions. Empirical findings are in line with those 
of the current literature and indicate that X-inefficiencies account for 20 to 30 % of 
costs in UK banking. Moreover, the findings suggest that choices made concerning 
measurement techniques make very little difference in terms of average industry 
efficiency or rankings of individual firms. Finally, in line with the results of Berg et 
al. (1992), Zaim (1995), and Rogers (1998b) our results suggest that in the beginning 
of the 1990s UK banks started to realise the benefits from deregulation, which has 
helped banks to reduce their inefficiencies level. 
The question whether banks are efficient is of interest to managers and shareholders, 
as well as to customers and regulators. If these institutions become more efficient, 
then profitability will improve, greater amounts of intermediated funds will be 
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available and better prices and service quality for consumers will be obtained. Thus, 
banks become more viable and, therefore, the possibility of failure or being subject to 
take-over decreases substantially. 
In Chapter 5 we examine the relationship between market structure and profit 
relationship in the UK banking industry. Direct measures of both market structure 
and efficiency are included, while an innovation of the current study is the utilisation 
of different efficiency measures to test the sensitivity of the results. There is evidence 
that UK data support the structure conduct performance hypothesis and its `quiet life' 
addendum, while there is little support for the relative market power and efficient 
structure hypotheses. 
These findings reflect a setting of prices in more concentrated markets due to greater 
market power that is less favourable to consumers. They further indicate that banks 
with market power purposely engage in some activities that raise cost more than 
revenues, and such activities will result in lower measured cost efficiency. Any gains 
from the positive profit structure relationship will tend to be offset by this cost 
increase. This finding may explain the weak profit-structure relationship in the 
previous literature and in the current test. The policy implications arising from the 
results are that antitrust actions are likely to be socially beneficial, by moving prices 
towards competitive levels and allocating resources more efficiently. 
In Chapter 6 we examine whether deregulation has altered the profits, costs, and 
efficiency of UK banking institutions. The motivation for this study comes from the 
notion that the global deregulation of the banking industry that took place during the 
1980s is expected to have an effect on the performance of banking institutions. 
Nevertheless, these effects have been examined empirically by only a few studies, and 
no evidence is available for the UK. By dividing the data set into three sub-samples, 
namely pre-regulation, concurrent, and post-regulation periods, we find that 
productivity and efficiency increase from pre-deregulation period to concurrent, 
whereas business conditions for banks' cost worsen followed by a reduction in banks' 
profits. Increasing competition and new technology have adversely affected costs and 
profits. In the 1990s structural adjustments to deregulation has been essentially 
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achieved, as the effects of banks' initiated adjustments are relatively small for the 
post-deregulation period. However, the business environment continues to affect 
bank cost. Despite the continuously increasing pattern of cost after deregulation, 
there is an increase in profits as well. This, in turn, suggests that profit margins of the 
industry have increased despite the rise in competition from non-bank rivals and 
foreign competitors after the liberalisation of financial services. 
Finally, it is important to point out shortcomings in existing research that should be 
addressed and outline potential areas for future research. There is consensus in the 
literature that differences in frontier efficiencies among banks exceed inefficiencies 
attributable to incorrect scale or scope of output. Nonetheless, there is really no 
consensus on the preferred method for determining the best-practice frontier against 
which relative efficiencies should be measured. Given the existing parametric and 
non-parametric models the solution seems to be in the addition of flexibility to 
parametric approaches and the introduction of a random error into the non-parametric 
approaches: Furthermore, given the main methodological limitation of the existing 
cost and profit functions, more flexible functions should be derived in order to 
produce more accurate estimates. Considering the structure-profit relationship it is 
evident that market share, concentration and efficiency explain only partly the 
variation of profits. Hence, other factors such as portfolio choices and regulatory 
changes should be examined as well. Last, more research should be undertaken in the 
European banking industry, as most empirical work has until now concentrated in the 
US market. 
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